tion as a responsible cabinet with the Viceroy interfering as little in policy-making as the King in England. It was on this assumption that the negotiations with Sir Stafford proceeded. They had practically agreed on a formula for dividing the defense of India between the British Commander-in-Chief and the Indian Defense Minister. Then quite suddenly, on April 9, Azad stated, Cripps told him that the British government refused to terminate the Viceroy’s veto power. Thereupon, the negotiations with Cripps broke down. Azad felt that Cripps had made a promise and then discovered that London would not let him keep it. The key to an agreement between Britain and India, Azad declared, is the formation of an Indian provisional coalition cabinet government. The Congress Party did not expect to have a majority of the members of this cabinet, Azad declared.
I asked him what was the mood of the Indian people after the failure of Cripps. He replied, “In part it is one of helplessness. There is also an element of protest. But chiefly it is the feeling that there was no use trying to reach an understanding with the British government. The British have decided to give up nothing. Many Moslems have this impression too.”
Azad said that in the present political climate of India, no Moslem leader could oppose independence. The Moslem League, he declared, was reac-
