THEORY OF KNOWING.
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PROP. X.————
before the mind that which was absolutely unintelligible. And thus in tracing back into its history the distinction between sense and intellect, we perceive that, consistently with the character of the problem of the earlier philosophy, and with the method of working it, the senses, although they had to execute a most important function, were fixed, of necessity, as faculties of absolute nonsense—an opinion with which the doctrine advanced in this tenth proposition entirely coincides. Sense was thus fixed as essentially distinct from intellect.
A reason why the truth of this doctrine is not obvious15. The reason why the truth of this doctrine is not at once obvious is, because, although the mind always really apprehends more than what the senses place before it, still it apparently apprehends no more than what the senses place before it. This, at least, is its predicament in its ordinary moods. Hence, it supposes that the senses place before it, not what is nonsensical, but what is intelligible. Its own contribution, however, makes all the difference. If this were abstracted, the residue must be absolutely incomprehensible, because the additament in question (the known self) is necessary, not only to the constitution of the knowledge of this or of that order of intelligence, but to the constitution of the knowledge of intelligence universally. If the inferior animals have no cognisance of themselves (and there is good reason to believe that they have
