ciple of this bill, Count Romanones having accepted it as part of Canalejas' political testament. This difference of opinion brought about the resignation of the Cabinet (June n). Despite insistent efforts from the King, no solution could be found to bridge over the difficulty; and on June 13, Count Romanones having failed to conciliate the non-conformists of his party, formed a Cabinet of personal followers, which aggravated the division. Parliament was indefinitely adjourned. The division in the party materialized in the formation of a Garcia Prieto faction, and it was generally realized that the solution given to the crisis was a mere stop-gap, necessitated by the coming visit of M. Poincare to Madrid.
The Government weathered several strike difficulties and had to face a troubled period of unrest in Morocco, where Gen. Franco- Marina succeeded Gen. Alfau as High Commissioner. Spanish A Franco-Spanish rapprochement was then initiated, Rapproche- with a visit of Gen. Lyautey to Madrid and of M. Barthou, the French prime minister, to San Sebastian, where he saw the King. All these movements prepared the ground for the official visit of M. Poincare, then President of the French Republic, who arrived in Madrid Oct. 7. The President left Spain by way of Cartagena, where he embarked on the battleship " Diderot," Spain being represented by the battleship " Espana " and England by H.M.S. "Inflexible." Both the King and the President emphasized the fact that it was in Cartagena that six years earlier Spain, France and England had agreed on a common policy in the Mediterranean.
As soon as the summer holidays were over and M. Poincare had left Spanish soil, the latent crisis which divided the Liberal Senor party broke out again. The prime minister had to Dato provoke it himself in the Senate. He was beaten
Prime (Oct. 25) and he resigned. The King then considered ter ' that the Liberal policy which he had consistently followed since Seiior Maura's fall in 1909 was at an end. But he was not ready to follow Senor Maura in his uncompromising attitude, and he selected Senor Dato as a solution more accept- able to the democratic wing of the country. Senor Dato was unable to consult his chief on the King's offer, for Senor Maura had left Madrid for an unknown destination. He therefore accepted office (Oct. 27), being averse to leaving the Crown without the services of one of the two great historical parties. From this date, the Conservative party began to show open signs of division, and thus the second of the two great rotating parties, which Canovas and Sagasta had created, began also to disintegrate. The first act of the new Government was to grant a decree giving validity of law to the bill " De Mancomunidades," a move directed to enlisting the sympathies of Conservative opinion of Catalonia. On the last day of the year, Senor Dato obtained from the King a decree dissolving the Cortes.
The first half of 1914 saw the consolidation of the Dato faction of the Conservative party. The general election, which took place in the spring, yielded a sufficient majority, both in the Senate and in the Chamber. Moroccan Kind's affairs were the main subject of discussion in Parlia- ment an ^ press, and the King lost a good deal of the popularity which he had won under the Liberals on account of several incidents which, rightly or wrongly, were interpreted as acts of personal power and interference with the discretion of the Government in military matters. This opinion was strengthened by an uncalled-for decree, countersigned by Gen. Echagiie as War Minister, establishing the King's right to correspond directly with his army officers of all ranks. Yet the Reformist movement, which had gathered great momentum at a demonstration on Oct. 23 I9r3, when Don Melquiades Alvarez had defined its aims and limits, gained ground, ably helped by an intellectual group headed by Prof. Ortega y Gasset.
The international situation of Spain at the outbreak of war was defined by two sets of circumstances: official, and national or popular. The official situation was ruled by the Cartagena Agreement of 1907, confirmed by the conversations held in the same place in 1913 between M. Poincare and Count Romanones. These agreements and conversations stipulated that " should
new circumstances arise tending to alter the territorial status quo " in the Mediterranean or in the European and African coasts of the Atlantic, the three powers concerned (Spain, France and England) would " enter into communication " in order to take any measures that might be necessary. The war was obviously a " circumstance " falling within the limits of the above definition. Yet Spain did not " enter into communica- tion " with France and England. But, contrary to what was generally believed at the time, her abstention was due to the fact that the two powers most interested in the matter, France and England, made no sign to set in motion the Cartagena Agreements. Faced with this situation, Senor Dato promptly declared for an absolute neutrality. This decision was based on a sound reading of the situation from its national and popular point of view. The violation of Belgium had given to the war an almost sacred character which the Allies emphasized to the full. Yet the fact did not escape Spanish public opinion that, though the defence of Belgium and the interest of the Allies were two coincident aims, they were not essentially one and the same " cause." Thus, while the generosity of England in rushing to the rescue of Belgium (and for that matter of France) was not denied, it was also realized that England had a strong national interest at stake which powerfully helped her to make up her mind. Now, such a strong national interest was entirely lacking in the case of Spain. Spain was in fact the only European nation which had no stake in the war. Add to this that the na- tion was divided as to its feelings. The working classes, the more numerous part of the intellectuals and most of the trading communities, were pro-Ally. The clergy, most of the army and of the bureaucracy and the " idle rich," were pro-German. The Moroccan negotiations had by no means improved the feelings of the Spanish people towards France. For the well- informed politician and publicist, France was the nation which treated with Germany and with England as if Spain did not exist, and turned round afterwards to make Spain pay what she had had to pay in Berlin or in London. For the clergy, France was the atheistic republic, the scarlet woman of the West. For the army, France was the ever-watchful rival in Morocco. For all of them, England was a nation whose dominat- ing principle in foreign affairs was the increase of British power. Thus, the country was split into a reactionary and conservative pro-German wing and a democratic or " advanced " pro-Ally wing, and, as this division was real, and not fictitious as were the party groups, it cut across the parties. So-called Conserva- tives such as Senor Sanchez de Toca, so-called Liberals such as Count Romanones, sided with Reformists and Republicans on the pro-Ally side, while Liberals such as Senor Villanueva and Conservatives like Senor Besada led the pro-Germans.
On one definite point everybody agreed. Spain was to keep out of the war. There were only two exceptions, more apparent than real. Senor Lerroux, the leader of the Catalan Radicals, advocated participation in the war on the jvea side of the Allies. But he spoke without responsibility, as a man who knows that he can make capital out of an opinion which he is perfectly sure he will never be in a position to carry into practice from office. The other case was more serious. On Aug. 10 El Diario Universal, a paper known to reflect the opinions of Count Romanones, published an article under the title of " Deadly Neutralities," which in a veiled manner advo- cated participation in the war on the side of the Allies. It created a great sensation, for it was attributed to Count Romanones himself, and it is certain that, if not written by him, the article was concocted under his direct inspiration. As events were to show, it was only meant as a ballon d'essai, and, after a short period of press agitation, was forgotten.
The Government concentrated their activity on the organi- zation of the country for the new situation created by "the war. A " Committee of Initiative " was created for the War study and coordination of national and private i.exisia- efforts to deal with war problems, and this Committee a< "*' was put under the chairmanship of Seiior La Cierva -a move to attract this important political figure to the Datist side of the
