At this stage of the war, coordination of the efforts of various departments of state was even more important than internal reorganization. The British Ministry of Munitions never absorbed the purchasing sections of the Admiralty; and the predominant need of naval supremacy, strengthened by the traditional rights of the senior service, had enabled naval requirements to retain a nominal priority over land requirements. This did not greatly affect munition output when once the munition movement was in full swing except on occasions, notably, when a sudden decision was made to mount two guns on every merchant ship; when the losses of ships at sea placed the shipbuilding programme in front of all other demands and by its call upon steel prejudiced other branches of production; and to a less extent after the battle of Jutland, when the decision was made to replace the whole existing naval ammunition supply.
In the case of seaplanes, and a few articles connected with the anti-submarine campaign, anti-aircraft bombs, etc., the Ministry supplied naval as well as army requirements. But the Ministry did not supply the main needs of the Admiralty; and the plan of forming a single Ministry of Supply for both services, including all the goods supplied by the Army Contracts Department, though much discussed when Mr. Churchill came to the Ministry and though recommended by a Treasury com- mittee, was never carried into effect. Moreover, control was gradually developed by the Ministry of Food, and by the mines, timber, paper and other departments, which still re- mained under the Board of Trade, dealing with various spheres of economic life. There was also a continued demand from the army for specialists to run the repair services, workshops, etc., which were built up behind the front.
Thus there arose keen competition between departments for man-power, for tonnage and for finance (especially dollar credits in the United States and Canada). There also remained the question of the order of priority of work to be done. But experi- ence had proved that no absolute " priority " could be given to any single activity. The word continued in constant use until the end of the war, but in fact the increasing strain upon economic resources, combined with the greater accuracy of demands and forecasts, meant that the conception of placing demands in order of importance was largely superseded by the plan of rationing economic resources. Each of the three factors mentioned was dealt with by a Cabinet committee, which in one case became the province of a new Ministry that of Na- tional Service. In the case of finance the allocation of American dollars was taken out of the hands of the Treasury and assigned to a standing committee called the American Board an inter- departmental committee under the presidency of Mr. Chamber- lain, who with Lord Buckmaster represented Great Britain on the Inter-Allied Committee of Finance. The problem of tonnage also passed out of the hands of a periodical meeting of depart- mental officers under the Parliamentary Secretary of the Ministry of Shipping into the purview of a Cabinet committee, and the programme so approved was coordinated with that of the Allies by the Inter-Allied Maritime Transport Council.
So far as they affected munitions, the three factors were intimately connected. It was cheaper to manufacture at home than to buy abroad, and a given amount of dollars would carry a larger programme if spent on raw material than if spent on finished articles. But the tonnage needed to import materials was greater than that required for importing articles such as manufactured explosives or ammunition, while there was ob- viously a saving in British man-power by buying the finished product. On the other hand, munition capacity at home was in a more highly advanced stage of development than in America, and was quickly adaptable, whereas British orders in America had to compete with the enormous programme of the U.S. War Department. Moreover, the reserve of man-power in the United States was intact, and it was evident that the most rapid and effective way in which America could make her weight felt in the world contest was to get that reserve into the field, with the help, if necessary, of British munitions and equip- ment. The balancing of these considerations, which occupied
much of the time of Ministers during the last 18 months of the war, thus broadened out into the problem of coordinating the whole Allied effort. But the final decisions did not radically alter the proportions of British munitions production.
Man-power. As regards man-power, 53,000 men were with- drawn between March and Nov. 1917 for the army from muni- tions work, by a continuous process of substitution and dilution without diminishing production. As a result of the German offensive in the spring of 1918, which created a man-power crisis and led to the raising of the age limit for general recruiting, it was decided to make an immediate " clean cut " in the munition factories of all men of 19 and 20 regardless of the nature of their employment, and to take all men of 21, 22 and 23 within a short period. A hundred thousand men were obtained by this plan before the middle of the year; but when the tide of battle turned, Mr. Churchill secured the suspension of the second part of the scheme. Indeed, he secured the release of some of those already enlisted for work upon the new tank programme, for the blast furnaces, and for the manufacture of scientific instruments, etc.
Throughout this period the employment of women steadily increased, and the lack of skilled men was met by pressing them to enroll as war-munition volunteers thus increasing the re- serve of mobile skilled men and by rationing skilled labour to firms. Protection from recruiting was withdrawn from men not fully employed on skilled work. The embargo on employing more than a certain number of skilled men was at first resisted, and led to a strike at Coventry in July 1918. But the Ministry stood firm and the scheme was carried into effect.
Tonnage. In the autumn of 1917 a drastic cut was ordered by the Cabinet in the import programmes of the different depart- ments, since the Minister of Shipping, taking the best available estimate of losses from the submarine campaign, anticipated that the imports into Great Britain would drop by 10 million tons. The ration to the Ministry of Munitions was reduced from 12 million to 10 million tons, most of which had to be deducted from iron-ore imports. The steel budget was con- sequently reduced and pressure put upon the departments to minimize their programme. The Minister, however, took the view that, as other supplies might be uncertain and it would be foolish to keep ships waiting for a cargo, he should be allowed to maintain a surplus stock of metals, materials, etc., on the Atlantic seaboard of America ready for shipment at any moment. Owing partly to the success of anti-submarine measures, partly to the success of the policy of concentrating ships on the shortest (i.e. the Atlantic) route, and partly because other materials were not ready in time, the actual imports of munition materials during 1918 were at the rate of 12 million tons a year. In the autumn of 1917 an arrangement was made with the United States to supply American ships to convey material needed in Great Britain to replace material used in making goods for the U.S. army in Europe. But this scheme of hypothecating ships to convey particular replacement material was not, in fact, carried into effect, being superseded by the plan of reviewing and allocating the tonnage and material resources of the Allies as a whole through the machinery of the Inter-Allied Transport and Munitions Councils.
The orders for heavy shell placed by the Ministry in 1916, which were delivered during the early part of 1917, gave so large a stock that no further orders were necessary except in regard to 6-in.-shell orders, which were placed both in the United States and Canada for delivery in 1918. Apart from this, the main requirements from America were for shell steel, nitro-cellulose powder, copper, spelter, motor lorries and lubricating oil, while as the year progressed substantial orders were also placed for aeroplane spruce and for Liberty engines. The rate of dollar expenditure, however, in 1918 represented less than half of the maximum reached in the first quarter of 1917, while in Canada the purchases dropped to less than 60% of the maximum reached in the second quarter of 1917.
Inter- Allied Relations. These discussions emphasized the necessity for agreement with the Allies. In the late summer of
