itrict itself; and on Dec. 20 a provisional agreement was reached. Japan maintained (Dec. 20) that 60 per cent of the quota proposed for the United States and Great Britain on -5-3 pl an was insufficient for her defensive needs, and .ed that it be increased to 70 per cent; her delegates were icially unwilling to sacrifice the " Mutsu," a new capital ip (in large measure paid for by popular subscription) which, under the Hughes plan, would have to be scrapped. This obstacle was overcome by permitting Japan to retain the "Mutsu," on condition that an older ship, the " Setsu," should be scrapped. This change gave Japan two post-Jutland ships and an increased capital-ship tonnage, to offset which it was agreed that the United States should complete two ships still in process of construction, and that Great Britain should con- struct two new vessels not to exceed 35,000 tons each. In replacement tonnage the ratio was to stand thus: United States ind Great Britain 525,000 tons each, and Japan 315,000 tons i ratio of 5-5-3- This agreement was stated to be contingent apon a suitable arrangement for France and Italy, who had lljeen offered a replacement tonnage of 175,000 each. But M. iSarraut, representing France, held out for an aggregate of 350,000 tons, to be constructed on a replacement basis from [1925 onwards. The controversy was finally laid before M. Briand, who had returned to France; he agreed to accept for France the capital-ship ratio of 1-75 as against 1-60 for the United Slates and for Great Britain, but made his consent
- onditional on the obtaining of a larger proportion of auxiliary
- ral't and submarines, which were regarded by France as purely
I defensive weapons. " The idea which dominates the Washington Conference," he telegraphed, " is to restrict naval armaments Iwhich are offensive and costly. But I do not believe that it |!s the programme to deny to a nation like France, which has a arge extent of coasts and a great number of distant colonies, the means of defending its communications and its security."
The French reply settled the problem of capital ships, but |l warm controversy was provoked over submarines, Mr. Bal- iour, on behalf of the British delegation, proposing the complete ibolition of the submarine, on the ground that it was an Inhuman agent of warfare, effective only in illegal attacks upon hommcrce. Mr. Hughes proposed a reduction of submarine .onnage for the United States and Great Britain to 60,000 ppiece, and approximately the status quo for France, Japan, knd Italy (31,500 for the first two, 21,000 tons for the last). IBut the French delegates refused to accept less than 90,000 tons for submarines and 330,000 for cruisers and auxiliary [:raft. Mr. Balfour then made it plain that, failing action against [:he submarine itself, Great Britain could accept no limitation for anti-submarine craft.
As a result, the treaty, as finally agreed upon by the five Inajor Powers, did not include limitation of total tonnage of liubmarine or auxiliary craft. Limits, however, were placed Lpon the total tonnage of aircraft carriers and upon individual j:onnage of capital ships and cruisers, as well as upon the calibre l)f guns carried.
The failure of the British attempt to abolish the submarine ras mitigated by the passage of a series of resolutions presented jy Mr. Root and later embodied in a treaty. As accepted, they itated the rules of international law as to " visit and search " >n the high seas, and declared that belligerent submarines are lot exempt from these rules. They invited the adherence of all
- ivili/,ed Powers to this statement. In the third place, they
ecognized that the use of submarines as commerce destroyers ras practically impossible without violation of these rules, jind that prohibition of such use should be accepted as a law of iiations; they declared the assent of the contracting Powers uo such prohibition and invited that of all other nations. No lefinition of a merchant ship was adopted. In the fourth place, pey declared that commanders of all ships transgressing inter- lational rules should be subject to punishment for piracy. Vircraft limitation was rejected by the Conference, after a Uchnical report of the sub-committee had declared limitation o be impracticable, but an inquiry commission was appointed.
The abolition of the use of poison gas in international warfare,
on the other hand, was advocated by the Naval Committee
Jan. 7 1922, on the motion of Mr. Hughes, and prohibition
of poison gas was embodied in a treaty.
In respect of the problems of the Pacific one of the most important accomplishments of the Conference was the drafting of a new treaty, presented at the plenary session Dec. 10 1921, between the United States, Great Britain, France and Japan. It pledged each to respect the rights of the others in relation to their insular possessions and insular dominions in the Pacific, to accept mediation in case of controversy over these possessions, and to open frank discussions if their rights were threatened by any other Power. The treaty was to remain in force for 10 years, and upon its ratification the Anglo- Japanese Alliance Vas automatically to be terminated. A reservation accompanied the treaty embodying provisions to the effect that it should not be deemed an assent on the part of the United States to "mandates" granted in the Pacific under the Peace Treaty of Ver- sailles, and should not preclude agreements relative to mandated islands.
The reservation also excepted from arbitrable controversies ques- tions lying within the domestic jurisdiction of the contracting Powers. To the treaty was later appended also a second agreement, denning the phrase " insular possessions and insular dominions " in such a way as to exclude Japan proper from its scope. The representatives of the United States and Japan also signed a treaty regarding Yap, according to which the United States was to have free access there on a footing of entire equality with Japan in all that related to cable and radio service, and received certain privileges and exemptions in relation to electrical communications. Subject to various conditions the United States consented to the administration by Japan of the mandated islands in the Pacific north of the equator.
Chinese problems were presented Nov. 16 1921 by Mr. Sze in the form of ten points, which the Conference was asked to adopt. They called for recognition of the territorial integrity and political and administrative independence of China, the "open door ' neutrality, and the complete removal of all political, jurisdictional, and adminis- trative restrictions upon the Chinese Republic.
The general attitude of the Conference towards China was crys- tallized Nov. 21, when four resolutions presented by Mr. Root were adopted. They declared the intention of the Powers' to respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China, their desire to maintain the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations, and their agreement not to seek special rights or privileges. Details of specific arrangements to be enforced led to long discussions. A resolution was adopted (Dec. 24) proyiding for the voluntary withdrawal of foreign post offices from China Jan. I 1923, on condition that China should maintain efficient service and continue the supervision of the foreign co-director general. The problem of extra-territorial rights could not be settled definitely, but it was referred to an inter- national committee for intensive study and report within a year. The demand for the withdrawal of foreign troops from China was referred to a sub-committee, and finally it was agreed that, while the principle of withdrawal was accepted, the issues raised should be made the subject of inquiry, in order to determine the conditions upon which withdrawal must depend. On the other hand the Powers passed a resolution urging China to reduce the large military forces maintained by the military governors. The relinquishment of foreign leaseholds in China was not actually secured (though Great Britain announced her readiness in this respect if other countries would join her) ; but China's fight for " open diplomacy " was virtually won when a resolution was passed (Dec. 8) pledging the nine Powers not to enter into any agreement that might impair the force of the four Root resolutions. As regards the customs tariffs, the demand for China for complete autonomy was not granted, nor the request made, in view of the nation's financial necessities, that her quota be raised from 5% to 12^%. It was decided, however, that China's customs revenue should be increased by $46,000,000 silver annually, through an advance to 5% effective, a surtax of 23%, and a surtax not exceeding 5 % on luxuries. Other resolutions included agreements that foreign radio stations should transmit only Government messages, that there should be no unfair dis- crimination in railway rates, an expression of hope that the railway system might be unified under Chinese Government control, and an agreement for the establishment of a Board of Reference for Far Eastern Questions.
. The question of the Japanese occupation of Shantung entailed long negotiations, which at times seemed dead-locked, especially those relating to the Tsing-tao-Tsinan-fu railway. Largely through the mediation of Mr. Hughes and Mr. Balfour a separate agreement was finally reached between Japan and China and signed Feb. 4. It provided for the return to China of the former German leasehold and 5O-km. zone in Shantung, and the withdrawal of Japa- nese troops and gendarmes; China was to purchase the Tsinan-fu railway for $30,000,000, but, before complete redemption, there were to be appointed a Japanese traffic manager subject to the direction of the Chinese managing director, a Japanese accountant, and a Chinese accountant of equal rank. Japan renounced all rights
