Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 9.djvu/24

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STEAM STONE-CUTTER CO. V. 8EABS. 9 �marBlial, aceording to the la-ws of the state, if the attachment could effectually be so made, or the estate be so levied upon in any case in equity. The only questions made are as to whether the court bas the power to issue such writs, and whether the service of such a writ in that manner created a lien that will hold until decree. It bas been the practice of the court for about 30 years to issue such writs, upon cause shown, in this manner, some of which have been served by attaching real estate in this manner, but doubts have arisen lat- terly in respect to the legality of this course. In no case bas the question arisen, so far as is known, except upon the application for the writ, and not then so as to involve appearanee for the opposite party or argument. It is presented now for the first time for do bate, and bas been argued with thoroughness and ability upon each slde. �An attempt bas been made to rest these proceedings upon the gen- erai authority, usage, and practice of courts of chancery. That such courts have issued writs of sequestration from the earliest times is abundantly shown. Hind. 127; Colston v. Gardiner, 2 Ch. Cas. Ai; Francklyn v. Colhoun, S Swanst. 276; Peck v. Crane, 25 Vt. 146. But these writs were always issued in the nature of distresses to compel appearanee or performance of some decree or order, and not for the purpose of creating a mere lien upon property to be held for the satisfaction of a money decree. These proceedings must be maintained, if at all, by the force of the statute of the United States, the rules and practice of the courts in pursuance thereof, and the laws of the state adopted thereby; although the practice of courts of chancery, both ancient and modern, is to be looked into for the purpose of understanding and applying these statutes and rules. �Tbe statutes of the United States make a distinction between common-law causes and equity and admiralty causes as to provision for process, and forms and modes of procedure. For the former, the practice, proceedings, and remedies by attachment and execution of the courts of the states are adopted. Eev. St. §§ 914, 916, 916. For the latter, it is merely provided that — �"The forms of mesne process, and the forms and modes of proceeding in suits of equity and of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, in tho circuit and district courts, shall be according to the principles, rules, and usages which belong to courts of equity and of admiralty respectively, except when it is otherwise provided by statute or by rules of court made in pursuance thereof; but the same shall be subject to alteration and addition by the said courts respectively, and ta regulation by the supreme court, by rules prescribed from time to time to any circuit or district court, not inconsistent with the laws of the tJnited States," Rev.St. §913. ��� �