ought to be resorted to (if it all) only in extreme cases of difficulty and danger, yet let it be remembered that usage, that immemorial custom, is paramount in every written obligation; and let us beware of engrafting this abuse upon the Constitution. A people who mean to continue free must be prepared to meet danger in person, not to rely upon the fallacious protection of mercenary armies.
Amendment to the Constitution.—Election of President of the United States.
Mr. C. PINCKNEY (of South Carolina) thought it a very dangerous practice to endeavor to amend the Constitution by making laws for the purpose. The Constitution was a sacred deposit put into their hands, they ought to take great care not to violate or destroy the essential provisions made by this instrument. He remembered very well that, in the Federal Convention, great care was used to provide for the election of the President of the United States independently of Congress, and to take the business, as far as possible, out of their hands.
On an Act laying Duties on Licenses, &c.
Mr. BIRD said, that he considered Congress as incompetent to transfuse into the state governments the right of judging on cases that occurred under the Constitution and laws of the federal government, as they were to transfuse executive or legislative power, derived from that Constitution, into the hands of the executive and legislative organs of the state governments.
Judiciary.—On Mr. Breckenridge's Motion to repeal the Act passed for a new Organization of the Judiciary System.
Mr. J. MASON. It will be found that the people, in forming their Constitution, meant to make the judges as independent of the legislature as of the executive; because the duties they have to perform call upon them to expound not only the laws, but the Constitution also; in which is involved the power of checking the legislature, in case it should pass any laws in violation of the Constitution. For this reason, it was more important that the judges in this country should be placed beyond the control of the legislature, than in other countries, where no such power attaches to them.
Mr. Mason knew that a legislative body was occasionally subject to the dominance of violent passions. He knew that they might pass unconstitutional laws; and that the judges, sworn to support the Constitution, would refuse to carry them into effect; and he knew that the legislature might contend for the execution of their statutes. Hence the necessity of placing the judges above the influence of these passions; and for these reasons the Constitution had put them out of the power of the legislature.
Mr. MASON, (of Virginia.) When I view the provisions of the Constitution on this subject, I observe a clear distinction between the Supreme
