while Bulgaria adopted such a threatening and aggressive attitude'to both her allies that, on June 2, Greeks and Serbians signed a defensive alliance, intended primarily to prevent Bulgarian hegemony in the Balkans, but clearly drafted so as to be binding in case of attack by any third power. Bulgaria, hoping to rush Salonika and anticipate the result of further negotiation or arbitration, attacked the Greek and Serbian lines on June 29, but was heavily defeated at Kilkish (July 4) and compelled to retire fighting towards the Bulgarian frontier. Seeing the Bulgarians punished, Rumania intervened to claim territorial concessions in the Dobruja. On July 20 the Turks reoccupied Adrianople. Neither the Powers nor the two sur- viving partners of the Balkan Alliance protested against this violation at Bulgaria's expense of the Treaty of London.
Peace of Bucharest. The Rumanian intervention brought the belligerents to terms, and peace was signed at Bucharest on Aug. 10. The frontier of Greek Macedonia was carried eastwards as far as the river Mesta (Kara Su), thus excluding Bulgaria from the coveted Aegean port of Kavalla, and north- wards as far as Fiorina and Doiran. Venizelos had no hope of mitigating Bulgarian enmity and restoring the shattered alliance by any further concessions, and was driven to base Lis policy on a balance of power, hoping to immobilize Bulgarian ambitions by the stanc'ing threat of the alliance with Serbia and the new friendship with Rumania.
Northern Epirus. The Greek frontier in Northern Epirus de- pended on the delimitation by the conference of the Powers in London of the new principality of Albania, and the decision of the international commission appointed for this purpose was subject to Italy's refusal to allow Greece to hold any of the Adriatic littoral north of Corfu. When the decision of this commission was pro- mulgated (Florence, March 1914), Greece obediently withdrew her troops to the south of the new frontier, but the inhabitants of the evacuated district, which included Chimara, Argyrokastro, and Koritsa, were so thoroughly Greek in sentiment that they immediately proclaimed a provisional government, and finally obtained from the Albanian Government, subject to the international commission of control, certain rights of autonomy with which they were pro- visionally satisfied (Corfu, May 17 1914). In Oct. 1914, after the departure from Albania of Prince William of Wied, Greece was authorized by the Entente with the consent of Italy to reoccupy this district of northern Epirus with her troops in order to preserve order, on the express understanding that the question should be finally settled by the Peace Congress. Greek forces were obliged to hand over these districts to Italian occupation in 1916, but were au- thorized to reoccupy them after the war (Dec. 1919). The Italians accordingly evacuated Epirus and French troops the Koritsa district in April and May 1920. Subsequently Chimara and other of the disputed districts were restored by the Greek authorities to Albania (June I 1921), who appealed to the League of Nations against the frontier claimed by Greece. The Council of the League of Nations, however, relying on the declaration of the Powers in 1914 decided June 28 1921 that only the Supreme Council of the Allies (then represented by the Ambassadors' Conference in Paris) was com- petent to determine the Albanian frontiers.
The Dodecanese. Greece also awaited the decision of the Powers with regard to the islands of the Aegean; and in the solution of this question it happened again that Italy was the Power responsil.le for checking Greek aspirations. Italy had occupied during her Tripolitan war with Turkey the twelve islands of the southern Spo- rades, known as the Dodecanese, all of which, except Rhodes and Kos, were barren rocks inhabited by Greek sponge fishers, and by the Treaty of Lausanne (Oct. 18 1912) had retained them only as security for the evacuation of Tripoli by the Turkish troops. During the Balkan War the Italian occupation had naturally protected these islands from attack by the Greek fleet which had successfully seized from Turkey all the other islands of the Aegean. Sir Edward Grey declared on Aug. 12 1913 that " Italy had never allowed England for one moment to doubt that it was her intention to com- plete that part of the Treaty of Lausanne with regard to these islands and retire from these islands when Turkey had completed her part; England had complete confidence in her good faith." On Feb. 13 1914 the Powers recognized Greek sovereignty over all the islands seized by the Greeks during the war, with the exception of Tenedos and Imbros, which were supposed to command the entrance to the Dardanelles; but still the Italians gave no sign that their occupation of the Dodecanese was either conditional or temporary. It remained for Venizelos after the World War to negotiate with Signor Tittoni an agreement (July 29 1919) by which all the outstanding questions between Italy and Greece were compromised, and all the islands were to revert to Greece, with the exception of Rhodes, the cession of which was to be dependent on the result of a plebiscite to be held within 15 years of England's cession of Cyprus; and Venizelos re-
fused to sign the Treaty of Sevres in Aug. 1920 until the official and obligatory character of this agreement had been recognized by the Supreme Council. The islands of Tenedos and Imbros to- gether with the island of Lemhos were occupied during the World War by the British fleet; and the British forces under Gen. Fin- layson handed the three islands over to the Greek authorities in accordance with the Treaty of Sevres on June 25 1921.
The decision of the Powers after the Peace of Bucharest, assigning to Greece sovereignty over the Aegean islands, was not recognized by the Turks, who commenced a boycott of Greek shipping and an organized persecution of Greeks in Asia Minor. Fortified by the opportunity of buying two battle- ships which would have secured for their fleet the supremacy of the Aegean, Turkey plainly threatened to reopen the war. In June 1914 the situation was indeed so alarming that Venizelos appealed for Serbian support. The Serbs in their reply did not hesitate to recognize the obligations of the Greco-Serbian alliance; and after pointing out that their immediate participa- tion in a third war was for obvious military and financial reasons extremely undesirable, if not impossible, they proceeded to address a strongly worded protest to the Grand Vizier at Constantinople, with the result that he felt that they were quite prepared to declare war in defence of Greek interests. They also requested the other Powers to use all possible pressure to restrain Turkish provocation. They showed such goodwill in the exercise of these diplomatic measures that on June 22 1914, M. Streit, then Foreign Minister in the Government of Venizelos and subsequently King Constantine's private adviser, telegraphed to Belgrade " the lively gratitude of the Greek Government for the Serbian demarche at Constantinople on the subject of the persecution of the Greeks in Turkey, a demarche which has proved once again the solidarity of our alliance and the bonds of affection which unite the two peoples." Meanwhile Venizelos, having sounded the other Powers and learned that, owing to Germany's refusal to take part, there was no chance of a naval demonstration by the Great Powers in order to coir pel the Turks to respect the decision of the London conference with reference to the Aegean islands, succeeded (July 8 1914) in buying for immediate delivery two American battleships, which deprived the Turks of any chance of challenging the superiority of the Greek fleet. Turkey at last consented to negotiate, 1 and Venizelos was on his way to meet the Grand Vizier at a neutral capital, when at Munich he learnt of the outbreak of the World War. There also he received the question from the Serbian premier as to the attitude Greece would adopt in view of the Austrian invasion. Venizelos declared at once (Aug. 2) that " with regard to the war with Austria he must await fuller information and consultation with his colleagues in the Govern- ment before he could determine the answer to be given; but that with regard to the possibility of a Bulgarian attack the place of Greece would be at the side of her Serbian ally in order to keep their common enemy at a respectful distance, and ensure the maintenance of the Treaty of Bucharest." This declaration was officially renewed on his return to Athens.
The World War. On Aug. 4 1914 Germany informed Greece both officially and by private telegram from the Kaiser to King Constantino that she had concluded alliances with Turkey and Bulgaria, and invited Greece to join the Germanic powers in a united campaign against a Slav domination in the Balkans. This invitation was declined by King Constantine in terms of warm personal friendship. Venizelos, on behalf of the Greek Government (Aug. 8), supplemented the King's rather regretful reference to the impossibility of Greek cooperation with Germany owing to the Mediterranean supremacy of the British and French fleets, by suggesting the renewal of a Balkan federation to include Bulgaria for the maintenance of neutrality. The hostile attitude of Turkey, however, now once more strengthened by the entry into the Dardanelles of the German cruisers " Goeben " and " Breslau," gave little hope of preventing the war from spreading in the Near East; and on Aug. 23 Venizelos officially declared with full authority that " Greece, not merely
'These negotiations were subsequently resumed, and resulted (Nov. 14 1914) in an agreement known as the Treaty of Athens.
