Thus far of the Cartesian Method in its prior half, and in its application. But in order accurately to fix the character of the Method of Descartes, we must take into account its latter or final part.
VI. As in the prior half of his Method Descartes seeks principles, and makes the discovery of such the terminating point of his Analysis; so in the latter half he proceeds from principles, making the most remote conclusions from these the terminating point of his Synthesis.
The regulative principle of the Cartesian procedure in the establishment of the reasons of individual phænomena is the relation of truths as Reasons and Consequents. From what is given intuitively, he essays to reach by demonstration the extreme limits of Philosophy, that is, to construct a system of reasons. It is thus that, though Descartes recommended and practised a return to observation and experiment in the interest of Philosophy, his mode of reaching the highest principles of Science is far from being identical with the Baconian. This and the Cartesian are, in truth, at opposite poles. With Bacon, the highest principles of Science are merely the most extensive generalizations, and form the terminating point of his investigation. With Descartes, on the contrary, the highest laws are ungeneralized, are in themselves, and independently of any elaboration, principles of universal extent, and form the starting-point of demonstration.
