at Portsmouth, on the grounds that ‘it must be meant for Captain Samuel Hood,’ and that it was not convenient for him to accept the command, doubtless owing to his recent marriage. In due course he was told that the commission was intended for his brother; but his biographers have imitated the mistake of the admiralty, adding that he commanded the Thunderer for the next three years.
In December 1763 Hood was appointed to the Katherine yacht. On 23 Sept. 1766 he succeeded Sir Charles Saunders as treasurer of Greenwich Hospital, but continued in command of the Katherine till December 1777, when he was appointed to the Robust of 74 guns, one of the fleet under Keppel in the following year, in the action off Ushant on 27 July, and in the autumn cruise. In his evidence before the court-martial on Keppel [see Keppel, Augustus, Viscount], Hood, who had been in Palliser's division, and felt himself implicated in the attack which had been made on Palliser, showed a bias against the commander-in-chief. When the Robust's log was called for, Hood admitted that it had been altered by his directions after the court-martial was ordered. The log, he said, had in the first instance been written up carelessly, and ‘when he found it was likely to be produced in court, he judged it proper to revise and correct it.’ The alteration was no doubt ill-judged; but the court accepted his explanation. Public opinion, which then ran in favour of Keppel, was not so lenient, and the word ‘hooded’ came for a short time into general use as an epithet applicable to false testimony. Any one conversant with ships' logs of that date will, however, accept Hood's opinion that ‘log-books, kept in the manner that ships' log-books are, ought not to be implicitly taken as evidence’ (Minutes of the Court-martial on Admiral Keppel, p. 27).
After the court-martial Hood resigned the command of the Robust, was reappointed to the Katherine, and continued in her till promoted to be rear-admiral of the white, on 26 Sept. 1780, the same day on which his brother was made rear-admiral of the blue. In September 1782, after the death of Rear-admiral Kempenfelt, he was appointed to a command in the grand fleet under Lord Howe, and hoisted his flag on board the Queen of 90 guns, in which he took part in the relief of Gibraltar and the skirmish off Cape Spartel. In the general election of 1784 he was returned to parliament as member for Bridgwater, but was shortly afterwards elected member for Buckingham. On 24 Sept. 1787 he was promoted to be vice-admiral of the white, and in the following year was nominated a knight of the Bath. During the Spanish armament in 1790 he hoisted his flag for a short time on board the London, as fourth in command of the fleet assembled at Portsmouth; he was also appointed rear-admiral of England. In February 1793 he was appointed second in command of the Channel fleet under Lord Howe; he hoisted his flag in the Royal George, and on 12 April 1794 became admiral of the blue; but continuing in his command, had a full share in the operations culminating in the action of 1 June 1794. For his services on this occasion he received the gold medal and chain, in common with the other flag-officers, and was on 12 Aug. 1794 created a peer of Ireland, under the title of Baron Bridport of Cricket St. Thomas in Somerset. During the following autumn and spring, though occasionally at sea, he remained for the most part at St. Helens. In June 1795 it was requisite to convoy the expedition to Quiberon [see Warren, Sir John Borlase], and in consequence of Howe's failing health the command temporarily devolved on Lord Bridport. With fourteen sail of the line, of which eight were three-deckers, under his immediate command, he sailed from St. Helens on 12 June, and, having parted from Warren on the 19th off Belle Isle, remained on the coast as a measure of further security against the French fleet, which he supposed to be still at Brest. It was, in fact, in his immediate neighbourhood, had chased the small squadron under Cornwallis only two days before [see Cornwallis, Sir William], and was sighted by Warren on the evening of the 19th. He immediately sent off a despatch-boat to Bridport with the intelligence, and followed with his own squadron, which included three ships of the line. He did not, however, succeed in joining Bridport, and on the morning of the 22nd the two fleets were in sight of each other. The French were inferior both in numbers and force, and still more in efficiency; the ships were for the most part in very bad condition, the men were neither sailors nor gunners, and the officers were equally ignorant of tactics, seamanship, and discipline. Aware of this, the French admiral, Villaret-Joyeuse, was unwilling either to fight or fly, and attempted to retreat leisurely and in good order. But with his officers good order was unattainable, and by daylight on the 23rd the leading English ships were up with and among the rearmost French. A partial action followed, resulting in the capture of three French ships, overwhelmed by numbers, and unable, from want of training, to make any efficient resistance. That their whole fleet was not taken or driven on shore is attributed by French
