each would have its own; but the "one" would be common to them all: it would be the same for all. Here, then, in this "one" we have an absolute truth, or at any rate a truth which may be accepted as an illustration of such. If there were no other intellects in the universe except these five, it would, in the strictest sense, be an absolute truth. Here the "one" presenting nothing but what is common and intelligible to all, is to be regarded as a truth of intellect simply—of pure intellect: the "one sensation" again presenting, in each case, something which is peculiar to each intellect, is to be regarded as a truth of modified intellect. Looking at the five cases, we say that, in each case, the "one sensation," in so far as it is one, is an absolute and universal truth; while, so far as it is sensation, it is a relative and particular truth. Such is the explanation of "the absolute;" and it seems not unintelligible if one will keep in view the illustration by which it is enforced. As a farther illustration, this remark may be subjoined. Again consider these five sensations. Each of them is a peculiar sensation; but at the same time each of them is. In so far as each of them is, a truth for pure intellect, an absolute and universal truth, emerges. In so far as each of them is peculiar, a relative and particular truth is presented. Here then we have "number" and "being," two important categories, set forth as specimens of the "absolute."
The analysis thus briefly illustrated is the main principle of the German philosophy in general, and
