had broken off the battle of Przemysl and the San in the night. Once more Kusmanek was confronted with the same tasks as in September. Shortly before the retreat of the field armies the fortress had been reinforced by the 8sth Landwehr Bde. and a company of airmen. The strength of the garrison was approxi- mately the same as at the beginning of the first investment. In order to extend the fortress's sphere of action, and to force the Russians to keep their line of investment at a greater distance from the actual ring of forts, at the same time obliging them to use more forces for the occupation of the longer line, Kusmanek had new foreground positions laid out. These formed a curve beginning at the Na Gorach height, and, passing 2-3 km. in front of the western ring of forts, came out S.E. of Krasiczyn at the old foreground position. From Helicha this position was extended to the S. of the fortress through Zlota Gora up to the Siedliska group. This measure secured a double advantage: it placed another obstacle in the way of the attacker, who would have to surmount it before he could assault the ring of forts; and the works would suffer far less from the bombardment, as the siege artillery would be forced to remain farther away from the for- tress. On the pth the investment of the fortress was completed for the second time. The Grand Duke Nicholas had selected the Russian XI. Army under Gen. Selivanov for the siege. This army, consisting of about four infantry and one to two cavalry divisions, had barely half the forces used in the first siege under Radko Dimitriev. This circumstance, and the comparatively small activity shown by the Russians at the beginning of the second siege, pointed to the conclusion that Selivanov was less concerned with a rapid seizure of Przemysl than with the idea of a regular siege, in which he would effect a saving of men on his own side while exploiting the scarcity of food supplies in the fortress, leaving the garrison to grow weak from starvation be- fore he advanced to a serious attack.' Kusmanek, on the othvr hand, displayed all the more activity. The months of Nov. and Dec. he employed in aggressive defence, and only desisted when the decimation of his forces by disease forced him to do so. In nine sorties he seized every possible opportunity of damaging the enemy, of preventing any withdrawals from his forces to the field armies; of destroying his supply trains and lines of communi- cation, and finally of bringing into the fortress any food-stuffs such as fruit and vegetables which could be collected. In Dec., when the Austro-Hungarian armies took the offensive again, these sorties gained in importance, for each important action under- taken by the fortress with the object of containing Russian forces was necessarily a great disadvantage to the Russians defeated in the battle of Limanowa-Lapanow. Above all, in the case of a successful advance by the right wing of the III. Army, the possibility of cooperation between that wing and the sortie troops was not excluded.
On Nov. 7 and 1 2 further sorties were undertaken in the di- rection of Nizankowice and Kormanice. On the I4th, following on a report by ths airmen of movements of Russian forces through Pruchnik to the W. and S.W., an assault was delivered on Rokietnica by 17 battalions and 10 batteries. For the same reason an equally powerful sortie was made from the S.W. front on the 2oth, the main force moving on Cisowa, and the side columns towards Krzywcza and the Szybenica h light.
In Dec. the Russians also became more active. Having let Nov. go by without doing more than prepare a more or less sys- tematic siege, they now began their attacks and turned Dec. into a month of many battles. Quite at the beginning the 82nd Inf. Div. advanced against the N. front. Kusmanek delivered a vigorous counter-blow from the area of Mackowice against the enemy's right flank and repulsed the attack. On Dec. 9 this action was followed by yet another -sortie by 19 battalions and 10 batteries from the S.W. front, with the object of preventing the departure of the Russian 8ist Inf. Div.
In the middle of Dec., when the battle of Limanowa-Lapanow had reached its height, Kusmanek received an order from the Army Higher Command to deliver a fresh assault. In the hope of being able to join hands with Krautwald's group, advancing on the right wing of Boroevic's army, Kusmanek prepared for a
great undertaking. With 23 battalions and 15 batteries, com- manded by Field-Marshal-Lt. von Tamassy, he pushed forward on the 1 5th in the direction of Bircza and Krzywcza. After four days of victorious fighting, the heights halfway between Cisowa and Bircza were captured, the enemy driven back along the whole of the S.W. front, and the road to Bircza laid open. But as Krautwald meanwhile had been forced back by the Russians, and as the hope of effecting a junction with him had become a forlorn hope on account of the great distance intervening, and as, further, a fresh violent attack had been launched against the northern foreground position, Na Gorach, Kusmanek found himself obliged to turn his attention to this latter, and to recall Tamassy on the igth to the fortress.
Once more it was the Russian 82nd Inf. Div. which advanced on Na Gorach. Portions had already penetrated the advanced positions when Kusmanck's counter-attack set in on the 2oth, and on the 2ist threw them back to the line of investment.
At the end of Dec. yet another order from the Army Higher Command led to a fresh sortie. After the battle of Limanowa- Lapanow the Russians, taking advantage of their interior lines, had opened a counter-offensive against the troops of the III. and IV. Armies which had pushed forward into West Galicia. The proposal was for a sortie to be made in a south-westerly direction, falling in with the left flank of the Russian attack on the one hand, and on the other making a second attempt to effect a junction with the III. Army's right wing, which was pushing forward towards Lisko, Sanok and Rymanow. But with the suspension of the offensive on the 28th the sortie troops were brought back.
This sortie brought the offensive activity of the garrison to a close for the time being, in consideration of their ever-increasing losses through fighting and sickness. All forces were now to be reserved for the effort on a large scale to relieve the fortress, which was planned for the middle of February.
The month of Jan. saw the beginning of a period of great self- denial and sacrifice for the garrison, in consequence .of the in- creasing scarcity of food. The commandant and his staff had in addition the difficult task of maintaining the striking power of the garrison with insufficient means, which involved exacting the maximum of service from each individual soldier in spite of his lack of nourishment. On Dec. i 1914 Kusmanek, counting upon a delay in the relief operations, had ordered the first general reduc- tion of rations for men and horses. At the end of the month the first horses were killed for the purpose of providing meat and saving fodder. Had the fortress been consuming its full rations it could not have held out beyond the end of Jan., but by the reduction of the ration and further slaughter of horses (up to 7,450), supplies were eked out until the end of March. The extension of the life of the fortress was in proportion to the estab- lishment of horses it was necessary to keep up. For the projected break-through sortie and for the absolutely essential fortress duties a minimum establishment of 4,500 had to be allowed for. By means of further reducing the ration, resorting to incredi- ble makeshifts, and sacrificing 3,500 more horses, the provis- ioning was made to last until March 24, but there was a rapid mounting-up of the sick list. By the beginning of March one-fifth of the fortress establishment had fallen. To the scarcity of food was added in the winter months that of clothing, footwear and all the other necessaries of life. The garrison had been equipped, for the most part, with summer clothing, and even this had been badly damaged in the fighting. In respect of technical and artillery supplies also, the fortress gradually lost its power of resistance. The barrels of the guns had been gradually burnt out by the excessive demands made on them, and the range of the guns declined accordingly. The stores of ammunition were also rapidly coming to an end, despite the utmost economy.
While the striking power of the fortress was suffering sensibly from all the unspeakable privations imposed by hunger, cold and want, the besiegers were gradually becoming more active. At first the Russians confined themselves to increasing the air- men's activity. Almost every day their airmen circled round the fortress, with very little hindrance' from its quite inadequate means of defence, dropping bombs on the forts and the town. In
