theatre of war presents until the Italian armies are able to debouch
into the plains, show clearly that the principal effort of the Allies
must be made in France. The developments of Arras ' have proved
that it is tactically possible to break the German front, but that for
success an even more powerful effort is required, and that it is
necessary to attack simultaneously at a number of points. France
has at the present time 2,200,000 men engaged on her N.E. front
and has reached the limits of her man-power. She can maintain her
armies at their actual figure but she cannot increase them. The
solution of the problem is then in the hands of England. If she
sends us her New Armies we shall be able to make not only an
English and a French effort but an English effort and two French
efforts simultaneously at the most favourable moment and with
great power. The British forces, reinforced by the New Armies, will
be given zones of operation proportionate with their strength. They
will retain their present zone, extending it on both flanks to the N.
of Ypres and to the S. of La Bass6e canal, and they will take over the
zone to the S. of Arras towards the Somme. They will thus lie on
either side of the French X. Army, which will hold the front of
attack which it has organized. The alternation of French and
British troops has always given the best results. The principal effort
of the English armies will be directed between the left of the French
X. Army and the La Bassee canal and will extend to the N. of the
canal ; thus it will be linked up with the French attack in the neigh-
bourhood of Arras.
" Of course, if the Germans are compelled to fall back before all the British forces are in line, their whole strength will be directed towards exploiting the success won in the direction of Antwerp and of Brussels. We owe it to ourselves and to our Allies to make a great effort now. It is therefore at the present time of the highest im- portance that the New British Armies should be dispatched as rapidly as possible and at dates and under conditions fixed before- hand, so that definite plans of operations may be drawn up in agree- ment by the two commanders-in-chief. I am firmly convinced that our action will be decisive, if it is combined and coordinated."
This letter shows that Joffre had not, at the end of May, much hope that Foch would capture the Vimy Ridge, but the latter's fiery spirit would not permit him to admit failure while the prize seemed to be within his grasp, and he persuaded thecom- mander-in-chief to let him continue the battle. So the battle of Souchez, which had begun on May 9, dragged on until July 13. Twice Foch's men won their way to the crest of the ridge, only to be driven back, a.nd at last Joffre called a halt and decided to prepare for the greater effort of which he had written to Kitch- ener. In that letter Joffre had indicated that he proposed to renew the attempts on the Arras front to take the Vimy Ridge, while the British army fought on the left of the French X. Army, but he had said nothing about the second French effort. This he designed to be the principal blow to be delivered in Cham- pagne, to the E. of Reims. To obtain the French troops for this campaign he required the British army to extend its front to the right and left, and also to relieve de Castelnau's VI. Army on the Somme front. The remainder of the summer was occupied by these changes, which became possible as the New Army divisions arrived from England. The 2nd and 3rd of these reached France, disembarked at the end of May, and 6 more before the end of July, so that by then the 4 divisions and the cavalry division of Mons had in u months increased to 28 divisions and 5 cavalry divisions. These reinforcements enabled a British III. Army to be formed under Sir Charles Monro, which took over some 17 miles of, front from a point to the S. of Arras as far as the Somme, eventually extending its lines to the S. of that river. Haig's I. Army prolonged its right S. of the La Bassee canal to the neighbourhood of Lens, and thus found it- self facing the open plain of Loos, while Plumer's II. Army relieved the remaining French troops in the Ypres salient and brought its left into contact with the right of the Belgians.
While these movements were in progress, vast preparations were taking place on the battle-front. Guns, trench mortars, shells and military stores of all kinds had accumulated in hith- erto undreamt-of quantities. Joffre and his staff had it in their minds at this time that they were engaged in operations in the nature of a huge siege, 'and that the essential was to blow a prac- ticable breach in the enemy's lines through which the infantry could be poured to the assault. A study of the previous battles of trench warfare had convinced them that with sufficient guns and sufficient ammunition this was possible. The output of the
1 The battle of Souchez.
French factories had been increased enormously, and though the British Ministry of Munitions had hardly yet begun to be pro- ductive, still the supply of heavy guns and shells for the British army had been greatly increased and it was equipped to reply effectively to the German gas. For these reasons the hopes which Joffre had expressed in his letter to Kitchener were very generally shared in the Allied armies. The one fly in the ointment was that there had been a renewal in the British Cabinet of the controversy between the " Easterners " and the " Westerners " and Mr. Churchill had pressed with all his elo- quence and skill for a decisive campaign which should open the road to Constantinople. The result was a compromise, and three of the New Army divisions had gone to the East. Some compensation for this was obtained by the arrival of two more New Army divisions in France, and by the formation of a Guards' division, which had been made possible by the creation of new battalions of Guards and the replacement of those already in France by other battalions. This gave Sir John French an ad- ditional army corps, which he kept in his hands as a reserve.
Joffre opened his autumn campaign on Sept. 2^5. In addition to his great attack in Champagne, Foch with the French X. Army attempted once more to storm the Vimy Ridge, while Haig's I. Army attacked between the La Bassee canal and Lens, in conjunction with a secondary British attack to the N. of the canal and demonstrations on the front near Armcntiercs. 'I 'In- general plan of the N. battle was that Foch, having carried the Vimy Ridge, should advance E. to the S. of Lens, while Haig pushed E. through Loos to the N. of Lens and joined hands with Foch beyond that town. In this way the Allies would avoid the mass of ruined buildings and miners' cottages which composed (he town and would form admirable refuges for the German machine- gunners. The tactical methods to be employed on both the S. and N. battlefields were similar in conception, that is to say, there was to be a great rush forward of the assaulting infantry as soon as the attack had been adequately prepared by the artillery, and the reserves were to follow hard after the first-line troops. Only in the matter of the preparation of the ati was there any essential difference in the methods to be cmpl< by the British and the French. The former had determine replace an intense bombardment by a discharge of gas from cylinders similar to that from which they had suffered in 1 In- second battle of Ypres.
Of the British share in the general plan, the demonstrate in front of Armentieres proved quite ineffective, while the attack N. of the La Bassee canal failed. On the front opposite 1. however, the discharge of gas surprised the Germans and over- came the resistance of their first-line troops, though it c.-u some casualties among the British themselves and made it difficult to direct the attack. Despite this, the first wave of British infantry passed through and beyond Loos, when it appeared that they only needed the prompt arrival of the reserves to secure a very considerable success. Sir John French had, however, kept these back until he saw how the battle progressed, and when they arrived late in the evening the New Army division which formed two-thirds of the reserve found great difficulty in making their way through the confusion of the battlefield under conditions entirely strange to them, and were unable to confirm the first success won, so that, though Loos was held, German counter-attacks recovered a considerable part of the ground gained, and in particular the important Hill 70, which dominates Loos on the north. Worse still, Foch's attack on the Vimy Ridge failed almost completely and the Germans remained in possession of the crest. This alone condemned the N. attack to failure, for the British front of battle was not large enough to insure a breach in the enemy's defences sufficiently wide to be exploited successfully. The remainder of the battle of Loos, which lasted until Oct. 15, resolved itself into the repulse of a number of fierce German counter-attacks, which ended in mutual exhaustion, with the British in possession of the salient extending round Lens to the La Bassee canal.
The great battle in Champagne was an even more severe dis- appointment, because more had been expected. The first news
