CUBTIN V. DECKER. 087 �an examination of the fifth section of the act, -which provides that if, in auj suit remored ^rom a state court to a circuit court of the United States, it shall appear to the satisfaction of said circuit court, at any time after puch suit bas been
- * * removed thereto, that such suit does not really and
substantially involve a dispute or controversy properly within the jurisdiction of said circuit court," the suit shall be dis- missed or remanded to tbs state court. Thus a "dispute or controversy" is spoken of in the present tense; that is, at the time the court considera the question, after the cause bas been removed. �I forbear to enter further upon a discussion of the question, since it bas been so fully considered by other federal judges, vrbose opinions are entitled to great consideration. See Jack- son V. The Mut. Life Ins. Co. 3 Woods, 413; McLean v. The St. Pavl e Chicago Railway Co. 16 Blatchf. 309; and Chicago, St. Louis e N. 0. B. Co. v. McComb, 9 Eep. 569. �In Johnson v, Monell, 1 Woolworth, 390, Mr. Justice Miller held that under the act of 1867, for the removal of causes, the right of removal was not limifced to parties who were citi- zens of different states at the time the suit was commenced, and that, at least by the strongest implication, it provided otherwise. As the langûage ôf the act of 1867 is in substance like that of the act of 1875, the construction put upon the former act by Mr. Justice Miller is strongly: applicable to the statute of 1875. �In McGinnity v. Wkite, 3 Dill. 350, which was a case re- moved under the act of 1866, Judge Dillon cited Johnson v. Monell as authoritative, and, speaking of the aots of 1866 and 1867, said: "As both acts givetbe right to apply for the removal at any time before the trial or final hearing of the cause, I oan see no difference, in this respect, between the act of 1866 and the act of 1867; and the reaso^ing in the case cited (Johnson v. MotteU) seems to be applicable here, and to favor the right of removal." And, although pending the action in the state court the defendant had removed froia the state of which both parties were citizens whenthe action; was commenced, Judge Dillon sustained the right of removal. ����
