PROP. XIII.————
The simply inconceivable by us falls (see Introd. § 68) under the category of the conceivable. We can conceive it as that which is conceivable from involving no contradiction. Hence, although another self is not knowable by me (in the sense of being experienced), and is, moreover, not conceivable by me (in the sense of being conceived as that of which I have had experience), still I can conceive another self as conceivable—that is to say, as non-contradictory. I can do this, because I know and conceive my individual self, and the things by which I am surrounded. But what I can think of as taking place in one instance, I can think of as taking place in an infinitude of instances; or, what is the same thing, I can think of that one case as not the only case of the kind which is possible—in other words, as not exhausting the capabilities of nature in that particular direction. What has happened once, may be conceived to happen again and again. What is possible at all is possible to any extent. My consciousness is both possible and actual, and therefore other consciousnesses are possible; and, by a very easy and reasonable determination of the mind, I can admit them to be actual. With their actual existence, however, I have at present nothing to do. What I am undertaking to show is, not that other me's besides me exist, but only that I can form a conception of other me's besides me, and
