of Julian's theory is his Fourth Oration, in praise of the Sovereign Sun. The most striking feature of the theology proper of this system is its triple hierarchy of deities and worlds. Such a triple division was a common feature of neo-Platonism and had its roots in thoughts current before the Christian era; but it was no doubt emphasized by later theorists as a counterpoise to the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. That of Julian was probably borrowed from Iamblichus of Chalcis (uncle, it has been supposed, of his correspondent), to whom he frequently appeals in terms of the highest veneration (e.g. Or. iv. p.146 A, 150 D, 157 D; see Ueberweg, Hist. of Philosophy, § 69, vol. i. pp. 252–254, Eng. trans.).
According to this belief there are three worlds informed and held together by three classes of divine beings. The highest and most spiritual is the κόσμος νοηρός, or "intelligible world," the world of absolute immaterial essences, the centre of which is the One or the Good, who is the source of beings and of all beauty and perfection to the gods who surround him (p.133 C). Between this highly elevated region and the grosser material world comes the κόσμος νοερός, or "intelligent world," the centre of which is the sovereign sun, the great object of Julian's devotion. He receives his power from the Good, and communicates it not only to the gods around him, but also to the sensible world, the κόσμος αἰσθητός, in which we live. In this sphere the "visible disk" of the sun is the source of light and life, as the invisible sun is in the intelligible world. Any one who will read this oration with care will be convinced that Julian wished to find in his sovereign sun a substitute for the Christian doctrine of the second person of the blessed Trinity, and this appears in particular on pp.141,142 (cf. Naville, p.104; Lamé, pp. 234 ff.). The position specially given to the sun is a proof of the advance of Oriental thought in the Roman empire, and it was certainly no new idea of Julian's. Amongst others, Aurelian and Elagabalus had made him their chief divinity, and Constantine himself had been specially devoted to the "Sol invictus." Julian, we have seen, had from his childhood been fascinated with the physical beauty of the light. Towards the close of the century we find Macrobius arguing somewhat in the spirit of some modern inquirers that all heathen religion is the product of solar myths. Yet it is curious to observe the shifts to which Julian is put to prove this doctrine out of Homer and Hesiod, and from the customs of the ancient Greeks and Romans (pp. 135–137 and 148 ff.). He seems, indeed, conscious of the weakness of his arguments from the poets, and dismisses them with the remark that they have much that is human in their inspiration, and appeals to the directer revelations of the gods themselves—we must suppose in the visions which he claimed to receive (p.137 c).
The connexion of this theory with the national gods is nowhere distinctly worked out. It is, in fact, part of the pantheistic character of this belief, that the idea of the personality of the gods recedes or becomes prominent, like the figures in a magic lantern, according to the subject under discussion, without any shock to the dreamy neo-Platonist. At one time they are mere essences or principles, at another they are Zeus, Apollo, Ares, etc., ruling and directing the fortunes of nations, and imposing upon them a peculiar type of character and special laws and institutions. At one moment they are little more than the ideas of Plato, at another they are actual δαίμονες, acting as lieutenants of the Creator. This last view is in essentials the same as that put forward by Celsus (probably in the reign of Marcus Aurelius) in his book, known to us from its refutation by Origen (bk. v. cc. 25–33). It is the view asserted at length by Julian in his books against the Christians, especially as a defence of the customs and institutions of antiquity against the innovations of the religion which strove to break down all prejudices of class and nation. (St. Cyril. adv. Jul. iv. pp. 115, 116, 130, 141, 143, 148, etc.; cf. Fragmentum Epistolae, p. 292 C, D, ἄνθρωποι τοῖς γενεάρχαις θεοῖς ἀποκληρωθέντες, οἳ καὶ προήγαγον αὐτούς, ἀπὸ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ τὰς ψυχὰς παραλαμβάνοντες ἐξ αἰῶνος; for the subject generally, see Naville, c. iii. "Les Dieux Nationaux.") It is easy to see how fatal such a doctrine must be to moral progress. If everything is as it is by the will of the gods, no custom, however revolting, lacks defence. It is strange that, after the refutation of this absurdity by Origen, any one should have been bold enough to put it forward as a serious theory (cf. Orig. contra Celsum, v. cc. 25–28 and 34–39).
With regard to the relation of images and sacrifices to the gods, who are worshipped by these means, there is an interesting passage in the Fragment of the Letter to a Priest (pp. 293 ff.). He warns his correspondent not to consider images as actually receiving worship, nor to suppose that the gods really need our sacrifices. But he defends their use as suitable to our own bodily condition ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἡμᾶς ὄντας ἐν σώματι σωματικὰς ἔδει ποιεῖσθαι τοῖς θεοῖς καὶ τὰς λατρείας, ἀσώματοι δέ εἰσιν αὐτοί, p. 293 D). "Just as earthly kings desire to have honour paid them and their statues without actually needing it, so do the gods. The images of the gods are not the gods, and yet more than mere wood and stone. They ought to lead us up to the unseen. And yet being made by human art, they are liable to injury at the hands of wicked men, just as good men are unjustly put to death like Socrates, and Dion, and Empedotimus. But their murderers afterwards were punished by divine vengeance, and so have sacrilegious persons manifestly received a due reward in my reign" (pp. 294 C to 295 B).
(2) Defence of Pagan Morality.—We have already described at some length Julian's attempts to raise the morality of his heathen subordinates, especially in the priesthood. He was conscious of a defect, and strenuously set himself to remedy it, though he could do little more in the way of quotation of texts than allege a few general maxims drawn from ancient writings as to kindness to the poor, etc. His strongest argument is one that might well have made him hesitate—the shame of being so much outdone by the "Galileans." Another branch of this subject was the relation of
