De Ruyter they possessed an admiral of consummate skill and heroic character. He took up an anchorage at Schooneveld and stood on his guard. On the 28th of May Rupert and d’Estrées, believing that De Ruyter was too much afraid of their superior numbers to venture to sea, sent in a squadron of light vessels and fire-ships to attack him, but he took the offensive at once, scattering the light squadron, and falling with energy on the rest of the fleet, which, not being in expectation of a vigorous assault, was taken at a disadvantage. On this occasion the English placed the French in the centre, in order to avoid such a separation as had taken place in the battle at Southwold Bay. But the disposition made no difference in the result. De Ruyter concentrated on the van and centre of the allies, and in spite of his great inferiority of numbers was able to be superior at the point of attack. The allies were compelled to retreat, and De Ruyter, satisfied with having averted the invasion of his country, anchored at West-Kappel.
Seven days later, on the 4th of June, a second encounter took place. The French were now placed in the rear of the line as it engaged. The Dutch admiral, who had the advantage of the wind, fell on the English in the van and centre. His inferiority in numbers did not allow him to push his attack quite home, but he inflicted so much injury that the allies were forced to return to the Thames to refit. At the end of July the allies again appeared off the coast of Holland, bringing four thousand soldiers in the war-ships and two thousand in transports. De Ruyter’s fleet had been raised to 70 vessels, but the allies had also been reinforced and were 90 strong. On the 11th of August the Dutch admiral kept in the shallow waters of the coast looking for a favourable opportunity to attack. On the 11th of August the wind, which had been westerly, turned to the S.E., giving him the weather gage. The French division was leading, and De Ruyter fell furiously upon the English in the centre and rear. The French were kept in play by a small squadron under Bankert, while De Ruyter drove Prince Rupert in the centre out of the line, and in the rear Cornelius van Tromp fought a desperate duel with the English rear division commanded by Sir E. Spragge. The two admirals engaged in a species of personal conflict, and each was compelled to shift his flag to another vessel. While Sir E. Spragge, whose second flagship was shattered by the Dutch fire, was on his way to a third, his boat was sunk by a cannon shot and he was drowned.
The defeat of the allies was undeniable, and a violent quarrel broke out between them. Want of money, and the increasing violence of popular opposition to the French alliance, compelled the king to withdraw from the war. Peace was made in the following spring.
In this war, which presented no features of a creditable kind, the loss to English commerce from Dutch cruisers was so great that it was found necessary to suspend the clause of the navigation act which forbade the purchase of foreign-built vessels.
As England withdrew from her alliance with Louis XIV., the other powers of Europe, frightened by the growth of the aggressive French power, began to come forward to the support of Holland. The coalition then formed continued the struggle till 1678. But the war was conducted mainly on the land. The French king, who knew that his fleet was not as yet capable of meeting the Dutch single-handed, was content to withdraw his ships from the North Sea and the ocean. The Dutch, who had to pay subventions to their German allies, and to support a large army, could spare little for their fleet. For some time they willingly confined themselves to efforts to protect their commerce from French privateers. In 1674 a revolt of the people of Sicily against their Spanish rulers gave the French king an opportunity of seizing the island. Spain, unable to defend its possessions single-handed, appealed to the Dutch for naval help. In September 1675 De Ruyter was sent into the Mediterranean with 18 sail of the line and four fire-ships. The force was inadequate, but it was all that Holland could spare. The Dutch admiral, who was hampered rather than helped by his Spanish allies, did his best to make good his weakness by skilful management. He cruised off Messina to intercept the supplies which were being brought to the French garrison by a fleet of 20 sail under the command of Abraham Duquesne. Conscious that he must spare his small force as much as possible, he abstained from such vigorous attacks as he had made in 1672 and 1673. When Duquesne appeared on the 7th of January 1676 near the Lipari Islands, De Ruyter allowed them to get the weather-gage, and on the 8th of January waited passively for their attack. The French, with more recklessness than was usual with them in later times, bore down on their enemy courageously but in some disorder. Their leading ships were severely mauled, and their whole force so crippled that they could make no pursuit of the Dutch when they drew off, their injured ships being towed by the Spanish galleys, in the late afternoon. Duquesne was able to reach Messina and join the French ships at anchor there. De Ruyter made his way to Palermo, which was in the hands of the Spaniards. One of his vessels sank on the way and he was reduced to 17. It is true that his allies provided him with 10 ships of their own, but the Spanish navy had sunk to abject inefficiency. Their commander, the marquis of Bayona, arrogantly insisted on occupying the centre of the line with his worthless squadron instead of allowing his ships to be scattered among the Dutch for support. When on the 22nd of April the allies, 27 strong, met the fleet of Duquesne, 29 ships, off Agosta, they attacked from windward. De Ruyter, who led the van, was mortally wounded. The Spaniards in the centre behaved very ill, and no victory was gained. The serious fighting was, in fact, confined to the vans of the two fleets. After the battle the allies retired to Syracuse, where De Ruyter died, and where their ships were mostly destroyed by the French a month later. Reinforcements sent out from Holland were stopped in the Straits of Gibraltar and blockaded in Cadiz. The French remained masters of the Mediterranean. In the meantime, however, angry disputes had arisen between France and England. King Louis XIV. enforced his belligerent rights at sea with as much disregard of neutral interests as was shown by England in later times. His naval officers insisted on making prize of all Dutch-built vessels found under the English flag. In 1678 war seemed imminent between France and England. King Louis then withdrew his soldiers from Sicily, and made the peace of Nijmwegen.
Authorities.—For the English side, see Naval History of England, by Thomas Lediard (London, 1735); Memorials of Sir W. Penn, by Grenville Penn (London, 1833); The First Dutch War, 1652–1654, edited by S. R. Gardiner for the Navy Record Society (1899). For the Dutch side: Het Leven un Bedryf van den Heere Michiel de Ruiter, by Gerard Brandt (Amsterdam, 1687); Geschiedenis van den Nederlandsche Zeewegen, by J. C. de Jongke (Haarlem, 1858); Annales des Provinces-Unies, by J. Basnages de Beauval (The Hague, 1726). For the French side; Abraham du Quesne et la marine de son temps, by A. Jal (Paris, 1873). For the small Spanish share; Armada Española, by Captain Cesareo Fernandez Duro (Madrid, 1895–1901). For critical studies of these wars the reader may be referred to Naval Warfare, by Rear-admiral P. H. Colomb (London, 1899), and The Influence of Sea Power upon History, by Captain A. T. Mahan. (D. H.)
II. Operations on Land
The contemporary military history of Europe included, first, the war between France and Spain, 1654–59, usually called the Spanish Fronde, of which the most notable incident was the great battle of the Dunes fought on the 14th of June 1658 between the French and English under Turenne and the Spaniards under Condé, in which a contingent of Cromwell’s soldiers bore a conspicuous part. About the same time a war was fought in northern Europe (1655–60), celebrated chiefly for the three days’ battle of Warsaw (28th, 29th, 30th July 1656), and the successful invasion of Denmark by the Swedes, carried out from island to island over the frozen sea (February 1658), and culminating in a long siege of Copenhagen (1658–59). Between the second and third wars of England and the United Provinces came the short War of Devolution (1667–68)—a war of sieges in the Low Countries in which the French were commanded chiefly by Turenne. In 1668 the French under Condé made a rapid conquest of Franche-Comté. This was, however, given up at the peace. The war of 1672–78, the first of the three great wars of Louis XIV., was fought on a grander scale.
