native above the adventitious. In this respect the Philosophy of Descartes and that of Locke are at opposite poles. Locke's extreme, indeed, was principally determined by the opposite extreme of Descartes.
Idealism, when taken in its narrower sense, and not as equivalent to Rationalism, is merely a special form of the latter; for it denotes the doctrine according to which matter is merely an educt from mind. Rationalism, in this special manifestation, is involved in Cartesianism; for it follows, from the denial of the contemporaneousness of the knowledge of mind and matter, and the ascription of priority to the knowledge of mind: and such ascription of priority is made by Descartes to the virtual exclusion of the possibility of the knowledge of matter. The process by which Descartes essays to demonstrate the existence of matter is, of course, paralogous. All modern Idealism has its source in Descartes.
The Rationalist and Ideal tendency of Cartesianism is manifested in higher development in Malebranche, Spinoza, Leibnitz, Berkeley, the Leibnitzian Wolf; and, indeed, in the general tenor of the Philosophy that prevailed in the Schools of Europe until the complete ascendancy of Empiricism, through the Essay of Locke, on the death of Wolf in 1754. From this period Cartesianism, as a system or body of philosophical doctrines, gave place to the Sensuous Philosophy of Locke, which, in its turn, was the prevalent philosophy until exhausted in Hume. Since then
