Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 12.djvu/156

136 HARVARD LAW REVIEW. stitution began to change ; States were allowed a broader police power ; the control of interstate commerce was held not to be exclusive in Con- gress, and in the absence of federal legislation States were allowed to act. Chancellor Kent and Story were indeed disturbed ; but the Chief Justice drew the line firmly and allowed no dangerous intrusion upon the powers of Congress. Upon circuit his services were valuable ; he was dignified, courteous, practical. In a case once for the infringement of a copyright in a song, he had a witness sworn to sing to the jury the two songs in question, while he gravely suppressed the merriment in the court-room. His manner was kindly, though he seems to have lacked a sense of humor. In spite of his ability, however, Taney was several times, to say the least, impohtic. As often happens, integrity became stubborn- ness ; and he would carry out his views with a logical severity which was often ill-timed and unnecessary. One instance of this failing has been already noted, the removal of the public funds from the National Bank ; another instance was his opinion in the Dred Scott Case. But though his acts in these cases were ill-advised and unbalanced, they were never corrupt ; his integrity was morbidly severe. Taney's last years were sad- dened by his conflict with the executive at the outbreak of the Civil War, when he felt that the Constitution was being set at naught. But there again his distorted constitutional views of the slavery question seemed to pervert his judgment; and while his theory in regard to the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus was right, he misapplied it ; and placed his court in an undignified position by asserting its authority over the military forces at the seat of war and attempting to punish military authorities for contempt. Yet on most of the questions under the Constitution few men ever have added so much to our law as Taney. While Taney was Chief Justice a vacancy occurred on the bench in 185 1. To fill this vacancy President Fillmore appointed Benjamin Rob- bins Curtis of Massachusetts. He was a graduate of Harvard College, a cultivated man, and although hardly a scholar outside the sphere of the law, in the highest sense a gentleman. His study of law began at the Harvard Law School, where he had the benefit of Story's lectures. With- out finishing his course there, however, he began practice at Northfield, Massachusetts. Soon he removed to B )ston, and rapidly rose in the Suffolk bar. His success was due to the accuracy and range of his knowledge and to the clearness of his statement and argument. He was never eloquent, but a fine presence gave weight to his words. Curtis was a strong man and independent, but so even-tempered and poised that he was never driven from his strictly judicial state of mind. One of his greatest works was the report which he wrote for the Commission of the Massachusetts Legislature, in 185 1, upon reforming the procedure of the courts then in vogue. This report was practically embodied in the Practice Act, and the event has proved the quality of the work ; for while under the New York Code the New York reports are full of cases on the pleadings, a pleading case is almost unknown in the Supreme Court of Massachusetts. When appointed Associate Justice of the Supreme Court at Washington, Curtis was well chosen in view of the troubled times that followed the compromise of 1850. All of his calmness and independence was put to the test. The Dred Scott case contrasted Curtis and the Chief Justice, much to the advantage of the former. Curtis's dissenting opinion is a model of legal reasoning, and convincing; the Chief Justice missed his mark by committing himself upon the constitutionality of the