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JANUARY TERM, 1874.
53

Clark, et al vs. Bates, et al.


but no longer. The courts are just as much bound by subsequent events and treaties, so far as boundary lines are changed thereby, as they Would be by subsequent acts of Congress. The question of what is Indian country and what is to be treated as Indian country is a question to be determined by the courts with reference to the laws, treaties and facts pertaining thereto Congress has not the power to declare that to be Indian country which is not Indian country, and by such means exclude the citizens of the United States from the possession and occupation thereof, or from carrying on lawful trade and commerce therein under the general laws.

The positions and authorities taken and cited by the appellants upon the rule of damages are in no respect applicable to the case at bar. In this case an officer of the United States Government, authorized to seize the goods and property of citizens under certain circumstances, without process, and hold them until he notifies a United States Marshal, and until the Marshal appears with process to take and hold the goods (13 U. S, Statutes at Large, 29,) under the misapprehension that the circumstances authorized such seizure in this case, unlawfully seized and took the goods and property mentioned in the complaint from the plaintiffs, and notified the Marshal, who thereupon procured process and took possession of the same goods, and thereafter, finding the seizure by the defendants and himself unlawful, turned all this property back to the respondents. In such a case the rule must be that the plaintiff is entitled to recover the difference between the value of the goods when and where taken and the goods when and where returned, against any defendant, against whom an action of trespass can be maintained. And this principle is sustained by the authorities cited by respondent.

In the case of a levy of an attachment or execution without the connivance or aid of the original trespasser, for valid cause to satisfy debt, the law simply does that which the debtor should have done—applies the debtor's property to the payment of his debt; and when the law takes possession of it and applies it to this purpose it may be the same as if the