that the open refusal so to charge might have misled the jury. But the famous dicta in the opinion of the court, to the effect that the presumption is evidence in favor of the accused, seem clearly indefensible. The late case of Agnew v. United States, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 235, throws some light on the position the Supreme Court really takes on the question. In that case it was assigned as error that the judge charged as follows: " The defendant is presumed to be innocent of all the charges against him until he is proven guilty by the evidence submitted to you. This presumption remains with the defendant until such time, in the progress of the case, that you are satisfied of the guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Also that he refused to give the following instruction: "Every man is presumed to be innocent until he is proved guilty, and this legal presumption of innocence is to be regarded by the jury in this case as matter of evidence, to the benefit of which the party is entitled. This presumption is to be treated by you as evidence, giving rise to resulting proof, to the full extent of its legal efficacy." The court held that the instruction given was quite correct, and substantially covered that requested; that Coffin v. United States was in no way disregarded, as the presumption of innocence was clearly stated. It is the doctrine of the Supreme Court, then, that to tell the jury that the presumption remains with the defendant until his guilt is proved beyond a reasonable doubt, is equivalent to telling them that it is evidence to the benefit of which he is entitled. Does not this look as if the position really taken by the court is that the presumption is a substitute for evidence, and not evidence itself? If the presumption of innocence is a true presumption, this is undoubtedly sound doctrine.
A CASE UNDER THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT. — It is interesting to find the Supreme Court dealing with the application of the Thirteenth Amendment to circumstances entirely unconnected with the race question. That a principle of general application was added to our constitutional law by the amendment is not to be doubted (Story on the Constitution, 5th ed., § 1924), but the question is as to its scope. This came before the court in Robertson v. Baldwin, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 326. The Revised Statutes provide that deserting seamen may be taken before a justice of the peace and by him committed to jail, to be delivered to the master on the sailing of the vessel, or sooner on demand. The court bases its decision that these sections of the Revised Statutes are constitutional on two grounds. One is that this sort of thing has always been found necessary. Provisions of a like character, and often very harsh, are to be found in the law of every maritime nation, beginning with that of the Rhodians. This kind of argument, showing that the framers of the Amendment could not have aimed at the practices complained of, is the regular and satisfactory way of dealing with these questions of interpretation. Nor will the soundness of the result be doubted. It is absolutely certain that those engaged in securing the benefits obtained from the Civil War did not mean to prevent the customary methods of enforcing obligations recognized by civilized nations foremost in the crusade against slavery. The system of discipline on a ship does not resemble slavery. The master is all powerful aboard, but he is answerable in court for his acts when the voyage is over. One of the evils of slavery was its effect upon the dominant race. It is not perceived how the responsibility of the master of a vessel can have an evil influence upon him. Nor is it at all clear how discipline can
