lacked experience; there were not sufficient trained native soldiers
and the military posts were widely scattered. Nor was any
one post equal to a successful defence against the 2,000 and more
veterans von Lettow had with him. Ngomano was attacked,
and it surrendered after a gallant resistance in which some 200
casualties were suffered, including the commanding officer, Maj.
Pinto. Its loot gave the Germans just what they lacked food,
ammunition, rifles, machine-guns and clothing. The Nigerians
and the 25th Cavalry being in pursuit von Lettow then marched
up the Lujenda valley. He had no difficulty in keeping ahead of
the enemy, and the rainy season having set in the Nigerians and
25th Cavalry were recalled in the third week in Jan. (1918) and
the Germans had a short breathing space.
Gen. Van Deventer now sent home all his white and Indian troops, and the Nigerian Brigade also. Except for the Gold Coast Regiment (which was not sent back till Aug.) the 1918 operations were carried out almost entirely by natives the King’s African Rifles. There were, however, a considerable number of Europeans among the Portuguese forces, which were put under the supreme command of Van Deventer.
Given the character and extent of the country into which the Germans had entered, the known determination of von Lettow to continue the struggle and the proven difficulty of bringing him to a decisive action, “the 1918 campaign,” said Van Deventer, “had perforce to be one of virtual extermination.” Wide converging movements were undertaken. Gen. Northey sent columns from the E. and S. shores of Lake Nyasa, while the Gold Coast Regiment advanced W. from Port Amelia (a harbour midway between the Rovuma and Mozambique). This Port Amelia column was later strengthened and came under command of Brig.-Gen. Edwards. Between Feb. and the middle of May the Germans were engaged at several points from both sides, mainly in the central region between the Lujenda and Msalu rivers. Von Lettow then marched S. to the Lurio river, 200 m. from the point where he had left German territory, with no enemy in front of him except isolated Portuguese posts, from which he obtained more valuable supplies. He was pursued from the N., and an Anglo-Portuguese column started N.W. from Mozambique (to which port Gen. Edwards removed his base) to overtake him. But von Lettow, marching very quickly S., captured Ilie, and in June reached the coastal region near Quilimane (Kilimane), where he ravaged many rich prazas. In this month Gen. Northey left, having been appointed governor of British East Africa and Col. (Brig.-Gen.) Hawthorn took his place. On July 1 von Lettow attacked a mixed Portuguese and British force at Nhamacurra, 25 m. from Quilimane, and after three days’ fighting captured the place and inflicted very severe loss on the defenders. The approach of strong British columns then compelled von Lettow to retire. He marched parallel to the coast, in the Mozambique direction. He established himself at a place called Chalaua, but when in mid-Aug. British columns closed in upon it, it was to find the camp evacuated. Von Lettow had turned N.W. again, one of his ideas at this time being to raid the Blantyre district of Nyasaland. On Aug. 30 and 31 he was engaged by part of Hawthorn’s force at Lioma, E. of Lake Shirwa, and suffered severely. “It was hoped that the enemy might have been captured, but the rugged country and the thick bush made operations very difficult, and he finally broke away to the northward.”
Save that he could not replace his casualties (except to some extent by turning bearers into askaris) von Lettow held the advantage in this campaign in northern Portuguese East Africa. It was nearly as large as France, most of it was fertile, and the natives, richly rewarded with booty from captured posts, were friendly and useful. If hustled from one area there were others to which he could move. He was tied to no base and was an ideal guerilla leader. He had now, end of Aug., to decide his future course; he came to the conclusion that an attempt to invade British Nyasaland was too risky, as there the British communications were good. It was easier to go north. To reenter German East Africa would be a complete surprise to the enemy, who would imagine he was making for the Tabora region (where most of his askaris came from) and take precautions accordingly. This would give him an opportunity of turning in another direction, and keep his force in being. His casualties at Lioma had numbered 95, and he had lost stores, baggage and ammunition. By Sept. 1 his total strength had been reduced to 176 Europeans and 1,487 askaris. He suffered further loss in another encounter on Sept. 6, after which date he got clear of his pursuers. Gen. Hawthorn had sent troops by steamer up Lake Nyasa, which should have reached the N. end of the lake before von Lettow could get there; the steamers broke down, and when on Sept. 28 the Germans again reached the Rovuma they were able to overcome the weak posts stationed there. Avoiding places held in strength by the British, and keeping ahead of the columns now in hot pursuit, von Lettow passed round the N. corner of Lake Nyasa, losing many carriers by desertion Von Lettow’s Surrender. but recruiting a few askaris. He stayed at Ubena some days and then (Oct. 17) set out for Rhodesia. (At Ubena Gen. Wahle and two other Europeans, sick or wounded, were left behind.) On Nov. 1 von Lettow attacked Fife, just within the Northern Rhodesian border, hoping to capture its stores, but it was too strongly held, so the Germans turned S.W., making for Kasama, von Lettow now having some idea of penetrating into Belgian Congo. Kasama was taken on Nov. 9, but British columns were in its immediate neighbourhood and there were several patrol encounters. Necessity urged von Lettow onward. On Nov. 13 he was reconnoitring a crossing of the Chambezi (the eastern head stream of the Congo) when an English motor-cyclist arrived with a message from Gen. Van Deventer announcing the conclusion of the Armistice. Von Lettow notified his acceptance of the Armistice on Nov. 14; the formal surrender was made to Gen. Edwards at Abercorn on Nov. 23. The force which surrendered numbered 30 officers and 125 other Europeans, 1,165 askaris, and 2,891 other natives, among them 819 women, with one small field gun, 24 machine-guns and 14 Lewis guns. Those who surrendered included Dr. Schnee and Maj. Kraut.
The troops employed by the Allies in East Africa included 52,339 sent from India (among them 5,403 British) and 43,477 South African whites. Other white troops employed (East African and Nyasaland settlers, Rhodesian volunteers and the 25th Fusiliers) numbered about Troops employed by the Allies. 3,000, the African troops (King’s African Rifles, Nigerians, Gold Coast Regiment, Gambia Company, Cape Corps—1,600 strong—and West Indians) about 15,000; an approximate total of 114,000, not reckoning Belgian native troops about 12,000 in all the Portuguese and the naval force engaged. The greatest number in the field at any one time, May to Sept. 1916, was about 55,000; the lowest number, in 1918, was some 10,000, all African, save the administrative services. The total British and Indian casualties was officially returned at 17,823; of these 2,762 were among the South African Forces. These figures are exclusive of casualties among carriers and of deaths and invaliding through sickness, which among the South Africans alone exceeded 12,000.
The cost of the campaign to Great Britain, inclusive of Indian and South African expenditure and that of the local protectorates to March 1919, was officially estimated at £72,000,000.
Authorities.—British.—The despatches of Generals Smuts, Hoskins, Van Deventer, Northey, of the High Commissioner for South Africa (Lord Buxton), the Governor of Nyasaland (Sir George Smith) and of Adml. Charlton, published in the London Gazette, cover the operations, except the period up to March 1916, on the British East Africa frontier and the early naval operations, concerning which no despatches were issued. “The Times” History of the War, chaps. 155, 183, 206 and 276, covers the whole campaign. Brig.-Gen. J. H. V. Crowe, Gen. Smuts’ Campaign in East Africa (1918), has an introduction by Gen. Smuts and an account of the blockade runners. For the German treatment of prisoners, etc., see the White Paper, Cd. 8689 (1917); E. F. Spanton, In German Gaols (1917), and J. H. Briggs, In the East Africa War Zone (1918) For particular units see A. Buchanan, Three Years of War in East Africa (1919), chiefly about the 25th Fusiliers; Sir Hugh Clifford, The Gold Coast Regt. in the East African Campaign (1920) ; W. D. Downes, With the Nigerians in East Africa (1919) ; G. M Orr, “The Indian Army in East Africa,” Jnl. U.S. Inst. India (1919).
