diploma of legitimate sovereignty, he only takes away the country upon which the latter has been exercising his right. He remains still what he was before, a king "by the grace of God," only he is now a king out of a situation. If he can, he is at liberty to find some other country where he can settle down and rule with undiminished legitimate sovereignty by the grace of God, and if he is successful in finding such a place, his gratitude to the grace of God ought to be exceptionally fervent this time. This distinction between the abstract right to govern and the concrete possession of a country to govern, is a necessary and elementary principle of the monarchical theory. Without this principle, the kings who conquer and annex the countries of other monarchs, would be the rankest revolutionists; without it, they would prove beyond the question of a doubt that their grace-of-Godness is a fraud, even in their own estimation, and they would show their people what they really thought of a legitimate monarch's claims to hereditary sovereignty, and how to go to work to oust such an one from his position. By the light shed by this principle of the separability of theoretical sovereignty from actual government, we are able to comprehend without difficulty how the house of Brunswick could be ruling England with full and legitimate authority, while the no less legitimate Stuarts were living in exile at St. Germain and Rome, and we can also understand how King Humbert can succeed Victor Emmanuel in Italy "by the grace of God," while Francis II. of Naples, has been amusing himself in Paris as best he can, for almost a quarter century, "by the grace of God."
But enough of these absurdities. It is not worth while to waste any time discussing seriously the divine origin of the monarchy, the only foundation upon which it relies at present, even to enter upon such a discussion
