Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 3.djvu/617

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610 FBDEBAL BBFOBTSB. �Caldwell, D. J. The leamed counsel for the plaintiffa concede Mrs. Oliyer's acknowledgment of the deed of trust ia fatally defective. On the showing made Mrs. Oliver ought to be admitted to defend the suit. Lewis v. Drewster, 57 Pa. St. 410; Johnson v. Fullerton, 44 Pa. St. 466; Gantt's Di- gest, §§ 4481-2. In the deed conveying the lands to Mrs. Oliver the grantor declares the conveyance is "a gift of said lànds which I make to my daughter as a portion of my estate, hereby intending to vest in her a separate property under the laws of Arkansas." �The grantor obviously intended to limit the estate to the separate use of Mrs. Oliver. This intention is expressed in terms, and the use of the word "separate," according to the modern English authorities, is sufficient of itself to exclude the marital rights of the husband. Bispham's Eq. § 100; 2 Perry on Trusts, §§ 647, 648; 1 Bishop on Married Womei., §§ 817, 824. �The deed to Mrs. Oliver does not in terms pursue the lan- guago of section 8, '\ 111, of Gould's Digest, but that is not necessary; that act was intended to extend and enlarge the rights of married women to their separate property, and restrict th« common-law rights of the husband in the wife's property. �It certainly was not intended by that act to restrict the operation of the existing and well-settled rules of equity by which a wife was secured in the separate use of her property, and to declare that a conveyance that, by its terms, was in equity sufficient to limit the estate to the separate use of the wife, should no longer have that effect. �Any language in the deed which, prior to the passage of this act, would have been effectuai to limit the estate to the separate use of the wife, was still effectuai for that purpase after the passage of the act. 2 Bishop on Married Women. §§ 90-92. �In the absence of this statute, Oliver would, in equity, have held these lands as trustee for his wife. Under the statute both the legal and equitablç titles were united in her, and, in the language of the act, she was poseessed of them "in her ����