165
of the judges, by declaring that their salary shall not be altered, and that their functions shall be inalienable.
[It is not universally correct, as supposed by the author, that the state legislatures can deprive their governor of his salary at pleasure. In the constitution of New York it is provided, that the governor “shall receive for his services a compensation which shall neither be increased nor diminished during the term for which he shall have been elected;” and similar provisions are believed to exist in other states.
Nor is the remark strictly correct, that the federal constitution “provides for the independence of the judges, by declaring that their salary shall not be altered.” The provision of the constitution is, that they shall, “at stated times, receive for their services a compensation which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office.”—American Editor.]
The practical consequences of these different systems may easily be perceived. An attentive observer will soon remark that the business of the Union is incomparably better conducted than that of any individual state. The conduct of the federal government is more fair and more temperate than that of the states; its designs are more fraught with wisdom, its projects are more durable and more skilfully combined, its measures are put into execution with more vigor and consistency.
I recapitulate the substance of this chapter in a few words:—
The existence of democracies is threatened by two dangers, viz: the complete subjection of the legislative body to the caprices of the electoral body; and the concentration of all the powers of the government in the legislative authority.
The growth of these evils has been encouraged by the policy of the legislators of the states; but it has been resisted by the legislators of the Union by every means which lay within their control.
