cording to the dictates of predestination, then the commands and prohibitions of the Law would become null and void, and the Law would be completely false, since man would have no freedom of choice in what he does. Moreover, it would be useless, in fact absolutely in vain, for man to study, to instruct, or attempt to learn an art, as it would be entirely impossible for him, on account of the external force compelling him, according to the opinion of those who hold this view, to keep from doing a certain act, from gaining certain knowledge, or from acquiring a certain characteristic. Reward and punishment, too, would be pure injustice, both as regards man towards man, and as between God and man.[1] Suppose, under such conditions, that Simeon should kill Reuben. Why should the former be punished, seeing that he was constrained to do the killing, and Reuben was predestined to be slain? How could the Almighty, who is just and righteous, chastise Simeon for a deed which it was impossible for him to leave undone, and which, though he strove with all his might, he would be unable to avoid? If such were the true state of affairs, all precautionary measures, such as building houses, providing means of subsistence, fleeing when one fears danger, and so forth, would be absolutely useless, for that which is decreed beforehand must necessarily happen. This theory is, therefore, positively unsound, contrary to reason and common sense, subversive of the fundamental principles of religion, and attributes injustice to God (far be it from Him!). In reality, the undoubted truth of the matter is that man has full sway over all his actions. If he wishes to do a thing, he does it; if he does not wish to do it, he need not, without any external compulsion controlling him. Therefore, God very properly commanded man, saying, "See I have set before thee this day life and the good, death and evil .... therefore choose thou life",[2]
- ↑ M. mentions the same argument in the Moreh, but it had often been advanced before him. See Rosin, Ethik, p. 67, n. 2.
- ↑ Deut. XXX, 15. 19. Cf. H. Teshubah, V, 3.
Ethik, p. 5, n. 4, and p. 66, n. 1. Consult on this subject I. Broydé, in J. E., vol. V, art. Free Will, and works mentioned there; Wolff, Acht Capitel, Excursus, III, pp. 84—85; and Cohen, Characteristik, etc., in Moses ben Maimon, I, p. 76.
