S. from Arusha (a place 40 m. W. by S. of Moshi) to Kondoa
Iringa the chief strategic point in the interior of the northern
part of the country thence advance to the Tanganyika railway
and turn E. along that line to Morogoro. Smuts himself, with
the rest of his force, after clearing as much of the Pare and Usambara
regions as was necessary for his purpose, was to turn S.,
parallel to the coast and E. of Van Deventer’s line of advance,
also converging on Morogoro. It was hoped thus to corral von
Lettow and bring him- to a decisive engagement. Smuts had
reorganized his forces since the March operations, and no longer
had the aid of Gen. Tighe, who was given a command elsewhere
and created a K.C.M.G. Smuts formed his army into three
divisions, the first under Maj.-Gen. A. R. Hoskins (Inspector-General
King’s African Rifles), the second under Van Deventer,
the third under Maj.-Gen. Coen Brits. The first division was
made up of the two East African Brigades; the two other divisions
were composed of South African troops, supplemented by
batteries of Indian and other artillery. On April 3 Van Deventer
took the road across the Masai Steppe to Kondoa,
Van Deventer’s March to Kondoa.
which place he occupied after a smart engagement on
April 19. En route the garrison of Lol Kissale, 17 Germans
and 404 askaris with two machine-guns, had
been surrounded and forced to surrender. It had been
a brilliant march of some 200 m., but Van Deventer had lost
hundreds of animals through horse-sickness, and though only
some 80 m. from the Central railway he could advance no further.
Then the rainy season set in and cut off Van Deventer
for several weeks. Meanwhile von Lettow made rapid preparations
to meet Van Deventer’s thrust. Three companies were
brought from near Lake Kivu in the N.W. and by steamer on
Lake Tanganyika to Kigoma, whence they took train to Saranda
(the nearest point on the railway to Kondoa), while von Lettow
himself with 15 field and two mounted companies marched from
Korogwe on the Tanga railway to Kimamba on the Central
railway—a distance of 125 miles. Maj. Kraut remained in
charge of the force left in Usambara. The rains began while the
troops were on the march, but by the beginning of May von Lettow
and his force had occupied a strong position a little S. of
Kondoa. A good deal of minor fighting followed but neither side
made a general attack. (In May, owing chiefly to the privations
caused by the rains, Van Deventer could barely muster 3,000
rifles—a number inferior to that of von Lettow.) And in
June, during the period of waiting, the Belgian advance towards
Tabora began to have effect on von Lettow’s own position. Gen.
Smuts was also moving. His advance could not begin until May
18, the rains having turned much of the country into a lake.
It took an armoured-car detachment under Lt.-Comm. Whittall,
R.N., sent to reinforce Van Deventer, 35 days to cover 75 m.
(in the dry season the journey took three days).
When Smuts advanced Maj. Kraut retired, skilfully, by the railway to Handeni. Equally skilful was Smuts’s advance. The main column under Gens. Sheppard and Beves marched, through the densest bush, down the left bank of the Pangani, W. of the Tanga railway; a smaller force under Gen. Hannyngton followed the railway; a third column under Lt.-Col. T. O. Fitzgerald entered the Pare mountains through a gap (the Ngulu gap) on the east. Outflanked, Kraut had no option but to retire; he had strongly fortified the railway line, but had, apparently, not believed that an advance along the fever-haunted valley of the Pangani was possible. By June 15 the conquest of Usambara was completed by the occupation of Korogwe, whence the Tanga railway descends to the coast plain. Smuts put off the occupation of the coast region, and had already with his main force turned S., and on June 19 Handeni was occupied. Gen. Smut’s Main Operations. On June 24 a determined effort was made to round up Kraut’s force, the Germans being attacked simultaneously on three sides. In this action the Kashmiris and the 25th Fusiliers (familiarly known as “the Old and Bold”) earned special distinction. The Germans fought with great determination, and when the day was lost scattered in the bush and thus escaped. They reformed in strong positions in the Nguru hills.
After this fight Gen. Smuts was compelled to halt, forming a large standing camp on the Msiha river. The force had covered about 250 m. since May 22; water was short and the transport had reached the limit of its capacity. Malaria had greatly reduced the force several units had no more than 30% of their original effectives and the troops were on half rations. The interval of enforced idleness at Msiha camp was utilized in clearing Smuts’s left flank; that is, the northern coast region. This was done by Indian and African troops under Brig.-Gen. W. F. S. Edwards (Inspector-General of Communications), with the help of the Cape squadron, now under Rear-Adml. E. F. Charlton. At this time Gen. Smuts had already reached the conclusion that white troops were not best suited for campaigning in tropical Africa (nor were the Indian troops particularly suited for the work), and that a much larger negro element was needed. By his direction the raising of new battalions of the King’s African Rifles was undertaken, but the need was urgent for immediate reinforcements by trained black soldiers. These were found in West Africa. The Gold Coast Regiment had volunteered for service soon after its return from the Cameroon campaign; its offer was accepted and it sailed in June for East Africa and was in action in July. At the end of Aug. volunteers were called for a Nigerian overseas contingent and there was a ready response, but the Nigerian Brigade could not reach East Africa till Dec.–Jan. 1916–7. Meantime a battalion of the West India Regiment and the Gambia Company had joined Smuts. The coast operations, in which the navy played a great part, were successful; Tanga was occupied on July 7, Pangani on July 23, Sadani on Aug. 1 and Bagamoyo—the terminus of the old slave road from the great lakes—on Aug. 15. The British base was removed to Tanga, a saving of 75 m. sea voyage and over 200 m. rail transport. Dar-es-Salaam was occupied on Sept. 4, but it took three months before the port could be used as the new base.
While Smuts was still at the Msiha river von Lettow had brought most of his force from Kondoa to the Nguru hills. An attempt to surprise the British camp was unsuccessful owing to “the remarkably dense bush.” When on June 24 Van Deventer, reinforced, resumed his offensive the German detachments left on his front gave way, nor was their retreat marked by the skill usually displayed by the Germans in their retirements. Van Deventer was delayed by the difficulties of transport, but by the end of July he was in possession of some 100 m. of the Central railway—from Kilimantinde to Kikombo,—and on Aug. 9 had concentrated his division for an advance E. on Morogoro. Farther W. the Belgians were beginning to close in on Tabora. Von Lettow was obliged to leave his forces in that region to their fate, but (at the end of June) he had sent reinforcements to the detachments opposing Gen. Northey’s advance from the south. His own position now appeared critical. He withdrew Maj. Kraut and most of his force S. to Kilosa, on the railway, W. of Morogoro, leaving Capt. Schulz, with a few companies, to oppose Gen. Smuts, who resumed his advance on Aug. 5. Von Lettow’s plan was to get away with as much of his stores as he could. Kraut’s force did not remain at Kilosa, but crossing the railway struck S. in the direction of Mahenge, a military station in the middle of a healthy plateau, to which plateau the detachments which were opposing Northey were falling back.
Gen. Smuts’s effort, to use his own words, “to bottle the enemy up in Morogoro” failed. Schulz, after fighting an action at Dakawa on the Wami river on Aug. 16, retired on Morogoro, leaving a broken bridge across the Wami. Smuts sent forces to outflank von Lettow, but in vain.Von Lettow Avoids Encirclement. When on Aug. 26 the British occupied Morogoro it was to find it abandoned, and partly destroyed, by the enemy. Von Lettow had gone with his force into the Uluguru mountains, which lie immediately S. of Morogoro; by a track the existence of which was unknown to the British. With von Lettow was Dr. Schnee, the governor.
Gen. Smuts had taken measures intended to prevent von Lettow getting away from Morogoro by roads leading E. and W. of the Uluguru hills; he had not anticipated a retreat into the hills themselves. Brig.-Gen. Enslin was sent with the 2nd Mounted
