Middle Drina to keep a foothold on the right hand, and on the
22nd the whole river front was again occupied by the Serbians.
Meanwhile the troops of the Austrian II. Army had ceased to press Shumaja I. on the line of the Dobrava, and begun to fall back on Shabats, and the 2ist Landwehr Div. in the plain like- wise retreated on the Drina, followed by the Serbian cavalry division which gleaned prisoners, guns and vehicles. On Aug. 21-22, Shumaja I., reinforced by troops from Tser on its left, and also by Timok II. from the I. Army, advanced from the S.E., S., and S.W. on Shabats, held by elements of the IV. Corps and by the zgth Div., under the command of General Tersztyanski. On the 23rd sharp counter-strokes were made by the Austrians to hold off pressure on their river flank. Only rear-guards remained in Shabats when the Serbs attacked on the 24th.
So ended the first invasion of Serbia. The principal reason for its failure was the Austrian commander-in-chief 's undervalua- tion of the military, and overvaluation of the political, factors with which he had to deal. Neither on the part of the Higher Command nor on the part of the Court was pressure brought to bear on him. Nor, after the event, did he attempt to find scape- goats among his subordinates. What he did, he did in the exer- cise of unfettered judgment. But history will not regard this judgment as of a high order. To hurry * on an offensive in moun- tainous country, from a starting-point at a maximum distance from the strategically decisive point, with three armies equipped in the main for warfare in the plains, of which one was under orders for another theatre, is so astonishing a proceeding that it can only be assumed that. the campaign was never intended to be more than a demonstration of activity, analogous to a puni- tive march up some valley of the Indian frontier region. And indeed, Potiorek's position as civil and military commander of a rough frontier region has been very aptly compared to that of an Indian viceroy. Regarded from this standpoint, the advance over the Drina is an operation differing in degree only from the advance of the XV. and XVI. Corps on the Lim or that of the 3rd Mountain Brigade into the fastnesses S.E. of Gatsko. And in such an operation the assistance of the II. Army might no doubt be dispensed with. But if the ground of justification be thus shifted, the basis of criticism is shifted also, and in that case what is to be said of a modern European commander-in-chief who thought that an organized army of n strong divisions, recently victorious in two campaigns over other organized armies, could be treated as though it were on the military-tech- nical level of a frontier tribe? Actually, it appears that the astonishment and dismay of the commanders, from army down to and below division commanders, at the incomprehensible sequence of events was no small factor in the issue.
Of the conduct of operations on the Serbian side it need only be said that Putnik's management of his forces in space and time, and the choice of the moment and place of counter-attack, were masterly. To gain great results, the risks of a forward concentra- tion were accepted, but always under such conditions that the chances and profits of success were greater than the chances and losses of defeat. The object was limited, but its attainment com- plete without remainder.
At the same time, in this as in many other instances, the idea of a limitation of objective has been criticised per se. Only a detailed reconstruction of the conditions at the moment of the counter-offensive would make a final judgment to be formed on the question in the present case; and for that the materials not only have not been published but are probably not even in existence, since the bulk of the Serbian archives were destroyed in the autumn of 1915. But this much may be said, that the Serbians were, in point of ammunition and transport, ill-equipped for a great strategic pursuit either into Bosnia or into Hungary, that the great battle in Galicia was only just opening, and its consequences could scarcely be foreseen, and that the strain of the forced marches imposed by the forward concentration, fol- lowed by that of hill fighting, had told heavily on the victors.
The Syrmian Operation and the Massed Austro-Hungarian
1 The Commander of the V. Army, von Frank, protested against this hurry, and only submitted to a formal order.
Attack. The Yadar and Shabats operations closed, then, on the river line, but meanwhile no events had taken place on the front E. of Obrenovats, and the Austro-Hungarians were palpably withdrawing forces by all railheads between Weisskirchen and Mitrovitsa, and after a short rest the Serbian command decided to push an offensive over the Sava into Syrmia (Srem), the sub- district of Hungary lying in the angle between the Sava and Dan- ube. In this region were three of the six railheads at the enemy's disposal and an important lateral line. Its occupation would therefore thrust back the line of deployment of any future attack from the N., and the new front to be held defensively at the fur- ther limit of the.occupied area would lie in and across the Fruska mountain range (the Mitrovitsa-Peterwardein), and thence along a part of the Danube which was exceptionally strong as an obstacle owing to the marshes and channels at the confluence of the Theiss to Semlin and the old Danube front. This gained, it would be possible to embark upon an invasion of Bosnia with- out fear of a sudden attack in flank and rear.
As early as the 26th, two days after the reconquest of Shabats, Putnik issued general instructions regrouping the army for the new project. The II. Army (now to consist of Morava I., Timok I., Timok II., and " Combined " divisions) was to occupy and defend the Lower Drina to Lyeshnitsa exclusive. The III. Army (Drina I., Drina II., Morava II.) was to hold from Lyeshnitsa inclusive to Zvornik. A special detachment, reporting directly to G.H.Q., was to hold the crossings below and at Lyuboviya. The I. Army (Shumaja I., Danube I., cavalry division) was to assemble towards Shabats and prepare to force a passage into Syrmia. The Belgrade and Pozharevats groups were to continue in their defensive missions, the former to be prepared to cooperate with the I. Army in the capture of Semlin, the latter to dispatch its principal formation, Danube II., to Obrenovats for Sept. 9. The Uzhitse Army was to continue its mountain offensive towards Vishegrad, in concert with the Montenegrin Plevlye group. The date of the Sava crossing was to be ordered by G.H.Q., and mean- while the II. and IV. Armies were instructed to reconnoitre crossing places on the Drina line, and to obtain all possible intelli- gence as to the condition of the enemy in their front.
A pause followed, while the preliminary work was being carried out and the I. Army being marched over from the Morava valley. The enemy was occupied with reorganization, and with the reliefs and takings-over consequent on the withdrawal of the II. Army. On the whole northern front there remained one post-line divi- sion only, the 2gth; along the rivers themselves were Landsturm formations. Yet Potiorek was in fact contemplating a new thrust on the Drina; and the 2Qth Div. was ordered to be ready to cooperate by forcing a passage of the Sava at Yarak. Thus it befell that the division was grouped between Huma, Yarak and Nikinci when the Serbian offensive was launched. Apart from it, there were no formations in Syrmia other than the regiments holding the thin surveillance line.
On Sept. 3 General Krauss, commanding the 2gth A.H. Div., received word that the Serbs intended to force the passage of the Sava below Mitrovitsa. This report he more than half-disbe- lieved, and in any case, regarding Mitrovitsa- Yarak as the centre of gravity of the Serbian offensive into Syrmia, he was content to leave his forces grouped as they were for Potiorek's intended advance. This was to take place on the 7th, and for it the 7th Inf. Div. was added to Krauss's command, henceforward known as the " Combined Corps Krauss."
On the night of Sept. 5-6, the Serbian preparations being com- plete, the passage was forced in two places, between Mitrovitsa and Yarak by Timok I. of the II. Army, and at the Kupinovo loop by the I. Army. The former, intended more as a demonstra- tion than an operative crossing, was successfully achieved, but the eager troops pressed on without making a bridgehead, fell into the midst of Krauss's troops and, driven back on the river, were overwhelmed in the attempt to recross, five battalions being completely destroyed.
The Kupinovo division, on the other hand, secured their posi- tion with a bridgehead line before pushing on. Fortune favoured them, too, for the defence here consisted of Landsturm forces
