Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 10.djvu/90

64 HARVARD LAW REVIEW. as anything but a plaything or abandoned article, the money within the stocking must be treated as lost property, which was not legally found until the stocking was broken open ; that, the boys being then engaged in a common enterprise, the money came under the control of all, and each had the intention to take possession of part or all of it; the boys should therefore be treated as joint finders. The case, on this ground, appears to be sound in principle as on authority. Merry v. Green, 7 M. «& W. 623; Kobinson v. State, 11 Tex. App. 403; Durfee v. Jones, ii R. I. 588. Property — Landlord's Lien — Bona Fide Purchaser. — A tenant had a crop of corn stored on his premises, subject to a lien in favor of hjf landlord for unpaid rent. This corn was seized by a sheriff, under an attachment order obtained by the landlord. Held, that the sheriff could not hold the corn against one who had purchased it from the tenant without notice of the lien. Scully v. Porter, 43 Pac. Rep. 824 (Kan.). The same result was reached by the Mississippi court in a recent case [Chism v. Thompson, 19 So. Rep. 210). The two cases seem correct. These liens, of course, de- pend wholly on statutes, but there seems to be no good reason, in the absence of express statutory language, why they should be treated differently from common law liens. It was held, however, in Holden v. Cox, 60 Iowa. 449, that, unless the goods on which the lien attached were such as the tenant was keeping for sale, the lien held good against a bona fide purchaser. Property — Purchase for Value — Judgment Creditor. — Held, that a judg- ment creditor is not a purchaser for value, and hence an unrecorded deed takes prece- dence over a subsequent judgment lien. Smith v. Savage, 43 Pac. Rep. 847 (Kan.). This is the more logical position theoretically, as it is impossible to see how a judg- ment creditor can be considered a purchaser for value. Freeman on Judgments, § 366. The decision in this class of cases turns on the statute of the particular juris- diction. In Massachusetts it is provided that an unrecorded deed shall be valid only against the grantor, his heirs and devisees. Mass. Pub. St. c. 120, § 4. The judgment creditor is necessarily protected under this statute. In New York, on the other hand, unrecorded deeds are void only against subsequent purchasers for value and in good faith, and there, consequently, the same result is reached as in the principal case. Schroeder v. Guernsey, 73 N. Y. 430. Quasi-Contracts— Extinguishment of Certificates of Indebtedness through Mist/ kr. — The defendant, the District of Columbia, issued certificates of indebtedness entitling plaintiff to payment for work done on a certain street out of a tax defendant should levy on the abutting property. As the tax was not paid, defendant sold the land to plaintiff, taking these certificates in payment, but title did not pass, since defendant had neglected to secure a lien for the amount of the tax, and the land had been sold to a bona fide purchaser for value, etc. Held, that, defendant being liable on the certificates because of its neglect, the surrender of them by plaintiff and their cancellation was between the parties like the payment of so nmch purchase money, and plaintiff can recover their value in assumpsit, his purchase having been to protect himself, and therefore not voluntary. District of Columbia v. Lyon, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 450- In McGhee v. Ellis, 4 Litt. 244, the purchaser at an execution sale recovered from the judgment debtor by bill in equity, since the latter did not have title. It is con- tended that on principle such an action should be maintainable at law. Keener on Quasi-Contracts, 396. The court did not find it neccessary to rely on this analogy in the principal case, since it was the case of an involuntary payment to protect the interest of the purchaser. That the certificates were surrendered directly in payment would seem to be no reason for distinguishing the case from a cash payment and an extin- guishment of the obligation with the money so paid. It seems difficult to distinguish the principal case on principle from Homestead Co. v. Valley Co., 17 Wall. 153, where it was held that a payment of taxes by one who supposes he is owner is purely volun- tary under mistake of law, and hence he cannot recover money so paid. If the cases are not reconcilable, the doctrine of the principal case is preferable. Keener on Quasi- Contracts, 380. Suretyship — Securities Given to Indemnify Surety— Rights of Cred- itor. — The maker of a note deposited securities with his surety out of which the surety might reimburse himself in case he had to pay the note. Both maker and surety having become insolvent, the payee of the note filed a bill in equity asking that the securities be applied in payment of his note. Held, that upon the insolvency of the principal the surety had a right to apply the securities in payment of the note, and to that right the payee, especially in view of surety's insolvency, was entitled to be subrogated. First Nat" I Bank v. Wheeler, 33 S. W. Rep. 1093 (Texas). The cases are in a hopeless state of confusion as to what circumstances, if any, give