Page:Debates in the Several State Conventions, v1.djvu/458

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438
YATES'S MINUTES.

many will remain in the gift of the legislature. In either ease, it is necessary to shut the door against corruption, if otherwise, they may make or multiply offices in order to fill them. Are gentlemen in earnest when they suppose that this exclusion will prevent the first characters from coming forward? Are we not struck at seeing the luxury and venality which has already crept in among us? If not checked, we shall have ambassadors to every petty state in Europe; the little republic of St. Marino not excepted. We must, in the present system, remove the temptation. I admire many parts of the British constitution and government, but I detest their corruption. Why has the power of the crown increased, so remarkably increased, the last century? A stranger, by reading their laws, would suppose it considerably diminished; and yet, by the sole power of appointing the increased officers of the government, corruption pervades every town and village in the kingdom. If such a restriction should abridge the right of election, it is still necessary, as it will prevent the people from ruining themselves. And will not the same causes here produce the same effects? I consider this clause as the corner-stone on which our liberties depend; and if we strike it out, we are erecting a fabric for our destruction.

Mr. GORHAM. The corruption of the English government cannot be applied to America. This evil exists there in the venality of their boroughs; but even this corruption has its advantage, as it gives stability to their government. We do not know what the effect would be, if members of Parliament were excluded from offices. The great bulwark of our liberty is the frequency of elections, and their great danger is the septennial Parliaments.

Mr. HAMILTON. In all general questions which become the subjects of discussion, there are always some truths mixed with falsehoods. I confess there is danger where men are capable of holding two offices. Take mankind in general, they are vicious—their passions may be operated upon. We have been taught to reprobate the danger of influence in the British government, without duly reflecting how far it was necessary, to support a good government. We have taken up many ideas upon trust, and at last, pleased with our own opinions, establish them as undoubted truths. Hume's opinion of the British constitution confirms the remark.