The Conference, further, revealed the weakness of the existing
system of political intercommunication. It was shown that the
Declaration of London, which involved important questions of
maritime law of vital interest to communities separated by thou-
sands of miles of sea from Great Britain, had been approved with-
out any consultation with or even notice given to the dominions.
The excuse was that the dominions had not been parties to the
Hague Conference; and that the Declaration of London had
been the outcome of the proceedings of that body; but the British
Government adopted a very apologetic tone and readily en-
dorsed a resolution that, in future, the dominions should be given
the opportunity of considering the matter before the signing of
any convention which might affect their interests by the British
delegates at the Hague Conference; and this same general rule
should, as far as possible, hold good in the negotiation of other
international agreements.
The anomalous character of the British Empire was well illustrated by the adoption of a resolution which was, indeed, the logical sequel of the action of Lord Salisbury in 1897 in connexion with the grant of a fiscal preference by Canada to British goods; but was none the less of a centrifugal character. It was agreed that in cases in which a British commercial treaty with a foreign Power bound the dominions, negotiations should be opened with the object of securing liberty to any of them to withdraw from the operation of such treaty, without impairing its validity with regard to the rest of the Empire. In some cases foreign Powers were unwilling to agree to such a proceeding; so that the only alternative was the denunciation by Great Britain of a treaty which otherwise it might be in her interest to retain.
Apart, however, from details, the Imperial Conference of 1911 'did important work in cementing the intangible links connecting the different parts of the British Commonwealth. In the words of General Botha, it called into life " that friendship which must lead to cooperation, and better cooperation than we have had in .the past."
Towards the end of 1911 Sir Wilfrid Laurier's long period of rule in Canada came to a close, the Liberal leader suffering defeat .at the general election which took place over the question of trade reciprocity with the United States. In Ontario, whatever may have been the case elsewhere, the contest was fought as one connected with the maintenance of the British connexion; and the triumph of the Conservatives was hailed as a manifestation of imperial loyalty. The new Prime Minister, Sir Robert Borden, had for some years consistently maintained the view that, whilst .a more generous contribution by Canada to the needs of the imperial navy was necessary, such contribution must involve a real partnership in the decision of those questions of foreign policy on which might depend the issues of peace or war. For the time being he was satisfied with the undertaking of the British Government that a Canadian representative would al- ways be welcome at meetings of the Imperial Defence Committee, tut it was obvious that this could not be the final solution of the problem. Sir Robert's attempt to give substantial help to the British navy by the gift of three battleships failed, it is true, through the action of the Canadian Senate in rejecting the meas- ure; but the political claims which went along with the proposed gift were soon to find a partial fulfilment, the tremendous efforts put forth by the dominions in the World War forbidding, in any case, a simple return to the practice of the past.
On the purely naval and military side of the question, indeed, the results of the war might seem to vindicate the past policy. Dominion statesmen pointed with pride to the action of the little Australian navy, which, at the outbreak of war, promptly gave its services to the capture of the German colonies in the Pacific, whilst it was forthwith placed under the British Admi- ralty. The question of separate navies was for a long time a bone of contention between British naval experts and dominion public men, but it seems now impossible to contest the principle, though as late as 1918 the British Admiralty continued to advocate a single navy, under a single naval authority. In military matters the development of an imperial general staff and improvement
in military education had gone on, under the scheme initiated by Lord Haldane in 1909. Congenial ground was afforded for military reforms by the system of compulsory military training prevailing in Australia and New Zealand, a system which in the former country had been introduced by the Labour party. One may admit that the successes of the dominion troops in the war were mainly due to the individual initiative and valour of the rank-and-file and yet recognize the merits of the machinery through which these worked.
The independent character of the various portions of the Empire was well illustrated by the different attitudes they took up towards conscription, the Parliaments of New Zealand and of Canada, in spite of the hostility of the province of Quebec, having adopted it, whilst the people of Australia at two referenda refused its endorsement.
From the political standpoint, however, the situation was less satisfactory. The British Empire had gone to war in 1914 with- out the dominions having any voice in the decision. The circum- stances, indeed, with regard to the violation of Belgian neutrality were so manifest as, in this particular case, to prevent the pos- sibility of discussion; but, in the event of trouble in the future, the casus belli for the whole Empire may not always be so clear. It was obvious, then, that there was a real weakness in the sys- tem, requiring a practical remedy.
No Imperial Conference was held in 1915, owing to the exigen- cies of the war; and when it met in 1917, and again in 1918, it was accompanied by a new organ of government, of extreme signifi- cance. The Imperial War Cabinet was not, indeed, a Cabinet in the strict use of the word; because it had no direct executive authority, and because a majority at its sittings could not bind a dissentient minority; but, for practical purposes, it fulfilled the functions of a Cabinet, in concentrating upon a single objective the whole moral and material strength of the scattered Empire. It was hoped that an instrument which had proved so useful for the purposes of war might give the solution to the problem of the Empire in times of peace; such being the expectation of Mr. Lloyd George and of Sir Robert Borden. But a Cabinet of this kind requires a sacrifice of separate interests to the collective good such as is not often found except in times of emergency. Accordingly the meeting of Prime Ministers held in 1921, what- ever may have been Lord Milncr's intention when summoning it, bore at least in its initial stages little resemblance in its proceed- ings to a constitutional Cabinet, though in its final report it gave expression to the unanimous views of the Governments of the Empire.
At the opening meeting Mr. Lloyd George declared that, while in the past Downing Street controlled the Empire, to-day the Empire took charge of Downing Street. The main subject of discussion was the question of the renewal of the Anglo- Japanese Alliance. It was agreed by all parties that the alliance would require changes in its form, because of the changed con- ditions of the world, and in order that it should comply with the obligations imposed by membership in the League of Nations. But on the general question of the renewal of the treaty there was a difference of opinion. The Canadian Prime Minister, adopting the point of view of American public men and intent upon the promotion of the closest friendly relations between the British Empire and the United States, was opposed to the re- newal of the treaty in any form. The Australian and New Zealand representatives, on the other hand, who had much to fear from the presence in the Pacific of an unfriendly or offended Japan, recognized in the renewal of the treaty the surest pledge for future peace. The friendship of Japan during the war had un- doubtedly been of the greatest service to the British Empire; and the role of a Power, such as Great Britain, with over 300 million Asiatic subjects, might well be to act as a connecting link between the United States and Japan, playing to some ex- tent the part played by France after the Anglo-French agree- ment of 1904 in establishing more friendly relations between Great Britain and Russia.
It fortunately proved unnecessary that the question should be decided forthwith; and in July the invitation of the United
