explain how a reflective analysis can go to work upon its materials, these being, on this supposition, the absolutely unknown. On the other hand, does he admit implicit cognition? In that case, I think that there cannot be any very great difference between us; and that, with a little explanatory coaxing, he might be brought round to my side of the question: for if a man admits any implicit cognitions, or, I should rather say, implicit elements of cognition, he may surely accept the ego as among the number. But until I know whether, and to what extent, Mr G. accepts or rejects the doctrine of implied cognitions, I do not see how he and I can properly join issue, either in the way of agreement or disagreement. So much in reference to the ambiguity of which I complain.
For the reason given I shall not go much into argument on the point more particularly in dispute. Let me just say that Mr G.'s doctrine, that we have no cognisance of our present, but only of our past self, is, in my opinion, untenable, for these among other reasons:—
First, I cannot have any cognisance of my past self without distinguishing myself as past from myself as present. But I cannot make this distinction without being cognisant of my present self. Therefore, in being cognisant of my past self, I must always be cognisant (implicitly it may be) of my present self. Secondly, would the words "I am" have any meaning, except in reference to a self
