the left bank between the channel and the Suwaikiya marshes, was taken in hand. About the end of the year Khalil Pasha assumed command.
Meanwhile the 7th and 3rd Indian Divs. had begun to arrive in the Shatt al 'Arab in the middle of Dec., and Gen. Aylmer took charge of the troops who were to undertake the relief of Kut. Units as they disembarked were pushed on to 'Amara and pro- ceeded thence up the Tigris. The urgency of joining hands with Townshend forbade delay. There was no time to organize the force properly, it lacked powerful artillery for dealing with entrenchments, and the shortage of river transport multiplied its difficulties. The Turks were nevertheless driven out of "All Gharbi and were on Jan. 6 1916 defeated with heavy loss at Sheikh Sa'd. Three days later Aylmer again defeated them, whereupon they fell back to the lines of Hanna at the entrance to the awkward defile on the left bank of the Tigris. The reliev- ing force had hitherto triumphed over every obstacle; but when on the 2ist it essayed the storming of the Hanna position the effort failed; and so numerous were the casualties, coming on the top of losses in the previous actions, that Aylmer had to pause in his offensive and to await reinforcements. About the same date Sir P. Lake succeeded Sir J. Nixon in chief command.
Lake set himself to rectify organization in so far as means permitted, to place Aylmer's line of communications on a better footing, to improve the medical arrangements (which had broken down under the stress of Ctesiphon), and to develop the wharves at Basra and Qurna. Material of all kinds was, however, deficient, and the sands were running out. The Home Government trans- ferred the I3th Div. from Egypt to Mesopotamia on receipt of the bad news from Hanna ; but it was now too late to so expand the water transport as to enable the growing Anglo-Indian army to act with real vigour and independence during the few weeks that Townshend could still hold out. Aylmer attempted no forward movement during Feb.; but on the night of March 7-8, without waiting for the i3th Div., he advanced from near Sheikh Sa'd against the Es Sinn position, intending a surprise. This involved a long march in the dark hours; when day broke part of the force had not arrived; and although the Turks were at first in no great strength the attack was delayed. Then when the assailants ifter a pause of some hours advanced against the reinforced inemy, they were beaten back, and they had to retire to Sheikh Sa'd, having suffered severely in the combat.
The garrison of Kut was already on much reduced rations;
out Gen. Gorringe, who had succeeded Gen. Aylmer, could make
10 fresh attempt for nearly a month owing to transport and sup-
ily problems. However, on April 5 the i3th Div., under Gen.
Maude, stormed the Hanna lines and penetrated well into the
lefile on the left bank of the Tigris; but, when first the 7th Div.,
md then the i3th Div. attacked the Sanna-i-yat lines at the
arther end, they were in each case repulsed. Kut could hold
>ut only a few days longer, so Gorringe now tried to advance
o the right bank. After making some progress on the i7th in
pite of almost 'insuperable difficulties caused by floods, this
novement was brought to a standstill. A final effort was made
.gainst Sanna-i-yat by the 7th Div. on the 22nd, which nearly
ucceeded. Then on the night of the 24th a steamer loaded with
'revisions tried to run the blockade but failed, and on the 2pth
Cut with its garrison of 9,000 British and Indian troops sur-
endered. The attempts to relieve it had cost 24,000 casualties.
The tidings of this very grave mishap gave rise to profound
issatisfaction in the United Kingdom, a dissatisfaction that was
ggravated by information gradually leaking out with regard to
he sufferings of the sick and wounded after the retirement from
Ctesiphon. It was feared that so unmistakable a reverse to
'ritish arms in Asia might exert a more untoward influence in
ie East generally than in the event proved to be the case. As
result of strong feeling in the public mind a commission was,
may be mentioned, set up a few months later by Act of Par-
ament to inquire into the operations that had taken place in
lesopotamia. The commission did not report till nearly a year
ter, when the military situation in the land of the Two Rivers
id come to be very different from that which had prevailed in
May 1916 after the fall of Kut. Its conclusions were to the effect that much in connexion with the undertaking of a campaign on so ambitious a scale without adequate forethought and efficient preparations was worthy of blame, and it animadverted in strong terms on the very unsatisfactory character of the medical ar- rangements during the early stages of the venture.
No reference has been made hitherto to the Russian forces in Persia. These, based on the Caspian Sea, were actually in occupation of a considerable area of the Shah's northern terri- tories. They did not, however, represent a large body of troops, they were operating in a region of wide extent, and the avenues leading from the tracts in their occupation towards the plains of Iraq traversed rugged and unproductive uplands. For mili- tary contingents so situated to have afforded any practical help to the Anglo-Indian army during the critical months that followed Townshend's advance from Kut, was virtually prohibited by the conditions. Nor did their activities furnish indirect assist- ance to their allies by withdrawing any appreciable proportion of the Turkish forces serving under von der Goltz and Khalil Pasha from the theatre of war on the Tigris.
In view of the disaster which British arms had met with a disaster directly traceable to those in authority drifting into a comprehensive scheme of warlike operations without providing the necessary means for prosecuting the campaign it was decided that Kut must if possible be reoccupied. The hot season was, however, at hand. The troops had suffered exhausting trials and had met with cruel loss. Water transport, as well as artillery and war material of almost every kind, remained inadequate. There could be no question of resuming the offensive on the hand-to-mouth lines on which the advance from 'Amara had been initiated a year before, and which Gen. Lake had been obliged to continue when striving against time to relieve Townshend; so that a prolonged pause became inevitable. Von der Goltz had left Mesopotamia and the Turks, as it turned out, manifested no inclination to advance from the scene of their recent triumph they withdrew, on the contrary, from Es Sinn and formed an entrenched camp nearly all round Kut, while holding on to Sanna-i-yat and a period of several months in which no active operations took place set in.
Great developments, however, in the meantime took place on the Anglo-Indian line of communications, as also at Basra and Qurna, thanks to Gen. Lake's representations and to his powers of organization. A reasonable amount of heavy artillery was gradually accumulated. A narrow-gauge railway was laid down leading from Sheikh Sa'd to Es Sinn. Landing facilities at the ports were much improved. An additional division arrived from India. Gen. Gorringe was in July succeeded in charge of the troops at the front by Gen. Maude, who, a few weeks later, replaced Sir P. Lake as army commander.
Although much had been effected by the outgoing army commander in respect to organization, Maude realized that there was yet vital work to be done before his forces could act with effect in this peculiarly conditioned theatre of war. A master of administration and endowed with phenomenal energy, he was resolved not to commit his troops to a formidable undertaking until they were furnished with all that was necessary to insure their mobility and their tactical efficiency. From Sept. till the close of Nov. he laboured unceasingly at the base, enjoying full support from the War Office in London, which had definitely taken over charge of the campaign from the Indian authorities. By the begininng of Dec. he had been furnished with enough river craft, his supply arrangements were in a sufficiently forward state, and he had furthermore a sufficiency of war material at his command, to justify his embarking upon offensive operations of a far-reaching kind, and on the I3th he struck suddenly and with signal success.
Being in occupation of the right bank of the Tigris to a little above Es Sinn, while blocked on the left bank by the fortifica- tions of Sanna-i-yat, the Anglo-Indian army, astride the river, was by the conditions of the case necessarily disposed in echelon, with its left well pushed forward and its right withdrawn. It was organized in two army corps, the I., under Gen. Cobbe, on
