name " Mars South "), and the VII. Army another S. of the Oise across the front of the Crepy group (code name " Archangel "). The Michael operation was to take place about March 20, the Mars South and Archangel attacks a few days later after the regrouping of the necessary artillery and mine-throwers. The aim of the Michael attack was to be a break-through of the enemy front as far as the Somme on the line Ham-Peronne, and an advance, in conjunction with the Mars attack, on the right back of the Somme through Peronne-Arras. The Archangel attack had merely to 'make a diversion, and try to seize the heights E. of the Oise-Aisne canal.
The Supreme Command also gave instructions that prepara- tions for the attack over the Lys depression at Armentieres- Estaire (St. George I.) and towards the Ypres salient (St. George II.) by the VI. and IV. Armies were to be pushed forward so as to be completed by the beginning of April. The idea of an envel- oping attack at Verdun (" Castor and Pollux ") was allowed to drop, as the chief of the general staff of army detachment C. had held out only very moderate hopes of success for an offensive S. of Verdun across the Meuse. On the other hand, in the event of
great French attack in Champagne, there was some thought of letting the III. Army fall back within certain limits, while the I. Army delivered a flanking counter-attack.
Ludendorff thus held fast to his plan of directing his offensive blow against the British. In choosing the Michael instead of the St. George operation, he was influenced chiefly by the fact that it would be independent of seasons and weather conditions and could therefore be carried out earlier. The tactical attack would, moreover, fall on a particularly weak spot in the enemy's front.
The idea of a diversion on a large scale, to take place either before or simultaneously with the Michael operation, was aban- doned, as it seemed necessary to use all the available forces for carrying out successfully the one great blow as planned. On the other hand the Supreme Command arranged for deceptive measures to be taken at various points on the armies' front, e.g. & lively artillery battle on the St. George and Archangel fronts; partial actions on the I. and III. Armies' fronts, particularly at Verdun; a long-range artillery battle on the Lorraine front. These commenced in some cases in the beginning of March, and were continued in the days immediately preceding the battle and until after it was well started.
On March 10 Hindenburg sent out a definite order fixing the morning of March 21 for the attack. According to this order the centre of gravity of the operations lay in the XVII. and II. Armies both at the beginning and during the later development. After achieving the first great tactical aim the cutting off of the British in the Cambrai sector, the offensive was to be carried N. of the Omignon brook in the direction of Albert-Arras and beyond, where the British front was to be dislocated by the VI. Army. The XVIII. Army was only required to cover the left flank S. of the Omignon brook, and to this end to take possession of the Somme and of the Crozat canal. Its deeply echeloned right wing could be extended northward to Peronne in case of necessity. An additional order from the German Crown Prince's army group in the meantime paved the way for the idea of a new move by the XVIII. Army by contemplating the possibility of its advance over the Somme and the Crozat canal. General von Hutier, commanding the XVIII. Army, at once grasped this idea it had probably occurred to him before and, in a document handed in to the army group on March 15, proposed as the XVIII. Army's task " as soon as the Somme and the Crozat canal had been crossed, to draw upon itself the French reserves designed for the support of the British and beat them, and to break the communications between the British and the French.
. . The sooner the army reached the line Chaulnes-Roye, the more chance would it have of meeting the French while they were still deploying, and the better the prospect of bringing about the war of movement." The Higher Command of the army group passed on the proposal with the additional note: " the more the French counter-offensive spends itself on Rupprecht's army group, the more effectually will the proposed operation hit the French. The enemy will be quick to recognize its decisive meaning
and the threat to his capital. We may, therefore, expect a very strong resistance, and on that account the operation must be launched by powerful forces."
Ludendorff's attitude toward this proposal is not known. It would appear from a conversation over the telephone with General von Kuhl on March 20 that he had already weighed the possibility of accommodating himself to the idea if circum- stances so shaped themselves, since he now intimated his inten- tion of fixing the centre of gravity for the advance of the XVII. Army in the direction of St. Pol, and that of the II. Army in the direction of Doullens-Amiens in case the XVIII. Army should meet with strong French opposition on the line Bray- Noyon if not earlier.
The peace training of the German General Staff was based on the strategic and tactical principles of its former chief of many years' standing, Count Schlieffen. Although a declared champion of the Cannae idea, the Count had also definitely accepted the break-through in his reflexions and teachings, though only under the conditions of a war of movement. In choosing the spot for the break-through Count Schlieffen considered the tactical weak spot within the enemy's lines to be of the first importance as a clue. At the same time there must be the possibility of following up a successful assault and break-through by an operation in a useful direction. He therefore considered a simultaneous attack against the whole enemy front to be the best means of breaking through, as by this their forces would be tied up, the reserves engaged and the shifting of troops to another place prevented.
When Ludendorff in 1918 was faced with the problem of the break-through, it was not under the conditions of a war of move- ment. The outward appearance of the war had fundamentally changed in the war of positions which had lasted for years. The defence was established along the whole front in a modern field position constructed according to a technique based on experi- ence. The German attacking force was therefore confronted everywhere with the task of overcoming the opposition of the enemy in its tactically strong positions. For this he needed at whatever point the break-through was attempted the means employed in siege warfare, in particular a large quantity of heavy artillery and flame-throwers. For all that, however, the enemy positions were not everywhere equal in their tactical power of resistance. The ground, constructional work, density of occupa- tion, formation of reserves, and value of the defence troops, showed many points of difference, and admitted of the sorting out of strong and weaker portions of the front. Ludendorff formed his decision quite in the spirit of Schlieffen's teaching. He, too, spied out the enemy's weakness. For the choice of the English front the leading political motive was probably primarily respon- sible, but the decision also happened to be in agreement with the military considerations. For although the British and French troops, in respect of their power of resistance, in tactical defence might be assessed at equal value, the British were inferior to the French in the skilled handling of masses, in the art of defensive battle and in power of strategic manoeuvre. The weak points within the I4o-m. British front in question, Armentieres-La Bassee and St. Quentin, had undergone an exhaustive critical examination by the Higher Command of Rupprecht's army group. If Ludendorff decided to attack at St. Quentin it was because he would be hitting the enemy at his weakest point.
Military critics have raised the objection that Ludendorff let himself be swayed too much by tactical considerations and neglected the demands of strategy, seeing his own task from the very beginning only as a battering performance, consisting of a succession of independent hammer-blows. There is nothing to support such views. Rather is it evident that Ludendorff, here as always, was basing his strategy on the prospect of a promising tactical battle in complete accordance with the Schlieffen ideas. The attack delivered from Lens in the direction of St. Pol, as recommended by the French Gen. Buat, was extremely difficult tactically and did not offer any guarantee of a prompt initial success. But on this everything depended. Moreover, Luden- dorff, in placing the attack where he did, had had visions of one great definite strategic aim, to break through the front of the
