Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 5.djvu/351

BIERBAUER ». WIRTH. S39 �ceeds of the sale of confederate bonds which had been sent by the plaintiff bank to the defendant bank for sale, and which had been sold by that bank and the proceeds carried to the credit of the plaintiff. And the court say : "It may be that no action would lie against a purchaser of the bonds or against the defendant on any engagement made by him to sell. Such a contract would bave been illegal. But, when the illegal trans- action bas been consummated; -when no court bas been called upon to give aid to it; -when the proceeds of the sale bave been actually received, and rcceived in that which the law recognizes as having had value, and when they bave been car- ried to the credit of the plaintiffs, — the case is different. The court is there not asked to enforce an illegal contract. The plaintiffs do not require the aid of any illegal transaction to establish their case. It is enough that the defendants havo in hand a thing of value that belongs to them." �The case at bar is plainly distinguishable from both this case and Armsirong v. Toler. Here the court is called upon to give aid to the enforcement of an unlawf ul contract. The agreement to re-imburse the plaintiff bis expenses ineurred in keeping himself beyond the process of the court was as much infected with the taint of immorality and illegality as was the promise to pay a compensation for the service. It is not the case of a subsequent independent contract between the parties to pay the moneys here claimed, founded on a new consideration and disconnected from the illegal act. It is not the case where an illegal object was accomplished, and the money which was the price of it was then made the con- sideration for a new promise, express or implied. The de- fendants in effect said to the plaintiff if you will do certain aets for the purpose of obstructing public justice we will compensate you for the service and re-imburse you the ex- penses you incur in doing them. Upon this promise the plaintiff acted and paid out bis money. Upon this promise necessarily rests bis right of action, and so it becomes essen- tial, in showing the consideration for the promise, to "unravel the transaction and discover its origin," There was no other consideration for the expenditure of the moneys than ����