Bruguier vs. the United States.
216, §80;) public officers acting as such; (Greenleaf, §§ 83, 92.) Proving the sale of intoxicating liquors is sufficient under the indictment without specifying any particular kind in proof. (Wharton's Cr. Law, Ist Vol., 622.) General verdict on two counts is good. (Am. Cr. Law, Vol. 1, 422; People v. Austin, Parker's Cr. Reports, 154.)
Kidder, J.—The statute upon which the indictment in this case was drawn, is as follows: "Every person, except an Indian in the Indian country, who sells, exchanges, gives, barters, or disposes of any spirituous liquors or wine to any Indian under the charge of any Indian superintendent or agent," etc., " shall be punishable," etc. 4 U. S. Stat, at Large, 564; vide also Stat, of June SO, 1834, § 70 and the 13 U. S. Stat, at Large, 29.
I. Is the offense a felony? If so, the judgment of the court below ought to have been arrested, because the act of selling should have been charged in the indictment to have been done feloniously.
The term felony appears to have been long used to signify the degree or class of crime committed, rather than the final consequence of its commission. In cases where the statute declares that the offender shall be deemed to have feloniously committed the act, it makes the offense a felony. The statute under which this prosecution is commenced does not use this phrase.
Offenses under the 21st section of the Postoffice Act of the United States, of 1825, for detaining, embezzling, stealing letters or remittances, (wherein the punishment is much more severe than in the case at bar,) are not felonies. See opinion of the Supreme Court in the case of the United States v. Lancaster,*[1] The cutting of timber on government lands has always been considered a misdemeanor.
Originally the word felony had a meaning well defined, but it has become vague and undefined, being controlled entirely by the statutes of different states. Acts of parliameht and
- ↑ *5 Wheat., 434; United States v. Mills, 7 Peters, 430.
