cavalry on the battle-field can still 'be decisive, given the right conditions. These conditions are: (a) a theatre of war whose size, in relation to the numbers of troops engaged, admits of wide, open spaces; (b) an enemy who, by reason of inferior num- bers, skill, or organization, cannot protect his flanks effectively.
There is no reason to suppose that such conditions will not be met with in the future, even in a European war, as often as those obtaining on the western front from 1914-8; and as regards a war outside Europe, they are typical of the campaigns which have been fought in the past, and which will assuredly be fought again. Still, it cannot be denied that, for the cavalry of Europe at any rate, the size of modern armies and the general use of entrenchments, especially barbed wire, have decreased the chances of distinction in battle, already much reduced by the greater power of missile weapons.
The best example of the part which can be played by cavalry after a successful battle is that of Gen. Allenby's victory in Palestine in 1918. The enemy's flank having been rolled up by means of an infantry attack in great strength near the coast, the Desert Mounted Corps, consisting of three divisions, passed through. After riding due north for about 35 m., mopping up prisoners as they went, they turned north-east over the moun- tains, where they were just in time to forestall a hostile infantry detachment which was being hurried forward to defend the pass, and debouched at dawn into the Plain of Esdraelon. By five o'clock in the evening of the day after the battle the^e divisions had marched 70 m. in 36 hours, and had placed them- selves completely across the Turkish lines of communication. As a result 40,000 prisoners fell into their hands. The remnants of the Turkish army, retreating northwards, were pursued and overtaken. Damascus and Aleppo were successively occupied by the mounted troops, though not without fighting, and the Desert Mounted Troops took altogether 75,000 prisoners out of a total Turkish ration strength of about 100,000. The division which took Aleppo marched 500 m. in five weeks.
Other instances of successful cavalry pursuits during the World War could be found from the campaigns in Russia and Mesopotamia, and that in Palestine in 1917. And, referring to the end of the war in France, Sir Douglas Haig wrote as follows in his final despatch: " On the morning of the Armistice two British cavalry divisions were on the march east of the Scheldt, and before the orders to stop reached them they had already gained a line 10 m. in front of our infantry outposts. There is no doubt that, had the advance of the cavalry been allowed to continue, the enemy's disorganized retreat would have been turned into a rout." The events of the war in all theatres show clearly enough that a retiring force can march more quickly than one which is advancing and that only a comparatively brief respite is required to enable a beaten force to recover itself. It follows that a force of superior mobility is essential if the fruits of victory are to be gathered and a long succession of pitched battles avoided.
As for pursuit, so also for retreat, the value of cavalry was proved many times in the Russian campaigns. But a good instance is provided by the retreat of the British Expeditionary Force from Mons in 1914. During every day of this operation the British cavalry interposed themselves between the main columns of the army and the pursuing Germans, and so saved the infantry many tiresome rearguard actions and much fatigue. But from the point of view of moral, the services rendered by the cavalry were perhaps even more important. Some idea will be gained of them if it is remembered, once again, that the horse soldier is almost invariably less tired, and consequently less prone to doubts and fears, than the foot soldier, and that he sees over every hedge while the infantryman has to peer through it. Even so, it is difficult for any but an eye-witness to realize the extent to which the infantryman relies on the protection afforded him by the cavalry, the anxiety with which he awaits news, and the relief with which he receives it from his mounted brother, riding past in the dark, on his way to billets.
Future Organization. Before considering what influence mod- ern inventions are likely to have on the future of mounted
troops, it will be well to clear the ground by pointing out the advantages and disadvantages for war of cyclists as compared with horse soldiers. Their chief advantage is that every man can go into the firing line, whereas one horse soldier out of every four has to remain behind to hold the horses. On really good roads in good weather they can move more quickly than horses; and no supply column is required to feed bicycles. On the other hand, they are completely tied to roads, and if the men leave the roads to fight, they must eventually come back to the place where they left their bicycles, which cannot be brought up to them. Cavalry are preferable to cyclists for fighting purposes in all country except that which is so enclosed that horses also are almost confined to roads. And even then the roads must be specially good for cyclists to justify themselves. On the cobblestone roads which are so common in Flanders and northern France, and in other parts of Europe, the pace of cyclists is, in wet weather, reduced almost to that of a walking man. In fact there seems to be no country except Great Britain where they would advantageously take the place of horse soldiers for fighting purposes. For purposes of intercommunication, how- ever, they are extremely valuable, and the attachment of cyclists to an infantry unit will save much expenditure of horseflesh in any country reasonably well provided with roads. That is to say, they can take the place of part of the divisional cavalry. As a rule they should not be attached to the larger cavalry forma- tions. They will often have to move by a different route to that most suitable for cavalry, and, if marching in a column, discomfort results from the fact that their pace is much altered by gradients which are hardly perceived by horses; consequently the saving of horseflesh does not compensate for the extra trouble and complication of orders. But motor cyclists are of incalculable value with cavalry, and will be still more when a machine is produced which can move across country.
The modern invention which, more than anything else, limi- ted the activities of cavalry in the World War was barbed wire. It is doubtful whether this will be the case in the future. Barbed-wire entanglements are an accompaniment of position warfare; it takes much time and much man-power to erect them and this must always be the case except in the unlikely event of some invention arriving which will enable the soldier to pro- duce barbed wire much in the way that the conjurer emits yards of coloured paper from his mouth. Besides, in view of the introduction of the tank and the development of the wire-cutting technique of artillery it is questionable whether barbed wire will ever again play the part which it fulfilled in 1914-17.
The developments most likely to influence the future of the mounted arm are: (i) the tank; (2) the cross-country tractor; (3) the aeroplane; (4) gas.
The tank is thought by some to be likely before long to oust cavalry entirely from warfare, and the views of these persons, though they may be extremists, are entitled to very respectful consideration. They claim, and claim justly, that the evolution of the tank has made very great strides since the signing of the Armistice; and they assert that it will advance nearly as quickly in the future, a statement which is more open to argument. Experimenting with a new arm is a costly process, and, besides, the tank is not a vehicle which can be "easily adapted for civil use in times of peace. The paramount question of expense there- fore, coupled with the absence of the stimulus of actual or impending war, is likely to slow down the development of tanks, as well as the provision of them in large numbers.
The latest type of tank can, it is understood, go as fast and as far as cavalry in all but very unfavourable country; but it may be a number of years before a machine is produced which is capable of crossing swamps, thick woods, or rocky mountains, and which is thoroughly satisfactory in a tropical climate. It is true that obstacles of this kind affect cavalry also, but tracks invariably exist by which they can surmount them, though they may have to go in single file at a foot pace. And it would be specially dangerous for the British army entirely to replace cavalry by tanks, because conditions unfavourable to tanks are precisely those with which it has most often to contend.
