The Kolubara Campaign. The course of the war during Sept- ember and October had not been favourable to Austria-Hungary. Galicia had been lost, and the line of battle had receded W. until it lay in the region of Lodz-Cracow-the Dunajec and the Car- pathians. In November, the campaign in the western theatres had ended in deadlock. Falkenhayn had succeeded to the control of German operations, and his doctrine of wearing-down strategy was taking shape. Winter was at hand.
Nevertheless, Potiorek meant to resume active operations. No binding order prevented him from doing so. Conrad's instruc- tions were that he was to prevent an irruption of the Serbs into Austro-Hungarian territory, but it was left to him to decide whether that defence should be passive or conducted offensively by partial attacks. The Emperor expressed the wish that Poti- orek would succeed in defending the monarchy, to which the Feldzeugmeister replied that he " hoped to do a good deal better than that." Falkenhayn, with his wider outlook, suggested a sudden seizure of the N.E. corner of Serbia with the view of opening up a line of munitions transport to Turkey, but this proj- ect aroused no interest at the headquarters of the " viceroy " of Bosnia, who was resolved to drive another offensive into Serbia with all his might, at the first favourable opportunity.
The Serbians meanwhile had suffered severely from the unfa- miliar conditions of trench warfare, notably in the Machva, and at the end of October Putnik had decided to evacuate the line in that quarter. The Austrian attack of Oct. 31, therefore, met with only outpost resistance, and Shabats was occupied two days later, while monitor activity continued on the rivers. 1
The advance of Krauss and the VIII. Corps in the Machva was the first stage of the new general offensive. On the night of the 4Sth it was developed by a frontal attack from Shabats com- bined with a fresh crossing at Mishar, the Serbians continuing their retreat to the line N. Dobrava-Dobrits-Tser ridge. On the next night (Nov. 5-6) a heavy bombardment opened along the whole Austrian front, especially on that of the Guchevo range. On the 6th, infantry pressure began along the mountains from the W. end of Guchevo as far as Yagodnya. Once more, evidently, Potiorek intended the centre of gravity of his attack to be on the right and right centre, the front of his own army composed of mountain troops long familiar to him, and well equipped for the work. On the 6th, from the slopes of Guchevo itself he issued a proclamation, stirring his troops to the highest efforts by prom- ising them this time the " annihilation " of the " exhausted " enemy. Nor were these empty words, for the condition of the Serbian moral at this time and their shortage of ammunition were evident.
At this opening moment, the dispositions and order of battle on both sides were as follows:
Serbian II. Army (Vidoyevitsa-Dobrava) : Morava I., Timok II., Shumaja I., Timok II., Cav. div. and details; 63 battalions, 27 squadrons, 34 batteries.
///. Army (Yadar-Kostaynik) : Drina I., Drina II., Combined Division; 40 battalions, 6 squadrons, 1 8 batteries.
I. Army, under Boyovish (Kostaynik-Uzovnitsa stream and Drina): Morava III., Danube I., Danube II. (temporarily de-
pated by a counter-attack of the 8th Mountain Brigade when that formation returned from an expedition in relief of Sarajevo. The Serbian column retreated whence it had come, to Bamabashta. Finally, when on the main front much warfare set in, the Serbians and Montenegrins began slowly to retire to their respective fron- tiers, while on the other side a systematic drive was carried out by large forces of the XV. and XVI. Corps. One Austrian group ad- vanced from Sarajevo E. on Rogatitsa, and won a severe engage- ment on Romanja Planina on Oct. 21-22. While another following up the retirement of the Serbs from Vlasenitsa advanced on Roga- titsa from the N. The Montenegrins between Focha and Katinovik did not give way without inflicting severe losses on the group opposed to them. But by the end of October all the allied forces had with- drawn behind the Drina. Farther S., the region of Artovats was again the scene of some irregular fighting in October.
1 During October, there had been many local engagements on the Danube-Sava front. Belgrade was frequently bombarded. The defence was very active, and minefields were placed at several points, to one of which, near Shabats, the monitor " Temes " fell victim on Oct. 23. In the main, however, the Austrians kept the upper hand.
tached to II. Army); Lyuboviya detachment; 44 battalions, 9 squadrons, 24! batteries.
Uzhitse Army, under Aratich (along Upper Drina from Tirye- shnitsa stream to the Lim, front continued thence by Montene- grins): Shumaja II., Lim detachments, Uzhitse Brigade; 34 battal- ions, 2 squadrons, 12 batteries.
Belgrade Detachment, under Zhivkovich (Brestovik-Pechani) : 17 battalions, one squadron, 9 field and some medium batteries.
Obrenovats Detachment (Pechani-Vukodrazh R.) : 6 battalions, 3 batteries.
Branicevo Group and Kraina Group (Brestovik-Kladovo) : 12 bat- talions, 4 batteries.
(The three last-mentioned forces were on the river front.)
Serbian total: 226 battalions of all categories, 41 squadrons, 113 batteries, modern and B.L.
The Austro-Hungarian forces and dispositions, as established by the Serbians, were as follows :
River front from Shabats E. : 55 battalions, almost entirely Land- sturm.
Shabats- Machva-Loznitsa front (V. Army, in order from left to right Krauss, VIII., XIII.): 87 battalions.
Loznitsa-Lyuboviya (VI. Army, XV., XVI. Corps, 40 Honved Divs., and other troops) : 1 10 battalions.
South-west of Lyuboviya: mountain troops (1-2 brigades).
On the 7th, the VI. Army attacked and pushed the Serbian III. Army off the entire Guchevo ridge, and bore back the I. Army * and the right of the Uzhitse Army till the latter, marking the extreme left of the battlefronts, stood on Trsvena Stena.
On the 8th the retrograde movement of the III. and I. Armies continued to the line Kozaningrad (pt. 706) on Tser-Strasha (i424)-Zavlaka-Petrina Stena-Proslop. Meanwhile, the Serbs on the Machva retiring to the line Kozaningrad-the Dobrava were under strong pressure. Next day, in the midst of general activity on the water, an Austrian regiment forced the passage of the Danube at Semendria, threatening an inroad in the Morava valley itself, and part of the Belgrade force was hurried E. to deal with this threat, which it did successfully.
The reports from the front had already decided Putnik to withdraw to a line covering Valyevo, viz. Obrenovats group, Kolubara mouth to Skela; II. Army, Ub-Blizonzhski heights; III. Army, Yantina-Kamenitsa; I. Army, Yolina Breza-Sovachki Kik; Uzhitse Army, right Trsvena Stena-centre and left Vishe- grad to river Lim. But it soon became apparent that a stand could not be made on this line. Moral was low, with mixture of units considerable. In the two Drina divisions of the II. Army in particular men feared for their families and considerable numbers left the ranks and made their way home, while accompanying the retreat were hundreds of refugee families with their carts and beasts, fugitive or requisitioned. From the interior, new drafts came up in thousands and congested Valyevo.
Though the army was by no means in dissolution, it was un- disguisedly in full retreat. By order of G.H.Q. communications were destroyed in the retirement.
The line now to be taken up was the so-called " Kolubara line," which from the rear followed that river to the confluence of the tributary Lig, then, by the Lig to Gukosi and thence by height 700 to the Malyen ridge at Malyen (point 997). The Kolubara part of the line (with a defensive flank along the Sava) was to be held by the Obrenovats group; from just below Lazarevats to Malyen inclusive was allotted to the II., III. and I. Armies west. The Uzhitse Army was to leave one brigade at Kadinyacha on the ridge between Rogatitsa and Uzhitse, the remainder astride the Vishegrad-Uzhitse road at Shargan.
By the evening of Nov. 14, the Obrenovats detachment had taken up its positions behind the Kolubara, the II. Army had fallen back from Kotsielevo towards Lazarevats and the Middle Kolubara, the III. Army, always manoeuvring so as to extricate its right before its left could be turned, was astride the Yadar- Valyevo road at the water parting about Kamenitsa, and the I. Army continued, the line S. to Velovitsa, with its Rogatitsa detachment (somewhat out of touch) pushing the left in the
2 The I. Army was short of Danube II., which had been taken to strengthen the II. Army N. of Tser. Habitual disregard of the order of battle, i.e. an unnecessary regrouping, has been criticised as a peculiar failing in the Serbian method of conducting operations. Often, of course, there was no alternative. But there seems some justification for the criticism, nevertheless.
