true, but they were out of all proportion to the sacrifices made.
The truth is that the French methods had been found unsuited
to the gaining of any real success; better artillery preparations,
a larger scale of attack, not as hitherto a series of successive
efforts on a narrow front, but an advance by large attacking
waves along all the front of assault, and closer support of the
infantry by the artillery, which should follow the advance and not
remain tied to its first positions, were necessary.
The winter battle, however, was not yet over. On March 12 the offensive was resumed N.E. of Le Mesnil. By the isth practically the whole of Sabot Wood was at last occupied. Opera- tions continued in the next few days between Perthes and Souain, in the Perthes sector, N. of Beausejour and N. and N.E. of Le Mesnil. Every foot of ground was bitterly contested, as wit-' ness the fighting for Jaune Brule wood on March 18; but not till the 23rd did the French slacken their efforts. A letter of con- gratulation was addressed to the IV. Army by Gen. Joffre, and it was ordered to cease its attacks and consolidate its gains. One corps, the VIII., had alone lost close on 8,000 men, including 160 officers, between Feb. 16 and March 23.
Still the Champagne remained active. On April 8th, a violent German attack on Beausejour redoubt was repulsed after an initial success. Thenceforward the enemy had recourse in the Perthes-Beausejour area to mine warfare, with its alternative of long delays and sharp assaults. In May the French operations in Artois, and those of the enemy in Galicia which brought about the large-scale Russian retreat, threw the course of events in Champagne into the background. The only action of importance was the German repulse on May 16 at Ville sur Tourbe, of which their first communique made so much. In fact an as- sault delivered by two regiments in close order, following on the explosion of three large mines, resulted merely in the seizure of a few trenches, which were speedily recovered by the French Colonial infantry, with heavy losses for the enemy. (B. E. P.)
III. THE AUTUMN BATTLES OF 1915
After the offensive in Artois in May and June, activity on the French side was transferred to the Vosges and the Argonne, where local attacks were delivered throughout the summer, in the vain hope of confusing the enemy's ideas as to the point of delivery of the forthcoming offensive. At the same time prepara- tions were taken in hand for an attempt in Champagne on a larger scale than ever before, and for a simultaneous and powerful diversion in Artois. The situation seemed to favour it. The increase in the British strength had permitted Field-Marshal French to extend his front; the French defensive system had now been so perfected as to allow of a reduction in the garrisons of quiet sectors and a proportionate increase in the reserves availa- ble. New divisions had been formed, and methodical instruction of the troops destined for the attack had been taken in hand. Finally there had been a great increase in the available supply of guns and shells.
In Champagne the object aimed at was nothing less than the complete rupture of the German lines on the front Bazancourt- Challeranges, so as to outflank their left N. of Reims and their right in the Argonne. It was also hoped, as before, to disengage the eastern front. The plan was to attack on a front of 25,000 yd. between the Moronvilliers hills and the Aisne.
The German defensive position, both in Artois and Cham- pagne, consisted of a continuous front system, with several successive lines of trenches, and further back centres of resist- ance, themselves immense closed works, with a maze of trenches, capable each of holding out against assault. As a general rule these were some 2,000 yd. apart, but their exact situation was modified in accordance with the ground. This front system, comprising from two to five separate lines, and some 300 to 500 yd. deep, was followed by a second, traced on the ridge to the S. of the Py valley. It was carefully organized and pro- vided with machine-gun positions and thick belts of wire shel- tered on the reverse slopes.
At the beginning of Sept. the Germans had 70 battalions in Champagne, belonging to the III. Army (von Einem) and to the
5oth Div., XIV. Corps, and XII. and VIII. Reserve Corps. During the artillery preparations which preceded the French attack they brought up 29 more (a division of the III. Corps, the i83rd Brigade, and half of the 43rd Reserve Div.), making in all 99 battalions on the first day of the battle. Ninety-three further battalions had to be put into line to fill up the gaps, so that their forces were practically doubled during the fighting; these were drawn either from the units at rest, such as the X. Reserve Corps, brought from Russia, or from the reserves of neighbouring sectors. In all, then, the Germans engaged 192 battalions. Their reinforcements came into line, not as large units with a view to being used for counter-attacks, but by small driblets thrown in hastily as need arose; no doubt the command, fearing a break through, parried the danger as best it could by using these troops in single battalions or even half battalions. There thus resulted a regular " hotch-potch," to use Col. Feyler's expression, on Oct. 2, between La Main de Massiges (Hill 199) and Maisons de Champagne, on a front of 12,000 yd., of 32 battalions belong- ing to 21 different regiments. The sth Div., for instance, had one regiment near Massiges, one battalion of another regiment near Tahure, and one of a third at Trou Bricot.
On the Allied side the arrival of a new British army, the III., in the Albert area, and the extension of the VI. French Army's front to the N., had rendered possible the transfer of Gen. Petain's II. Army from Artois to Champagne. Under the su- preme direction of Gen. de Castelnau it was to attack in con- junction with the right of the IV. Army under Gen. de Langle de Gary, and the left of the III. under Gen. Humbert, which was opposed by the German V. Army. On the left of the III. French Army, the V., under Gen. Franchet d'Esperey, faced the I. and VII. German Armies. The Allied fighting forces in Champagne numbered in all 35 divisions, or 420 battalions, at least, more than double the German forces engaged. So little effort had been made to keep the forthcoming attack a secret that, as early as Aug. 15, an order issued by Gen. von Ditfurth announced that it was expected; and on Sept. 22 Gen. von Fleck foresaw a " desperate effort " on the part of the French High Command.
Thanks to the efforts put forward to provide the French army with the heavy artillery and munitions it had lacked hitherto, the preliminary bombardment began on the morning of Sept. 22 and continued for three days and three nights without cessation, and was directed against the whole of the German front as far back as the second position. At the same time long-range fire was carried out against the hostile headquarters, billeting areas, and supply depots, and the Bazancourt to Challeranges railway. The effect was on the whole considerable, certain enemy units being left for 48 hours without rations as a result of the bombardment.
On the 22nd and 23rd the -weather conditions favoured ob- servations of fire, but on the 24th heavy clouds blew up. Next day, at 9 A.M., broke in rain, which lasted for several days. This had no little influence on the result of the battle.
At 9:15 A.M. (zero hour) the assault took place along the whole of the long front, and the first infantry waves, in an irre- sistible rush, broke into the enemy's trench system. On the left the attack was directed against a salient between Auberive and the St. Hilaire-St. Souplet road; the first trench was taken but the attack was held up by uncut wire in front of the second line 1,000 yd. in rear. At the same time a counter-attack from Auberive, supported by the fire of the heavy artillery on the Moronvilliers ridge, took the French in flank; the left was forced back but the right held its ground. This first phase was very short, and thanks to weak resistance the French suffered little.
The enemy had another strongly fortified redoubt E. of the St. Hilaire-St. Souplet road. Astride this road to the left of it the French infantry broke into the first hostile trench system, but were checked by machine-gun fire. To the right the assault- ing units carried four lines of trenches, covered by belts of wire and sheltered in the woods, capturing 700 prisoners and 7 guns and penetrating the hostile lines to a depth of 2,700 yd. In the Souain valley, which marked the right boundary of the IV. Army area, the advance was pushed forward rapidly in three different directions; to the W. it reached the wood of William II., 2,000
