53rd Div., who had to withdraw his right from 'All Muntar.
Early on the 27th his patrols again occupied the hill. But the
Gaza garrison had now been reinforced, and the patrols were
driven off again. The point of junction of the sard and 54th
Divs. was now the apex of an acute salient. The latter divi-
sion, in order to join the former, had had to leave the Sheikh
'Abbas ridge, on which the Turks now appeared. The 54th
Div. and the Camel Bde. on the S.E. face of this salient were
heavily attacked. All attacks were repelled, but the position
towards the apex of the salient grew more and more precarious.
General Dobell, therefore, ordered a further retirement during
the night of the 27th-28th to a strong position on the W. bank of
the Wadi Ghuzze. This movement was successfully carried out
and the action came to an end.
The advance to the Wadi Ghuzze had been effected, covering the further progress of the railway. The enemy had been brought to battle and was now pinned to the Gaza-Beersheba line. Nearly a thousand of the enemy had been taken prisoner, besides two guns, and he had lost several thousand killed and wounded. The cost of this to Sir Archibald Murray was some 4,000 casualties. Gaza, however, and its garrison had escaped, though this was owing to climatic conditions against which both commander and troops were powerless.
In spite of the fact that an unkind fate had snatched away the fruits of complete success just as they were within Gen. Dobell's grasp, in Sir 'Archibald Murray's view the military results of the action had justified his anticipations. The enemy had been brought to battle, and had been severely mauled, and the advance of the railway to the Wadi Ghuzze was assured. It will be remembered that the instructions under which Sir Archibald Murray was acting at this time were to defend Egypt during the summer and to prepare for an offensive campaign in the autumn. The railway could now be pushed forward suffi- ciently to admit of what would be required.
Meanwhile, within three days of the Gaza action, Sir Archi- bald Murray suddenly received altered instructions. The gen- eral strategic situation was again changing. In France the great German retreat was slowing to a halt on the Siegfried line; the preparations for the battle of Arras were in hand, and farther S. the second battle of the Aisne was shortly to begin. In Russia the revolution was fairly launched. In Mesopotamia Sir Stanley Maude was driving the Turks far from Bagdad towards Samarra. Sir Archibald Murray was ordered accord- ingly, on March 30, in view of the altered situation, to make his objects the defeat of the Turks S. of Jerusalem and the occupa- tion of that city. Sir Archibald replied that he still required the five divisions which he had always considered necessary for a. further advance an estimate from which he had never varied ; he also indicated that the prospects of a rapid advance were to say the least doubtful. In reply, he was instructed to push his operations with all energy, though no additional troops could be sent to him, since it was considered that, in view of the military situation of the enemy, his present force would suffice. Un- doubtedly the latter portion of this instruction was unhappily expressed. The War Cabinet, with the whole strategic situation in its view, was no doubt more competent than Sir Archibald Murray to judge of the advisability of taking certain risks on the Palestine frontier, so there can be no question but that the alteration in the instructions was justified. But Sir Archibald Murray, on the other hand, was more competent than the War Cabinet to judge of the actual military situation of the enemy opposed to him, and of the probable sufficiency for their task of the forces of which he disposed. However, immediate prepara- tions were begun for a renewed offensive, and on March 30 Gen. Dobell moved forward the Eastern Force headquarters to Deir el Belah, on the coast some 8 or g m. from Gaza.
If anything was to be done quickly, as the War Cabinet's new instructions evidently contemplated, there was nothing for it but a renewed attack on Gaza. Already Gen. Dobell's thoughts had been turned in the direction of Beersheba; but, in discussing with Sir Archibald Murray the question of operating by his right, he was constrained to say that it was difficult to estimate
how long a delay would be involved in the preparations neces- sary for such an undertaking. The whole of the existing organ- ization, and in particular the position of the railway running close to the sea-coast, restricted the area in which it was imme- diately possible to undertake serious operations on the confines of the desert to within a very strictly limited distance from railhead. To prepare for an effective operation farther to the right would involve weeks of preparation and rearrangement. Sir Archibald Murray decided, therefore, to attack Gaza again, and instructed Gen. Dobejl accordingly.
In any case a vast amount of preparation had to be made. The Turks were daily increasing their force on the Gaza-Beer- sheba line, and it was evident that Gen. Dobell's troops, specially lightly equipped for the passage of the desert, would have to be organized for the battle on more normal lines. The divi- sional artilleries, which had had to be reduced in the desert, had to be increased again; heavy guns and howitzers had to be railed up and heavy artillery groups formed. A few tanks were brought up, and the troops had to be instructed in methods oi cooperation with this new weapon which they had never before seen; they had also to learn the use of gas shell and smoke- clouds. New large-scale maps had to be made and issued, includ- ing trench maps hastily prepared and incessantly revised from aeroplane photographs. Aircraft cooperation with the artillery had to be reorganized. The latest methods, in these and a hundred other matters, found advantageous by experience in more important theatres, had to be hurriedly assimilated by an army which had just painfully emerged from a i5-months' sojourn in the wilderness, and whose last pitched battle, so to speak, had been fought on the Gallipoli Peninsula. The limited capacity of the communications and transport available made the organization of the supply of ammunition and engineer stores a matter of great complexity. Preparations for water supply were far more difficult and arduous still. Arrangement had to be made for bringing up rail-borne water from pipe-line head at Rafa to Deir el Belah, and for pumping it thence by a small pipe-line into tanks prepared in the Wadi Ghuzze. Scores of wells were sunk in the wadi. Several hundred thousand gal- lons storage capacity was prepared at these wells, and by repair- ing and filling the great underground grain-reservoirs of the natives in the neighbourhood. Scores of prepared crossing- places over the Wadi Ghuzze had to be made and allocated to the various formations, arms and transport. Between March 30 and April 15, however, all this work was practically completed, and Sir A. Murray brought up his advanced G.H.Q. to Khan Yunus, on the railway about 6 m. S.W. of Deir el Belah.
By this time the enemy had five divisions and a force of cavalry in line, and he had been considerably strengthened in heavy artillery. The Gaza defences were now strong and well wired, and the Turkish trench system extended S.E. from Gaza for some 7 m. to the Atawine ridge. Farther to the S.E. the defensive system was less continuous, but one division was about Tellesh Sharia (16 m. from Gaza) and between that place and Atawine. Beersheba was also held.
General Dobell disposed of the 52nd, 53rd and s^th Divs., the still incomplete 74th Div. in process of formation from dis- mounted yeomanry, the two mounted divisions of the Desert Column, and the Imperial Camel Bde. The French battleship " Requin," and H.M. Monitors 21 and 31 were also to cooper- ate by fire from the sea when the time came. General Dobell had planned his operations in two stages. The first stage was limited to securing the outer defences from the sea to Sheikh 'Abbas, a commanding feature rather over 4 m. S. of Gaza. The seconc included the attack on the 'Ali Muntar position and Gaza.
The first stage began at dawn on April 17, and success was complete. The 52nd and 54th Divs. took all their objectives by 7 A.M. with but few casualties. The 53rd Div. on their left pushed forward reconnaissances along the coast. One mounted division protected the right of the 54th Div. ; the other watched and immobilized the enemy's force about, and W. of, Tejlesh Sharia. The ground gained was consolidated, and final prepara- tions for the second stage completed on the i8th.
