serve troops, not yet inured to war, and dispersed over a wide front, when they launched their attacks against the Meuse
heights on the 2oth and following days.
At Vigneulles Gen. Grand d'Esnon of the 7Sth Res. Div. was killed and the enemy surmounted the Hauts de Meuse. Before long the German heavy artillery was bombarding the forts of Lionville and Geronville toward the S. and Camp des Remains in front. On Sept. 24 St. Mihiel was in the hands of the Ger- mans, who tried to gain ground W. of the Meuse but could not get beyond Chauvoncourt. In the N. von Strautz's army was held by Gen. Pol Durand's group of reserve division's which had come to the assistance of the VI. Corps. Toward the S. it was attacked by the XVI. Army Corps at St. Baussant and by the VII. Cav. Div.
The region of. Leronville-Marbotte was without defenders, but the Germans did not advance in the direction of Commercy, as their aim was to encircle Verdun. To this end the German Crown Prince attacked to the S. of Varennes and in Argonne simultaneously and the French III. Army thus found itself threatened both to the N. W. and to the S. of Verdun.
The isth Div. of the VIII. Corps was brought back to Chau- mont-sur-Aire to the III. Army Reserve, ready to hasten either to the aid of the V. Corps in the Argonne or toward Chauvon- court to help the 75th Res. Div.
The i6th Div. was transported by train from St. Menchould to Leronville-Sampigny and placed under the orders of the I. Army headquarters, for the purpose of covering Commercy, and was reinforced on Sept. 28 by the Bclfort Brigade. From this mo- ment von Strautz's army, which was composed of Bavarians, had its III. Army Corps bottled up at St. Mihiel and so the " Hernia," called also the " Wedge," came into being. From Les Epargcs to the Meuse S. of St. Mihiel, the III. Army put in line the VI. Corps and part of Gen. Pol Durand's group. The Bislee penin- sula and the front Koeur-la-Grande-Brasseitte-St. Agnant were held by the VIII. Corps with the i6th Inf. Div. and the Belfort Bde. To the E., in the region of the Bouconville pondsin Woevre, was the 7th Cav. Div. Still farther eastward the XVI. Corps was attacking fiercely at St. Baussant, urged on by the determined commander of the I. Army.
The zone S. of the St. Mihiel wedge and Woevre and N. of Toul was assigned to the I. Army. The point of liaison between the I. and III. Armies was on the Meuse below Bisl6e. Before long the III. Army was put under the command of the I. Army and it was therefore Gen. Dubail who was matched against Gen. von Strautz.
At first the Germans tried to debouch from Chauvoncourt, but without success. Elsewhere, both in the S. and the N., they made every effort to enlarge the wedge while the French attacks were directed toward diminishing it. Hence there resulted partial engagements at Chauvoncourt, in front of Les Parodies, at Les Eparges near the Hauts de Meuse, in the Bois d'Ailly, in the Bois Brule, near Aprcmont, and at St. Baussant.
For the beginning of April 1915, Gen. Dubail ordered an attack on a large scale from the N. and the S. to be delivered by several army corps. A force designated the army detachment Q6rard, including the I. and II. Army Corps, the Verdun Provisional Div., and the I. Cav. Corps, opened the attack on April 5 and took possession of Fromezey, Gussaniville and 1'Hopital farm (in the region of Etain), but broke down before the intact German wire for in the marshy ground the artillery projectiles buried themselves deeply.
In conjunction with the attack by Gerard's force an attack was launched by the XII. Corps and VIII. Corps which, however, had no particular results. The fighting lasted from the sth to the 22nd without achieving anything but the exhaustion of both attackers and defenders.
- From that time forward the struggle resolved itself into a
series of partial combats. The names Les Eparges, the Tranchee de Calonne, Chauvoncourt, Bois d'Ailly, Bois Brule, Seicheprey, Bois le Pretre recur day by day in the communiques of 1915.
On May 5 1915 the VIII. Corps lost in one morning all the ground which it had taken several months to gain in the Ailly
wood. There was even a moment when a gap in the line seemed to be broken through and the way opened to Commercy; but the counter-attacks came in time to regain part of the Bois d'Ailly, and restore the situation. In the course of one of these counter- attacks in the woods, a company of the 17 2nd, led by Com- mandant d'Andre, crossed five lines of German trenches in succession and came within sight of St. Mihiel. But here they were confronted by German reserves and surrounded. For three days these heroes resisted all attacks, having nothing but their rifles and the German grenades picked up in the fifth line of trenches. They finally succumbed to hunger and thirst. Justly indeed was this trench named " the thirst trench." When Gen. von Strautz saw Commandant d'Andre on the day after the fighting was over, he said, " Vous avez el6 deux fois blessi, vous ttiez au Bois d'Ailly, vous ties un brave."
At Bois le Pretre, near the Moselle, the fighting was incessant and for the most part to the advantage of the French.
At Les Eparges it was mine warfare. In this the Germans had generally the upper hand, but, as at the Bois d'Ailly and the Bois le Pretre, the upper hand did not imply the gain of ground desired. In mine warfare the Germans had a very considerable advantage over their opponents in the matter of equipment and especially of boring tools. At the outset the galleries they made in the Crete des Eparges and the colossal dimensions of their mine chambers astonished even the men of the II. Corps, re- cruited though many of them were from the mining country of the Nord. But, though astonished, they were not dismayed, and feeble as their implements were, they often took their revenge for the mine attacks to which they were subjected.
The characteristic of the army of 1915 was the poverty of its material in comparison to that at the disposal of the enemy. In ' it was learned the lesson that a nation poor in coal and iron must shed much blood to save itself from slavery.
When in Sept. 1915 the Champagne offensive was launched, quiet set in on the front Les Eparges-Chauvoncourt-Bois d'Ailly- Bois le Pretre. On both sides, the forces on this front were milked to obtain quality and quantity on the field of the great battle. When it died down, the battered formations came back to rest and recruit and also to fight, for activity began again in Nov. and Dec. 1915.
In Feb. 1916 the storm burst at Verdun, and in July the other storm on the Somme. Then the front with which we are con- cerned became so calm that the commander of the VIII. Corps called the Wedge of St. Mihiel a convalescent home.
Here and there, now and then there was a coup de main, but the only result was to show both sides the necessity of not relaxing vigilance. The year 1917 came and went without changing cither the positions or the attitude of the two parties. The great Bri tish offensive of Arras, the great French offensive on the Aisnc, the Franco-British battles of Ypres absorbed all the offensive power of the adversaries on the western front. Not till 1918 did the sector Les Eparges-Chauvoncourt-Bois d'Ailly-Bois le Pretre become again the scene of victory.
In concluding this survey of operations on the front between Les Eparges and the Moselle, it is necessary to underline again the poverty of material and munitions under which the French army laboured. Not only did it possess little heavy artillery, but even the 75*5, excellent for barrages, diminished daily and were replaced by B.L. guns of 90 and 95 mm., obsolete since 1900. Track for light railways could not be had. Boring tools were so short that mine warfare in the Forest of Apremont had to be waged with pick, chisel and crowbar. Ammunition was served out by spoonfuls, and at one moment the commander of the eastern group of armies had only 350 rounds per gun for his 75's half an hour's battle allowance.
These conditions were, of course, not peculiar to the front under consideration, and are introduced here to enable the reader to see how the Higher Command was obliged to apply the great Napoleonic principle of economy of force; to show how it was possible for the Crown Prince to break in the Verdun front or, for that matter, the whole front from the Meuse to Switzerland, for the defenders were few, their guns few, and their shell very few.
