I will add one word more, and I have done. This seems, Mr. Chairman, altogether to be aimed at the Senate. What have they done to chagrin us? or why should we attempt to abridge their powers, because we can reach them by our regulations in the shape of a bill? I think we had better let it alone. If the Constitution has given them this power, they will reject this part of the bill, and they will exercise that one privilege judiciously however they may the power of removal. If the Constitution has not given it to them, it has not vested it any where else; consequently, this house would have no right to confer it.
Mr. HARTLEY. I apprehend, Mr. Chairman, that this officer cannot be considered as appointed during good behavior, even in point of policy; but with respect to the constitutionality, I am pretty confident he cannot be viewed in that light. The Constitution declares the tenure of the officers it recognizes, and says one class of them shall hold their offices during good behavior; they are the judges of your Supreme and other courts; but as to any other officer being established on this firm tenure, the Constitution is silent. It, then, necessarily follows that we must consider every other according to its nature, and regulate it in a corresponding manner. The business of the secretary of foreign affairs is of an executive nature, and must consequently be attached to the executive department.
I think the gentleman from South Carolina goes too far, in saying that the clause respecting impeachments implies that there is no other mode of removing an officer. I think it does not follow that, because one mode is pointed out by the Constitution, there is no other, especially if that provision is intended for nothing more than a punishment for a crime. The 4th section of the 2d article says that all civil officers shall be removed on conviction of certain crimes. But it cannot be the intention of the Constitution to prevent, by this, a removal in any other way. Such a principle, if once admitted, would be attended with very inconvenient and mischievous consequences.
The gentleman further contends that every man has a property in his office, and ought not to be removed but for criminal conduct; he ought not to be removed for inability. I hope this doctrine will never be admitted in this country. A man, when in office, ought to have abilities to discharge the duties of it. If he is discovered to be unfit, he ought to be immediately removed; but not on principles like what that gentleman contends for. If he has an estate in his office, his right must be purchased, and a practice like what obtains in England will be adopted here. We shall be unable to dismiss an officer, without allowing him a pension for the interest he is deprived of. Such doctrine may suit a nation which is strong in proportion to the number of dependants upon the crown, but will be very pernicious in a republic like ours. When we have established an office, let the provision for the support of the officer be equal to compensate his services; but never let it be said that he has an estate in his office when he is found unfit to perform his duties. If offices are to be held during good behavior, it is easy to foresee that we shall have as many factions as heads of departments. The consequence would be, corruption in one of the great departments of government; and if the balance is once destroyed, the Constitution must fall amidst the ruins. From this view of the subject, I have, no difficulty to declare that the secretary of foreign affairs is an officer during pleasure, and not during good behavior, as contended for.
