PROP. IX.————
cognition), he must apprehend himself also (this is the innate, or home ingredient in the total cognition); and conversely, that whenever a man apprehends himself (the innate element), he must always apprehend something else, be it a thing or a thought, or a feeling (the foreign element) as well. So that every cognition, or idea, or perception, necessarily consists of two parts, the one of which is native to the mind, and is often denominated a priori—to indicate that it is the essential or grounding element; and the other of which is extraneous to the mind, and is frequently termed a posteriori, to signify that it is the changeable, or accidental, or accruing element It is thus obvious that the doctrine of innate ideas, when properly understood, is merely another form of the doctrine advanced in the first proposition of the epistemology; and, further, that it is merely another phasis of the doctrine of "the universal and the particular" propounded in the sixth proposition of that same section. The me is the innate, or a priori, or universal, part of every cognition, perception, or idea: things, or thoughts, or states of mind whatsoever, (the not-me) are the extranate, a posteriori, or particular part of every cognition, perception, or idea.
22. The circumstance, then, above all others, to be attended to in coming to a right comprehension
