and practically all the resources of the prosperous country were
henceforward at the service of the volunteers. By the middle of
Sept. the army had increased to 60,000 men. The Germans,
whose garrisons had advanced to Rostov at the mouth of the
Don, did not look on that extension with friendly eyes; they
did their best to disintegrate the volunteer fighting forces, and
at the same time tried to induce Alexeyev and Denikin to accept
a condition of vassalage, similar to that which had been sub-
mitted to them by the Don Ataman, Krasnov. But nothing of
the kind was possible in the case of Alexeyev and Denikin:
their whole energy was directed towards a patriotic reconstruction
of Russia, and they declined all overtures from the crafty foe.
On Sept. 25 Alexeyev died after an illness which he had con-
tracted during the World War, but against which he had struggled
by sheer devotion to his task, never sparing himself, never re-
laxing his efforts. It was impossible to replace fully this man,
who resembled one of the heroes of antique virtue. Denikin, who
had to step into the breach, was not Alexeyev's equal in military
genius or in statesmanship, but he was worthy of his prede-
cessor in purity of character and in his sense of duty.
The revolt of Siberia and eastern Russia against the Bolsheviks prevented the latter from concentrating their forces against the dangerous volunteers, and the Germans were at the end of their tether in the struggle with the western Allies, and unable to use their position in Russia to any useful purpose. These favourable circumstances made it possible for Denikin to spread his wings wide. The Don Cossacks joined him, he established communica- tions with Astrakhan and Ural Cossacks and the Orenburg province on the right, while on the left, his lieutenant Schilling moved towards Kiev and Odessa. There was some very heavy fighting in the centre, where Stavropol was taken after a struggle of several days, and 3 5 ,000 Reds surrendered or were exterminated. Towards the beginning of 1919 Denikin was master in the S. of Russia, and could begin to organize a base for an attack on the main block of the Soviet Republic. The principal Cossack armies had congregated round the nucleus of the Volunteer army. The latter had unfortunately suffered grievous losses in the ceaseless fights of the Civil War, which it had to conduct in miserable equipment, with hardly any ammunition except that which was taken from the enemy, in hunger and cold; some 30,000 of its best men had fallen, and these could not be replaced either by conscripts, driven in by command, or by the Cossacks, who could fight well when they chose, but who did not always want to do so. The difficulty of the political situation became apparent when the question of an arrangement between the various forces under Denikin was seriously raised. On Nov. i Gen. Denikin met the Regional Assembly (Kmyevaya Rada) of the Kuban territory. He made a powerful speech in which he said, among other things:
" Can there be any peace politics on the Kuban? Will your long- suffering settlement be safe from a new and more cruel invasion of the Bolsheviks when the Red power establishes itself firmly in Mos- cow, when it throws back by weight of numbers the Volga front, when it presses on the Don from north and east and when it moves towards you? No! It is time that people should cease to wrangle, to intrigue, to seek precedence. Everything should be sacrificed for the sake of the struggle. Bolshevism must be crushed, Russia must be liberated. Otherwise your well-being will not prosper, you will become the plaything of the enemies of Russia and of the Russian people. . . . There can be no talk of separate armies the Volunteer army, the Don army, the Kuban army, the Siberian army. These should be one army the Russian one, and also one front, one Chief Command, endowed with full power, responsible only to the Russian people, as represented by its future supreme authority."
The speech did not produce the desired effect. It was criticized in the lobbies by separatists and by Socialists, but it was at least conceded to the Commander-in-Chief that a Government should be formed in which ordinary provinces, like Stavropol or the Black Sea district, should be subjected to an emergency military regime, while the Kuban and to some extent the Don should be governed by independent institutions, though maintaining a kind of federal allegiance to the High Command. The Kuban obtained, in fact, political autonomy, but agreed to place its forces under the command of Gen. Denikin. Yet the Ukrainian
elements of the Rada contrived to send a special mission to Paris, and negotiated there with representatives of the Allies indepen- dently of the Russian "Political Council" and of S. D. Sazonov, the Foreign Minister of the South Russian Government.
For the conduct of the Government Gen. Denikin formed a " Special Council," which combined legislative and executive functions. It consisted of generals of the headquarters staff and the heads of departments, some 18 or 20 in number (Gens. Dragomirov, Lukomsky, Romanovsky, etc. ; the civil members Neratov, J. P. Shipov, N. Astrov, Stepanov, K. Sokolov, M. M. Fedorov, etc.). Most of the members belonged to the so-called National Centre and to the moderate Right. The Left was represented by four Cadets, of whom, however, two had drifted a good deal to the Right. The weight of authority rested with the generals, but there were long discussions and many compromises. It was attempted to steer a strictly " business course," politically colourless, but the Government did not succeed in achieving popularity. Gen. Denikin regarded this Assembly as a con- sultative organization, and gave his decision after listening to proposals and discussions. He insisted on keeping military restoration to the fore until the Bolsheviks had been laid low or at least until Moscow had been liberated. No pronouncement was allowed as to the form of Government, but the authority of the old Constituent Assembly, which was attempting to gather power in Ufa and Omsk, was rejected as the product of popular insanity. On the whole the Government was clearly leaning towards the Right, but Denikin was averse to any kind of acts of violence and oppression; his rule was, however, not free from contradictions and lacked political initiative. He fol- lowed the current more than he directed it.
His military plans were based on the idea that if he succeeded in driving the Bolsheviks out of the Russian provinces the population would reform behind his lines and set up compact patriotic levies against the hateful usurpers. With this purpose in view he pushed forward rapidly in all directions, and it seemed at first as if events justified his previsions. The Bolsheviks were driven back everywhere by the Volunteers and the Cossacks. When they rallied in the East and made a determined attempt to retake Tsaritsyn and turn the line of the Don they were re- pulsed and finally routed by Gen. Wrangcl's Caucasian army. The Cossacks of Mamontov and Shkuro made raids deep into the lines of the enemy; officers and soldiers of the Red army deserted in thousands to the Whites; the population met Denikin's hosts as liberators with processions and the ringing of bells. Kursk, Kharkov, Voronezh, were occupied, and in July the advance guard reached Orel, some 200 m. from Moscow.
This rapid progress proved deceptive. The armies of liberation did not bring law and order with them. Not only were Commis- sars and prominent Bolsheviks given short shrift, but officers who had served in the ranks of the Reds and gone over to the Whites were subjected to irksome investigations and delays before obtain- ing " rehabilitation." The badly equipped and badly supplied troops laid hands on all sorts of goods and stores; it was hard to distinguish between requisition and looting. Such administrators as were introduced by the advancing army were more intent on bettering themselves than on looking after the population; the peasants felt themselves menaced by the revenge of the squires.
The people, driven to despair, took to flight, and the more ad- venturous among them formed " green " bands, which roamed about the country, seized stations, stopped trains, cut off pro- vision columns. The most daring of these brigands, Makhno, made Ekaterinoslav his capital, and nearly overran Rostov in the summer of 1919. The most threatening symptom of all was the lack of union between the various sections of the Whites. The Kuban was preparing for complete independence and negotiating with the Mahommedan mountaineers for a league. Denikin found it necessary to strike hard against the Separatists; the Rada was dissolved; one of the leaders, Kalabukhov, was shot as a traitor, and a new Government was formed from among the supporters of a closer union with the Russian army (Nov. 1919). The " line " Cossacks were favourably disposed, but the coup d'ttat did not succeed in uprooting the movement for an in-
