Page:Experimental researches in chemistry and.djvu/460

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1857.]
On the Conservation of Force.
445

time, something happens whilst the time is passing which did not happen before, and does not continue after: it is therefore not metaphysical to expect an effect in every case, or to endeavour to discover its existence and determine its nature. So in regard to the principle of the conservation of force; I do not think that to admit it, and its consequences, whatever they may be, is to be metaphysical: on the contrary, if that word have any application to physics, then I think that any hypothesis, whether of heat, or electricity, or gravitation, or any other form of force, which either willingly or unwillingly dispenses with the principle of conservation, is more liable to the charge, than those which, by including it, become so far more strict and precise.

Supposing that the truth of the principle of the conservation of force is assented to, I come to its uses. No hypothesis should be admitted, nor any assertion of a fact credited, that denies the principle. No view should be inconsistent or incompatible with it. Many of our hypotheses in the present state of science may not comprehend it, and may be unable to suggest its consequences; but none should oppose or contradict it.

If the principle be admitted, we perceive at once, that a theory or definition, though it may not contradict the principle, cannot be accepted as sufficient or complete unless the former be contained in it; that however well or perfectly the definition may include and represent the state of things commonly considered under it, that state or result is only partial, and must not be accepted as exhausting the power or being the full equivalent, and therefore cannot be considered as representing its whole nature; that, indeed, it may express only a very small part of the whole, only a residual phenomenon, and hence give us but little indication of the full natural truth. Allowing the principle its force, we ought, in every hypothesis, either to account for its consequences by saying what the changes are when force of a given kind apparently disappears, as when ice thaws, or else should leave space for the idea of the conversion. If any hypothesis, more or less trustworthy on other accounts, is insufficient in expressing it or incompatible with it, the place of deficiency or opposition should be marked as the most important for examination; for there lies the hope of a discovery