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esse suo; and this, though their right to the possession is clear.”

And in the case of Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall. 203-218, Justice Swayne says: “A receiver is not appointed for the benefit of either of the parties, but of all concerned. Money or property in his hands is in custodia legis. He has only such power and authority as are given him by the court, and must not exceed the prescribed limits. The court will not allow him to be tried touching the property in his charge, nor for any malfeasance as to the parties, or others, without its consent; nor will it permit his possession to be disturbed by force, nor violence to be offered to his person while in the discharge of his official duties. In such cases the court will vindicate its authority, and, if need be, will punish the offender by fine and imprisonment for contempt. Where property in the hands of a receiver is claimed by another, the right may be tried by proper issues at law, by reference to a master, or otherwise, as the court in its discretion may see fit to direct.”

Such has been the uniform holding of the courts until recently, since which modifications of the rule have been attempted by a few exceptional adjudications, and by legislative enactments in some of the states. A statute of the kind exists in Ohio. But this statute cannot control the action of this court. Jones on Railroad Securities, § 503; 7 Cent. Law Jour. 146; and Thompson v. Scott, 4 Dillon, 508. Nor can we yield to the modification of the rule adopted by some of the state courts. These decisions have been ably reviewed by Love, J., in the case of Thompson v. Scott, and his refutation of them maintained by a cogency of reasoning that ought, we think, to forever foreclose ail further discussion of the question. Mr. High, who advocates (in an article published in the Southern Law Review) the new doctrine, admits that “the weight of authority is adverse to the exercise of any right of action against a receiver by any court other than that from which he derives his appointment, and to which he is amenable.”

No other theory than that insisted on by us could be prac-