the Syrian, and to conserve intact the special interests of Great Britain in Arabia, where steps had already been taken by the British towards bringing about a rising by the emir of Mecca. Sykes had become an enthusiast for Lord Kitchener's pro-Arab policy, and in negotiating the agreement with France he laboured to render possible the ultimate establishment of Arab independence, even in Syria. So far as he succeeded he had in the main to thank M. Picot's fixed disbelief in the possibility of such independence. Sykes was sent to communicate the draft agreement to M. Sazonof at Petrograd and to the Grand Duke Nicholas in the Caucasus; and on 16 May it was duly signed by the three governments and kept secret. It assigned definite spheres of interest to each of the signatory powers: to Russia, the north Armenian and the south Kurdish provinces, to beyond Trebizond on the west; to France, Cilicia and Cappadocia, with the south Armenian provinces down to Aintab, and the Syrian littoral; to Great Britain, southern Mesopotamia with Bagdad, and the ports of Haifa and Jaffa. The zone between the French and British territories was to be placed under Arab sovereignty, and Palestine was to be subjected to a special régime, the details of which were reserved for future settlement. Commonly spoken of since as the ‘Sykes-Picot Agreement’, this pact has focussed unfair criticism upon the British representative, who was acting under orders at a moment of danger to the continuance of the Entente, while neither an Arab rising nor a British conquest of Palestine and Syria seemed likely to happen. At any rate the settlement thus arrived at enabled the British to go forward without let or hindrance in the war against the Turks.
Henceforward Sykes was attached to the Foreign Office, and used as chief adviser on Near Eastern policy, with special reference to the Arab revolt. Twice (1916 and 1917) he was sent out to Egypt to consult with the military command and the Arab bureau, and he accompanied M. Picot to Jidda in May 1917, in order to persuade King Husein of the reality of the Entente, and to secure some reasonable agreement about prospective Arab claims. A habit of reading his own thoughts in the minds of others, and a politician's instinct for scoring quickly, made him an unsafe negotiator with purposeful Orientals; but usually he won their affection, and he will be remembered by Arabs not only as a champion of their nationality, but as the inventor of the quadricolor flag under which they marched to Damascus, and under which the Hejaz was subsequently ruled. In spite of his fervent Catholicism he was converted early to Zionism, which he believed to be a just cause, likely to serve England well with Russia and the United States, and not inconsistent with British pledges to the Arabs. He was employed at home throughout the autumn of 1917 to prepare public opinion for the Balfour declaration (November 1917), and no one became more popular with Zionist leaders. From the Foreign Office he was able to dictate the general tenor of the proclamation issued by General Allenby on his entry into Jerusalem (December 1917), as he had already dictated that read by General Sir Stanley Maude [q.v.] at Bagdad. With characteristic disregard of self-interest he refused from first to last all honours for these or other war services.
During the first half of 1918 Sykes exerted influence at home to impose a pro-Zionist direction on the administrative policy of General Allenby in Palestine, and to minimize difficulties raised by the French about a further British advance. When Syria had fallen into British hands, and friction was imminent between the French administration in the coastal province and Feisal's administration in the interior, he asked to be sent out again on a roving commission. He was in Jerusalem when called upon to seek re-election to parliament for Hull; but despite his absence he was returned by an overwhelming majority, his wife acting for him throughout. Finally, he established himself at Aleppo, where he hoped to reconcile French aims with those of the Arabs, and also to serve the cause of the refugee Armenians—a people which he held to have been betrayed by the terms of the armistice with Turkey. By his earnestness and prestige he triumphed that winter, as few men could have done, over the disadvantages of his anomalous advisory position in territory occupied but not administered by the British; and never did he render better or more strenuous service. But the consequence was that when, in January 1919, he procured his recall, in order to lay the state of affairs in Syria before the British government, he was physically enfeebled. He halted in Paris where his wife, joined him. The Peace Conference had already assembled, and he began honestly and fearlessly to state facts unpalatable alike to French chauvinism and to British optim--
523
