to the Kne Contich-Bouchrmt, where civilian labourers and recruits had dug some rough trenches. 1
Meanwhile, along the Scheldt, the enemy's attitude was becoming more and more aggressive in the efforts to gain the crossings at Baesrode, Termonde and Schoonaerde. The situation of the Belgian 4th Div., on a front of 18 m., began to be serious. There lay the gravest danger which threatened the Belgian army that of being invested in the fortress. The 6th Div., which with the 3rd Div. still held the fort line between the Willebroeck canal and the Scheldt, now received orders to cross the Scheldt at Tamise to reinforce the 4th Div. and safeguard the army's communication with the west.
Withdrawal of tlie Belgian Field Army. -The defence troops were becoming extremely fatigued, the bravest among them being daunted by the uninterrupted bombardment and the persistent feeling of helplessness in the face of the weapons which had pulverized forts and lines of defence in succession. Soon the enemy would be bringing up his batteries to bombard the city itself. If it had taken only a week to reduce the prin- cipal line of resistance constituted by the modern forts on the S. of the Nethe, still less would suffice to break up the old forts of the inner line. The fortress could now offer no prolonged resistance. Moreover, all hope of linking the Antwerp front with that of the Franco-British armies had to be abandoned. Two new English naval brigades, recently formed, had arrived in the fortress on the 5th, bringing the effective of the Royal Naval Div. up to 10,000 men; a French naval brigade had been moved from Dunkirk to Ghent and the British 7th Div. and 3rd Cavalry Div. under Gen. Rawlinson had landed at Zeebrugge and Ostend. Had these troops arrived a few days earlier a combined operation- against the left wing of the besieging force ' might have changed the face of the war. But it was too late. As Mr. Churchill said:" A week earlier, the result would have been a certainty ... a little later 200,000 men could not have carried the operation through."
On the one hand, the Germans were threatening the line of retreat through Termonde. On the other, liaison with the Allies was compromised, for the German right wing in France was now hardly more than 30 m. from the sea, whereas the distance from
the Nethe to Nieuport was 85 miles. This being so, one con- sideration now dominated all others the Belgian army must avoid being surrounded. On the evening of Oct. 6 the King decided to separate the lot of the main body of the army from that of the fortress, and gave orders to cross to the left bank of the Scheldt during the night of the 6th-yth. The troops were then to continue their march westward. It was high time, for, on the 7th, the Scheldt was forced at Schoonaerde, the Germans making every effort to throw back the 4th Div. on Lokeren.
The fortress was still to be defended to the utmost by Lt.- Gen. Deguise, the governor. The garrison proper (personnel of the forts and fortress troops) with the 2nd Div. and the British Naval Div., some 50,000 men, were more than enough to do what could be done with the remains of the fortress.
The Final Resistance. On the 6th Fort Broechem, battered all day by four 30- 5*3 and two 42-cms., had been put out of action and dismantled. The improvised line Aertselaer-Contich- Bouchout was merely a row of light shelter-trenches, lacking in depth and with both flanks in the air. General Deguise con- sidered it too risky to commit his forces, very inferior as they were, to a determined defence of this exposed position. 2 He therefore placed the 2nd Belgian Div. and the English Div. on the line of forts No. i to No. 8. These two divisions stoically endured there the usual bombardment throughout the days of the 7th and 8th. Meanwhile the main body of the Belgian army
1 The German official account criticizes the inactivity of Gen. Paris in not seizing the opportunity offered by the success at Ringen- hof. Whether this criticism be well founded or not it shews that the position at that moment was regarded by the German command as critical.
2 On the night of the 6th the German line ran from a point S. of Fort Broechem, along the Little Nethe and in advance of the Nethe, to a point about I m. W. of Duffel Station. The Marine Div. was still short of the general alignment, not having crossed the river. On its left, the 4th Ersatz Div. faced the line of the south-western forts, of which Fort Breendonck was beginning to be subjected to bombardment. The left of the 4th Ersatz Div. was at St. Amand and Baesrode on the Scheldt, in touch with the forces operating at and above Termonde. On the extreme right, detachments were advanc- ing in the direction of Massenhoven redoubt arid Santhoven.
(C. F. A.)
E3 German positions
covering Brusssls
p -"
. ta
jj German advance last
Belgian divisions at outset of attack.
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SIEGE OFANTWERRI9 GENERAL MAP
Position of German left wing70ct Germanlineand movementsSOct Movements of GermanleftloOct.
