lesson, which was insufficiently appreciated by the Turkish Supreme Command. The form of a strategic movement has of itself BO driving force; the vital factor, in strategic force too, is the troops. Now the spirit of the troops depends mainly on their physical condition. An army called on, when insufficiently clad and underfed, to face the snows of winter soon loses its fighting value. If strategy depends on the efficiency of the troops, this in its turn depends on the efficiency of the supply and trans- port services, and the administration of the army in general. Only when this organization is in good order and working well , can the leading strategic conception be, in the true sense of the word, free. On this simple truth the strategy of the Turks dur- ing the World War always suffered shipwreck, even when they had better leaders than those who appeared during the war in Armenia. (F. C. E.)
(II.) MESOPOTAMIAN OPERATIONS
The Anglo-Indian operations of 1914-8 in Mesopotamia, which ended in the military occupation of almost the whole of that i extensive region, were in their initial stages conceived on com- paratively modest lines. They were at the outset undertaken merely with the object of (i) protecting the Anglo- Persian oil installations of the Qarun; (2) occupying the greater part of the Basra vilayet, so as to secure possession of the Shatt al "Arab and to maintain control of the districts immediately round the head of the Persian Gulf; and (3) impressing the Arabs and others in this and neighbouring regions and influencing thereby the in- habitants of the territories intervening between the Ottoman i Empire and India. It was foreseen in London and at Simla that the Ottoman Government would be likely, under instigation i from Berlin, to send troops in this direction, for the purpose of harassing the Indian executive by stirring up trouble in Persia and Afghanistan; and steps had been taken to deal with the contingency before relations between the Entente Powers and the Porte were actually broken off. The Poona Bde. of the 6th Indian Div. had been dispatched to an island near the head of
- the Persian Gulf in the middle of Oct., and on Nov. 7, two days
'after the British Government declared war on Turkey, these advanced troops appeared in their transports at the mouth of the Shatt al 'Arab.
The fort guarding the entrance to the estuary was taken after
j brief bombardment, and the brigade then disembarked and
Encamped some miles up-stream on the right bank. On learning
- his the Turks hurried all available forces down from Basra to
oar the way to the invader; but, the rest of the 6th Div. under
iSir A. Barrett having arrived, they were attacked on the iyth and
effectually overthrown. Basra fell on the 2ist. The vanquished
Dsmanlis for the most part retired to Qurna, at the junction of
|:he Euphrates with the Tigris, the point where the water-way
rcases to be navigable for ocean-going vessels proceeding up-
itream; but Barrett promptly pushed troops to a point higher
!ip, and the place surrendered on Dec. 9. Considerable Ottoman
- 'enforcements had, however, been on the way from Bagdad
t:owards Basra since the arrival of the Anglo-Indian expeditionary
orce in the Shatt al 'Arab, and these now began concentrating,
>artly in the direction of Ahwaz and menacing the oil-fields, and
>artly about Nasiriya on the Euphrates. Threatened in a meas-
Mre on either flank, and necessarily dispersed owing to having
nany posts to hold, the 6th Div. was not comfortably situated;
>ut, as the Turkish fighting forces which had come down from
he N. were not as yet organized for active operations nor in an
iggressive mood, the invaders were enabled to consolidate their
>osition, and they were little interfered with during the first
hree months of 1915.
The Indian Government was, however, anxious to obtain a
tronger hold upon the district already occupied, and so in
! Vlarch it was decided to raise the expeditionary force to the
'trength of an army corps. Early in April Sir J. Nixon took
'ver command from Gen. Barrett, who with limited means had
onducted the campaign with signal skill and judgment, and
Jen. Townshend at the same time assumed charge of the 6th
|)ivision. The last units of the new division (the i2th) had
rrived by the middle of the month. These changes, as it turned
out, synchronized with a marked increase of activity on the part of the Turks; for they appeared in some force near Qurna and also seriously threatened Ahwaz; they were, however, driven off with no great difficulty at both points. Encouraged by these successes, Nixon decid'ed to assume the offensive and to occupy 'Amara, a town of some importance 60 m. N. of Qurna on the Tigris, but considerably farther if following the sinuosities of the stream. This task was entrusted to Townshend, who carried it out by making free use of water-transport of all kinds for moving his troops. Aided by a naval flotilla, on May 31, he signally defeated a hostile force which tried to bar the way; and then, as the result of a bold stroke, on June 3 made himself master of 'Amara, capturing 17 guns and 1,800 prisoners. This operation accomplished, Nixon resolved on a blow against Nasiriya. The heat was now intense; but, in spite of this, por- tions of the 1 2th Div., relying for mobility largely upon water transport, took possession of the town after some hard fighting on July 25, another 17 guns with 1,000 prisoners being the prize of victory. The Anglo-Indian army which had descended upon this corner of the Ottoman Empire could then fairly claim that it had achieved the object for which the campaign had been originally undertaken.
Its triumph had been all the more creditable seeing how seriously it had suffered from want of transport, and taking the inadequacy of its administrative branches into consideration. It must be remembered that the Indian Government had accepted heavy commitments in other fields of military action. Two divisions had been dispatched to the western front. Large forces had been furnished for the protection of Egypt. The E. African campaign also at that stage was an Indian undertaking. The military organization of the great British Asiatic dependency had not in pre-war days been framed with the idea of prosecuting martial operations on an ambitious scale overseas. Large re- serves of trained men did not exist to fill those gaps in the ranks that contests with well armed antagonists bring about in the present day. The available departmental services notably the medical service had been starved. The troops now operating at the head of the Persian Gulf were, moreover, faced by quite exceptional difficulties, owing to the insufficiency of that shallow- draught water transport upon which their efforts and their main- tenance virtually hinged.
Unfortunately, the success which had hitherto attended the combinations of Generals Barrett and Nixon inspired the civil and military authorities at Simla with the desire for a more ambitious programme in Mesopotamia than that which had been contemplated in Oct. 1914, and they readily fell in with Nixon's proposal that an advance up the Tigris to Kut should be undertaken. The Home Government agreed. This meant an advance of some 180 m. up-river into the heart of the enemy's country by troops who had already undergone much hardship, the maintenance of the force depending upon a flotilla that was barely adequate for the purpose and that would become entirely inadequate were the strength of the force to be increased above that of the division and the cavalry brigade already told off for the undertaking. News had come that a Turkish force was assembling at Kut under Nur ed Din Bey. Although Nixon made strong representations with regard to his lack of water transport, he perhaps hardly made the danger of advancing beyond 'Amara unless this were substantially increased suffi- ciently clear to authorities far away from the scene of action. Nor, perhaps, was the virtual impossibility of rapidly aug- menting it realized. Townshend was charged with carrying out the proposed advance and early in Aug. his 6th Div. began gradually to push forward up the Tigris. On Sept. 14 he con- centrated his force at Sheikh Sa'd.
On the following day he drove an advanced Turkish force in disarray out of a fortified position at Abu Rumman on the right bank of the Tigris, about 15 m. from Kut, and he then lalted for some days to admit of supplies coming up and of reconnoitring the lines which the enemy had established on both )anks of the river about Es Sinn. On the 28th he attacked Nur ed Din in his entrenched position and completely defeated him,
