reported in the course of the day (Sept. 27), were compelled to see that the situation on which the decision to bring about an im- portant battle on the Wereszyca was based had now undergone a substantial change. Of the four essential conditions laid down earlier as the necessary basis for this decision, practically only one remained, or rather had been carried out: the one relating to the wheel of the IV. Army. This manreuvre had succeeded. On the other hand, it seemed doubtful whether the I. Army could continue its resistance N. of the Tanew for any length of time; the Archduke's weak army group stood opposed to superior forces moving to outflank it; and the decisive blow from N. to S. was rendered impossible by the general enemy grouping, 'in which the weight had been flung on to the right (N.) wing. The Army Higher Command had therefore no alternative but to make a radical change in the original plan of operations. It would perhaps have been most to the purpose to discard altogether the guiding idea which now offered so little chance of success, and to concentrate all the armies on the already constructed line of the San. But the Army Higher Command held fast to its resolution to bring about a decisive battle in the Grodek area, though making certain concessions to meet the altered situation. Thus the IV. Army, designed as the attacking wing in the original scheme, was to be converted into the defensive wing with its front facing E., while the II. and III. Armies were to deliver the blow from the S. to N. a complete exchange of roles. To this end the IV. Army had to continue its wheel manoeuvre and the II. and III. Armies to fight their way across the Wereszyca line, which until then formed the cover for their front, and then pro- ceed to the attack. As a result of these operations the two op- ponents laid their weight on opposite wings, the Russians on the N., the Austro-Hungarians on the S. wing. This was quite against the original intention of the Austro-Hungarians, and it undoubtedly weakened their position appreciably, from a stra- tegic and still more from a tactical point of view.
The Battle of Grodek-Rawa Ruska. Retreat behind the San. Directions for the execution of this plan were issued on the after- noon of Sept. 7. The IV. Army Command at once dispatched all heavy trains in a westerly direction to beyond the San. Rzycki, to the E. of Rawa Ruska, was selected as a pivot for the continua- tion of the army's wheel, and here were brought into action for the fire-fight the 4th and 6th Cav. Divs. (Gen. von Wittmann), which had been selected from the very considerable cavalry masses actually on the spot. A second cavalry corps (the iqth and nth Cav. Divs. under Gen. Nagy) was ordered to provide cover, mounted, for the army's extreme outer flank. The first of these cavalry groups executed its task admirably in a two-days' fire-fight. The army's right wing (the VI. and IX. Corps) was allowed to continue its offensive advance, partly with the object of drawing upon itself as the " defensive wing " as many as pos- sible of the enemy's forces, and partly so as to use its infantry so well schooled in attack to the best advantage in an area of which a comprehensive survey was quite impossible and showed no obvious boundary line. The left wing (3rd and 8th Divs.) went back, after the heavy fighting already de- scribed, to the N. of Wittmann's cavalry corps, where it remained for the rest of the proceedings in close touch with the II. Corps (4th and 8th Divs.). This corps, being pressed by the attacking V. Russian Army, retired after a series of battles by successive stages to Tomaszow.
Following out the Army Higher Command's plan of attack, the divisions of the II. and III. Armies began an offensive advance over the Wereszyca on Sept. 8 and wrested certain ad- vantages from the enemy, who on this front was consider- ably weaker; but point 315 (Stawczany-Mostki-Dornfeld), the line which the II. Army was to have reached by the evening of Sept. 8, was only taken on Sept. n. On the other parts of the front the fighting, on Sept. 9 and 10, swung backward and for- ward without a decisive advantage being gained on any one section. Here the Austro-Hungarians made effective use of that form of warfare which consists in throwing up cover during the battle on an extended front in other words, trench warfare, which later was to become the characteristic feature.
In contrast to the progress made on the right wing of the Austro-Hungarian battle-front, the development of the battle positions on the gth, loth and nth showed that the left wing had recoiled. There the IV. Army was fighting against a superior- ity of almost two to one. The IX., VI. and XVII. Corps on that part of the front facing E. were, it is true, able to hold their posi- tion, and the artillery line with about 100 guns which had been formed behind the salient (the XVII. and II. Corps) defeated all the enemy's attempts at attack; but the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand's army group (the 4th, 8th, isth and 3rd Divs.), which had been in action for nearly 20 days without a break, could no longer hold out after all its heavy losses, and had to be led backwards from one position to another. Even the relatively strong I. Army was forced to retire by stages, and into the gap thus formed between the IV. Army, after its wheel, and the I. Army, the V. Russian Army pushed forward slowly but surely its cavalry division and corps. This army had resumed its ad- vance on Sept. 7 after re-forming. 1 On the same day the 8th Div. had been put out of action by a strong column of the III. Russian Army advancing from the southeast. This left the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand with only the 4th and 8th Divs. of the VI. Corps and the gth Cav. Div. at his disposal. These weak forces could offer no permanent resistance on such open ground and, after fighting a serious battle on Sept. 9, they were withdrawn behind the line of the Rata (which ran provisionally parallel with the railway line from Jaroslau to Belzec), where they joined the 3rd and 8th Divs. of the XIV. Corps, which had likewise been severely battered.
The general strategic situation now appeared to the Army Higher Command to be untenable. Instructions were therefore issued on the afternoon of Sept. n to break off the fighting and retire behind the San. This retreat, facing full W., had, so far as the II. and III. Armies were concerned, only one disadvantage the scarcity of communications available within the narrow zone of retreat. But for the IV. Army the conditions almost brought about a catastrophe.
On the afternoon of Sept. u, the V. and XVII. Corps of the V. Russian Army, reaching out to the W., were posted, together with their own powerful artillery forces, in the direction of the rear and flank of the IV. Army. A single determined blow from these forces would infallibly have placed that army in a most hopeless situation. It was fortunate that the Russian corps in question were those that had received the worst punishment at Komarow and had therefore lost much of their fighting power. But behind this immediate danger there lay another not less serious. The Russian IV. Army, now pursuing the Austro-Hun- garian I. Army in its retreat over the San, could easily detach large groups from the massed forces on its left wing and send them forward against the line of retreat of the IV. Austro-Hun- garian Army, thus attacking this army at its most vulnerable point in the critical moment of the San crossing. The precautions which had to be taken against both these dangers were the more difficult to carry out in view of the fact that the whole of the army's infantry units were just then heavily engaged.
Under these circumstances the violent attack delivered in the afternoon by the united forces brought up from the E. and N.E. (the III. Russian Army) came as a welcome incident. The attack was repulsed along the whole front after an obstinate and bloody battle lasting on into the evening. Particularly in front of the i gth Div., composed of Bohemian regiments, there lay heaps of corpses. After the failure of the attack the Russians ceased fighting, and at many points whole sections of their front were discovered by reconnoitring patrols to be in retreat. Under these conditions it was an easy matter to shake off the enemy during the night of Sept. 11-12, and by following this up during the day with a powerful backward push, to break off fighting contact with the enemy almost entirely. To deal with the Rus-
1 Incidentally the Russian V. Army, which had been defeated at Komarow, but not pursued this being impracticable took exactly as long to re-form and return to the field as the II. and III. Austro- Hungarian Armies after their misfortunes E. of Lemberg, although in their case pursuit did follow.
